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VOLUME 43 SPRING 1966 NUMBER 2
OIL AND GAS FINANCING UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE





Colorado has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, effective
July 1, 1966.1 It is the purpose of this article to review briefly the
mechanics of perfecting a security interest under the Code and to
discuss in detail the application of specific Code provisions to oil
and gas financing.2 Particular emphasis will be placed upon filing
and priority problems in Colorado.3
In general, Article 9 of the Code is intended to replace the
various acts which previously regulated security interest in personal
property.' In the interest of uniformity, Article 9 includes rules for
the perfection of practically every type of consensual security interest
in personal property but does not cover security interest in real
estate,5 except insofar as "fixtures" are involved.' This realty-
personalty distinction is particularly crucial in oil and gas financing.
If a security interest in real estate is involved, real estate recording
laws are applicable. If a security interest in personal property is
*Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; member Colorado Bar; B.A.
Amherst College, 1962; LL.B. Harvard University, 1965.
tAssociate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; member Colorado Bar; B.B.A.
University of Wisconsin, 1962; LL.B. University of Wisconsin, 1964.
'Colo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 330; Vol. 7A, COLO. REV. STAT. (1963) ch. 155. For
convenience, subsequent references will be made to Uniform Code sections only.
2 Discussion of financing problems which may be unique to shale oil is beyond the scope
of this article. For a general treatment of oil shale matters unrelated to finance see the
Oil Shale Symposium 43 DEN. L.J. 1-90 (1966).
3 For a general discussion of the Code as it relates to oil and gas financing, see Vagts,
The Impact of The Uniform Commercial Code on the Oil and Gas Mortgage, 43
TEXAS L. REV. 825 (1965).
4 General Chattel Mortgage Act [COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1-1 to -20 (1963)] ; Inven-
tory Chattel Mortgage Statute [COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2-1 to -13 (1963)] ; Accounts




involved, Article 9 of the Code is applicable and the Code "security
agreement" and "financing statement" come into play.7 If the
collateral changes from realty to personalty, as may occur at the
moment of extraction of oil and gas,' then both bodies of security
law apply at different times. The realty-personalty distinction as it
applies to oil and gas interests in Colorado is discussed in Part I
of this article.
At this point, a brief review of the mechanics of Article 9 will
provide a useful background for the discussion to follow. The key
to Article 9 is "perfection"; that is, Article 9 is designed to regulate
uniformly the perfection of various types of security interests in
personalty as against third parties. Adoption of the Code eliminates
existing inconsistencies arising from perfection of various security
interests in the same collateral pursuant to separate statutory pro-
visions. In general, Article 9 provides that a security interest is
perfected when:
(a) there is an agreement that a security interest attach;' and
(b) value is given;" and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral; 11 and
(d) a financing statement is filed.'
Some exceptions are made for perfection by possession, "3 and
certain types of purchase money security interests are exempted
from the filing requirement." The above rules of perfection are
7 Section 9-102(1) (a).
8 Section 9-204(2) (b). See, e.g., Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399
(1897).




12 Section 9-302 (1). The contents of the financing statement are prescribed by § 9-402.
It must give the addresses of the debtor and the secured party and must, with few
exceptions, be signed by both parties. A copy of the security agreement may be filed
as a financing statement if it contains the requisite information, but care should be
taken to assure that the secured party has signed the instrument in addition to the
debtor.
Special attention should be given to the provision of § 9-402 (1), which requires
that both parties "sign" a financing statement. A few liberal courts have held that the
signature requirement was satisfied where a party "signed" in some manner other
than manually. [See In re Horvath Bankruptcy No. 31477 (D. Conn. 1963) and
Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F. 2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965) (typewritten signatures suffi-
cient) ; contra, In re Kane, 55 Berks Co. L.J. (E.D. Pa. 1962) (photostatic copy of
executed financing statement insufficient).] However, Colorado has added to that
section a requirement that a financing statement be manually signed by the parties.
Although this special provision clearly indicates that typewritten signatures or photo-
static copies of executed financing statements will not suffice for filing in Colorado,
the question remains whether a carbon copy of a manual signature will meet the statu-
tory requirernent. [See Op. AwnT. GEN. OKLA., No. 63-299 (1963), i U.C.C. Rep.
790.]
13 Section 9-305.
14 Sections 9-302(1 ) (c) and (d).
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generally applicable to oil and gas financing transactions, except as
noted in specific instances in the text discussion which follows.
A financing statement may cover both the extracted hydro-
carbons and the proceeds thereof.15 It is only necessary that the
financing statement designate that proceeds of the collateral are
claimed. It should be noted that under Section 9-307(1) a pur-
chaser of extracted hydrocarbons in the ordinary course of business
will take free of a security interest in the hydrocarbons even though
the purchaser knows of the existence of the security interest." This
provision is consistent with the need for marketability of the ex-
tracted hydrocarbons and does not adversely affect the secured party's
interest in the proceeds of production.
Attention should also be given to Section 9-203(1) (b) which
requires that a security agreement creating a security interest in oil
or gas to be extracted include a description of the land concerned.
Although no similar requirement is made as to a financing statement
covering oil and gas to be extracted, it is suggested that the legal
description of the land should also be included in the financing
statement to satisfy Section 9-110, which requires reasonably accurate
identification of the property covered by the statement.
As a practical matter, one of the primary advantages of code
filing as to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds is that it relieves
the lender from dual filing under present chattel mortgage and
accounts receivable statutes and greatly reduces periodic refiling
presently required by those statutes. The five year initial filing period
and five year continuation periods" will be much less burdensome
to the lender than the considerably shorter initial filing periods and
annual renewals presently required for chattel mortgages and assign-
ments of accounts receivable in Colorado."
The place for filing required by the Code is contingent upon
classification of the collateral. Basically, all types of Code collateral
involved in an oil and gas financing context would be goods19 (which
are further subclassified by Section 9-109 into four categories: con-
15 Sections 9-306, 9-402(2) (b).
16 Under the pre-Code Inventory Mortgage Act, a question existed whether extracted
hydrocarbons awaiting sale and delivery in the ordinary course to a purchaser consti-
tuted "inventory." If they were considered "inventory," an opposite result would
attach under the Act and a purchaser who had actual knowledge of the existence of a
security interest could not take free of that interest. Since it is the intention of the
parties that the security interest continue only in the proceeds of the sale of goods in
the ordinary course of business, few lenders will mourn the repeal of this provision
by enactment of the Code. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-2-7 (1963).
17 Section 9-403(2) (3).




sumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory); accounts,
contract rights or general intangibles;" and proceeds. 1 Various types
of production machinery and equipment used in oil and gas opera-
tions may be classified as "equipment."' Extracted hydrocarbons
awaiting delivery to a purchaser would probably be classified as
"inventory."' The filing provisions adopted in Colorado provide
for (i) local filing for consumer goods and farm interests, (ii) local
filing for fixtures, and (iii) central filing for all other interests.'
Thus, central filing in the office of the Secretary of State would be
proper as to all oil and gas financing transactions involving per-
sonalty in Colorado, except where local filing may be necessary
with respect to fixtures included in the mortgaged property. Certain
filing problems pertaining to fixtures are discussed in Part IX of
this article.
I. OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
PERSONAL PROPERTY OR INTERESTS
IN REAL ESTATE?
The vital question under the Code is whether various oil and
gas interests - landowners' mineral and royalty interests, leasehold
estates, overriding royalties, production payments and net profits
interests - are personal property or interests in real estate. Section
9-104(j) provides that Article 9 does not apply "to the creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease."
Presumably, this exclusionary rule is necessary to prevent conflict
between the real estate recording laws and the filing provisions of
the Code. Although direct case authority in Colorado is scanty, it
may be generally concluded that all of the above-mentioned oil and
gas interests, with the possible exception of the net profits interest,
are "interests in real estate" for recording purposes and thus ex-
cluded from the filing provisions of Article 9.
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that the landowner's
mineral estate is "an interest in the real property''25 and that his roy-
alty interest under a lease is "born of and is a part of the land itself."'





24Sections 9-401(1)(a), (b), and (c).
25 Simson v. Langholf, 133 Colo. 208, 217, 293 P.2d 302, 307 (1956). Sce also, Moshiek
v. Lininger, 130 Colo. 266, 274 P.2d 965 (1954).
2 6
Cruse v. Marston, 112 Colo. 291, 294, 148 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1944) (royalty income
to Colorado resident from Texas oil lands held to be derived from tangible property
within the meaning of a surtax provision of the Colorado income tax law).
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the lessee's interest and interests created from it, the majority rule,"
and the general opinion of the Colorado Bar, is that such are "inter-
ests in real estate"' for mortgage recording purposes.'
An argument to exclude oil and gas leasehold interests from
the operation of the Code may be derived from the portion of Sec-
tion 9-104(j) which speaks of "real estate, including a lease." One
construction of this provision is that "lease" includes a mineral
lease, and that an oil and gas leasehold is an interest in real estate
for Code purposes regardless of its characterization under prior
state law. If this construction is sound, it follows that the Code
expressly overrides any state law which suggests that a leasehold
interest may be something other than realty. This interpretation,
however, overlooks the underlying policy of Section 9-104 (j), which
is to defer to state law for a determination between interests in realty
and personalty. The preferable construction, therefore, is that a lease
is excluded from the rules of Article 9 only if it constitutes, under
state decisional law, "an interest in real estate."
A more persuasive argument to exclude oil and gas leaseholds
27 Representative jurisdictions applying the majority rule are Oklahoma [Continental Sup-
ply Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803
(1946)]; Texas [Carroll v. Holliman, 336 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1964)] ; and Cali-
fornia [Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788 (1935)].
In New York, an oil and gas leasehold and interests carved out of it constitute
personalty, by statute. N.Y., General Construction Law, § 39; Wagner v. Mallory,
169 N.Y. 501, 62 N.E. 584 (1902).
Kansas appears to be the only state which holds, in the absence of a clear statutory
provision, that an oil and gas leasehold is personalty for recording purposes. Shields
v. Fink, 190 Kan. 17, 372 P.2d 252 (1962). Kansas has enacted the Code effective
January 1, 1966. Thus, a Colorado bank financing development of a Kansas lease
must file under the Code as to the leasehold itself. Real estate recording would pro-
vide additional protection in Kansas. See KAN. STAT. ANNO. 58-2221 (1963).
28 Use of the phrase "interest in real estate" may lead to confusion in interpretation of
§ 9-104(j). This confusion stems from the fact that according to traditional property
law interests in land may be classified as either personal property or real property.
All interests in land of lesser dignity than a freehold estate, such as a term for years,
are traditionally regarded as chattels real; that is, personal property interests in land.
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 98 (1949). Thus, a question is presented whether the
Code draftsmen intended by § 9-104(j) to exclude from operation of Article 9 all
interests in real estate, whether traditionally regarded as realty or personalty. This
formalistic distinction is particularly important in states such as Colorado, which have
not yet ruled that the lessee obtains ownership of the oil and gas in place. Contra, see
Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 '(1923).
If the language of § 9-104(j) is literally interpreted, there is no question that an oil
and gas leasehold estate and other interests created from it are interests in real estate
excluded from the operation of Article 9, since that section does not differentiate as to
chattels real. For a general discussion of the realty-personalty classification of interests
in land see 1 WILLIAMS & MEYER., OIL AND GAS LAW, § 212 (1964). Moreover, in
Radke v. Union Pac. R.R., 138 Colo. 189, 207, 334 P.2d 1077, 1087 (1959) the court,
in construing an ambiguous mineral reservation in a deed as a "license," added by way
of dictum: "Under a lease an interest-or estate-in the land itself is created, which
is not true of a mere license." (Emphasis added.)
29 There is no question that an oil and gas lease is an instrument affecting the title to
real property, subject to the Colorado real estate recording statute. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 118-6-9 (1963). See Brice v. Pugh, 143 Colo. 508, 354 P.2d 1024 (1960). It seems




from operation of the Code can be fashioned from Section 9-204(2)
(b), which provides that "the debtor has no rights ... in oil, gas, or
minerals until they are extracted." This provision seems clearly in-
tended to keep under the real estate recording laws any type of
security interest relating to unextracted hydrocarbons.
The weight of authority in other jurisdictions and the treatment
of a landowner's interest in unextracted oil and gas as realty in
Colorado, lead to the conclusion that an oil and gas leasehold estate
and the interests created from it constitute "interests in real estate"
within the meaning of Section 9-104 (j) 30
Assuming that the oil and gas leasehold is "an interest in real
estate" exempted from Code filing, it would seem to follow that
other interests created from the leasehold estate, such as overriding
royalty interests and production payments, are similarly exempted. The
one interest, however, which may partake more of the qualities of
personalty, is the "net profits interest."'" There is some indication
from the cases, at least by way of dictum, that a net profits interest is
a mere contract light. 2 Under such a classification, a mortgage of a
30 There is authority in Colorado that an oil and gas lessee does not obtain a "vested"
property interest in the hydrocarbons in place until hydrocarbons are produced from
the leasehold in paying quantities. In other words, the lessee's interest in Colorado
may be "inchoate" until the hydrocarbons are discovered on the leasehold in paying
quantities. See generally, March, The Interest of Landowner and Lessee in Oil and Gas
in Colorado, 25 ROCKy MT. L. REV. 117 (1953). Several older Colorado decisions
hold that long-term, or "no term" leases with delay rental provisions, may be termin-
able by the lessor if the lessee fails to develop the premises for oil and gas
within a certain period of time. Florence Oil & Ref. Co. v. Orman, 19 Colo. App. 79,
73 Pac. 628 (1903) ; Lanham v. Jones, 84 Colo. 129, 268 Pac. 521 (1928). These
authorities suggest that the lessee has an interest in the nature of a revocable license
rather than a vested property interest in the unextracted minerals. The general rule,
by contrast, seems to be that a lessee's interest is fully vested upon execution of the
lease. See, e.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918). Where the
parties expressly contract for payment of delay rentals to perpetuate the leasehold
estate during the primary term prior to drilling or production, the lessor does not, of
course, have the right to revoke the lease if rentals have been timely paid. Although
the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet passed on the nature of the lessee's interest
under a modern "unless" form of oil and gas lease, it is possible that prior authority will
lead the court to perpetuate the "revocable license doctrine," which conditions vested
ownership in the lessee upon a discovery of hydrocarbons in paying quantities.
However, none of these older Colorado cases suggests that the lessee's interest,
whether or not inchoate prior to discovery, is not "an interest in real estate." There-
fore, they should not alter the conclusion that the real estate recording laws are appli-
cable to a mortgage of an oil and gas leasehold interest, and that the filing rules of
Article 9 are applicable only as to extracted hydrcarbons. But, see Hoagland, A Form
of Mortgage and Assignment of Oil and Gas Production, 34 DICTA 226 (1957),
where it is stated that Colorado is "in mid-air" as to whether a lessee's interest and
related interests are "interests in land."
31 The net profits interest is a share of gross production from a producing property,
measured by the net profits from operation of the property. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, § 424.1 (1964).
3 In LeBus v. LeBus, 269 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), there was an alleged oral
agreement that, in consideration for services in acquiring a leasehold for X, Y would
be entitled to one-fourth of the net profits, if any, resulting from operation of the
lease. The court stated that this transaction created a mere contractual right to have a
share of the profits paid over when earned-"a profit-sharing agreeirent"-rather
than a vested partnership interest in the realty. Contra, Greenleaf v. S. A. Camp Gin-
ning Co., 150 Cal. App. 385, 309 P.2d 943 (1957).
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net profits interest would presumably constitute a security interest in
a "contract right" within the meaning of Section 9-106, and Code
filing would be necessary to protect the mortgagee. 3 Despite the
contractual quality of the net profits interest, it is submitted that it
should also be treated as an "interest in real estate" for purposes of
the recording statutes.34 However, for complete protection, real estate
recording and Code filing should be accomplished where a net profits
interest is included as part of the collateral.36
This article will proceed on the assumption that an oil and
gas leasehold estate and other interests fashioned from it are "in-
terests in real estate" and are not subject to the filing requirements
of Article 9.
Despite the classification difficulties as to interests in un-
extracted hydrocarbons, it is clear under the Code that the extracted
hydrocarbons become personalty subject to the rules of Article 9.36
In addition, the general rules of Article 9 are applicable to the
various types of equipment and machinery used in oil and gas opera-
tions, insofar as such machinery and equipment remain personalty
under the decisional law of Colorado. If goods become fixtures, Sec-
tion 9-313 provides special rules for ascertaining the priority of
conflicting security interests in the fixtures and the real estate.
In many respects, financing of the oil and gas industry involves
considerations common to other industries. For example, the use of
after acquired property clauses and future advance provisions is as
commonplace in the oil and gas mortgage as in the mortgage of an
automobile dealer's inventory. 7 However, the types of collateral
covered by an oil and gas mortgage may present special problems
under Article 9 which are not usually encountered in other areas of
finance. Although implimentation of the Code will eliminate certain
inconsistencies in present law, the broad base of Article 9 will
inevitably provide a breeding ground for new problems to replace
33 Section 9-103 provides that filing as to contract rights must be made in the state where
the assignor keeps his records concerning them.
34 For a strong opinion to this effect, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 31,
§ 424.1.
35 Careful draftsmanship may also help to detract from the contract right theory. A net
profits interest created and conveyed as an interest in real estate measured by profits
derived from operation of the property would be less susceptible to interpretation as
a mere contractual interest.
36 Section 9-204(2) (b). See also, 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 31, § 212.
37 See generally, Voorhees, Financing Oil and Gas Operations on Credit-Mortgages
and Liens, FIFTH ANNUAL ROcKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 365 (1960) ;
Johnson, Legal Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF OIL
AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 141 (1958).
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the old. The remainder of this article will explore some of these
problem areas unique to oil and gas financing under the Code.38
II. FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
Personal property security interests in federal oil and gas leases
seem at first glance to present a special problem. Section 9-302(3)
states that "The filing provisions [of Article 9J do not apply to a
security interest in property subject to a statute ... (a) of the United
States which provides for . . . filing of all security interests in such
property." (Emphasis added.) Under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920"9 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto, it is provided
that:
Except for assignments of royalty interests all instruments of trans-
fer of a lease or of an interest therein... must be filled for approval
within 90 days from the date of final execution .... 40
Although the regulation appears to be phrased broadly enough
38The most immediate practical problem for oil and gas financers, as well as for other
lenders, will be the problem of transition to the new law when it becomes effective
July 1, 1966. Oil and gas financing arrangements are usually long-term affairs in-
volving after-acquired property, future advances and renewal filings. What happens
to pre-Code loans when the new law comes into effect? Must lenders file anew when
the Code becomes law? May pre-Code transactions be brought under the Code if
the parties desire to do so? Where are post-Code renewal filings made? Will refiling
under the Code bring with it all the substantive law of Article 9, which is generally
more advantageous to the lender than the old law?
Section 10-101 of the Code attempts to answer these questions by providing that:
Transactions validly entered into prior to the effective date ... and the rights,
duties, and interests flowing from them remain valid thereafter and may be
terminated, completed, consummated, or enforced as required or permitted
[by prior law].
Although this provision presents problems too numerous for discussion in this article,
the following may be stated as a series of general conclusions: a bank financing a pre-
Code oil and gas loan may keep the old filings alive and file status statements under
the pre-Code statutes, even after the Code becomes effective. The substantive law of
the repealed statutes will in every way continue to control pre-Code loans until a new,
post-Code "transaction" is created by reexecution of the instrument securing the loan,
or until the parties enter a choice-of-law contract binding them to the substantive law
of the Code and to its filing requirements. See Clark, U.C.C. Articles 9 and 10: Some
Problems Solved and Some Problems Created, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 99 (1965). For
difficulties raised in connection with transition to the Code in other states, see Janover
and Dulles, The Application of the Transistion Provisions of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 10 to Chattel Security Filing, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1027 (1964) ; Auerbach
& Goldston, Variations in the Ohio Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code,
14 W. REs. L. REV. 22, 51 (1962).
39 41 Stat. 437 (1920) ; as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 181-94 (1964).
40 43 C.F.R. § 3128.2(a) (1) (1965). In addition, certain procedural benefits are de-
rived from filing a mortgage in the Land Office. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-6(d) (1965) and
43 C.F.R. § 1850.0-6(d) '(1965) provide:
Transferees and encumbrancers of land, the title to which is claimed or
is in the process of acquisition under any public land law shall, upon filing
notice of the transfer or encumbrance in the proper land office, become en-
titled to receive and be given the same notice of any contest appeal, or other
proceeding thereafter initiated affecting such interest which is required to
be given to a party to the proceeding. Every such notice of a transfer or en-
cumbrance will be noted upon the records of the land office. Thereafter such
transferee or encumbrancer must be made a party to any proceedings thereafter
initiated adverse to the entry.
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to include mortgages within its terms, a memorandum 1 from regional
counsel of the Department of the Interior has implied that approval
of a mortgage of a federal lease is not required. Thus, mortgages
are commonly accepted by Land Offices for filing in the case files
without the necessity of approval. This, in turn, raises a question
whether the Mineral Leasing Act "provides for ... filing of all
security interests" in federal oil and gas leases and thereby excludes
filing under Article 9.
Although parties who search the Land Office records may
obtain actual notice of instruments on file, a troublesome question
exists whether the records are also sufficient to impart constructive
notice. With this problem in mind, most attorneys advise that a
mortgage of an interest in a federal lease be recorded in the county,
as well as filed in the Land Office. Such dual filing protects the
mortgagee from the uncertainties which stem from the fact that
the Mineral Leasing Act is not a federal recording statute. Failure
to record in the county has in some cases led to loss of priority as
against subsequent purchasers of an interest in the federal lease."2
However, the opposite result has also been reached by theory of
"implied actual notice" or "judicial notice." 3
The answer to this problem may be found, in part, in the
Official Comment to Section 9-302(3), which refers to specific
federal recording statutes which preempt the field, as for mortgages
on aircraft" or railroads. 5 At present, the Mineral Leasing Act and
regulations lack the specificity of the federal recording statutes cited
in the Official Comment. Thus, it is likely that filing under Article 9
will be required, in addition to Land Office filing, where chattel
security interests in federal oil and gas leases are involved. In light
of the more recent cases dealing with the Land Office record notice
problem, 8 the prudent lender would be well advised to accomplish
dual filing until the problem is resolved by legislative action. How-
ever, if a mandatory federal recording statute is added to the Mineral
41Memorandum to Regional Administrator, Region VI, GS-BLM-1953-100 (July 14,
1953).
42 Bolack v. Underwood, 340 F2d 816 (10th Cir 1965); Torgeson v. Connelly, 318 P 2d
63 (Wyo. 1959); Dame v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959).
43Krueger v. United States, 246 U.S. 69 (1918); Brush v. Ware, 40 U.S. (15 Peters)
93 (1841); South v. Wishard, 146 Cal. App. 2d 276, 303 P.2d 805 (1956) ; Arnold
v. Universal Oil Land Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 522, 114 P.2d 408 (1941) ; Livermore v.
Beal, 18 Cal. App. 2d 535, 64 P.2d 987, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 712 (1937) ; Gabbs
Exploration Co., 67 Interior Dec. 160 (1960) ; James C. Forsling, 56 Interior Dec.
281 (1938).
63 Stat. 940 (1949), 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
66 Stat. 724 (1952), 49 U.S.C. § 20(c) (1964).
46 See cases cited note 42 supra.
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Leasing Act,47 the Code would become clearly inapplicable to per-
fection of security interests in federal oil and gas leases.48
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS
One of the more important changes which will occur upon
implimentation of the Code in Colorado pertains to a mortgage by a
corporate debtor which covers both realty and personalty. Such
a "mixed mortgage" is commonplace in oil and gas financing. The
General Chattel Mortgage Act presently provides that if the mixed
mortgage is recorded in the real estate records of the appropriate
county, it shall also be a lien against the mortgaged personalty with-
out the necessity of complying with the filing provisions of the
General Chattel Mortgage Act. 49 It could be argued that filing
would nevertheless be required as to inventory and accounts re-
ceivable, which are generally controlled by the Inventory Chattel
Mortgage Statute and Accounts Receivable Law, rather than the
General Chattel Mortgage Statute. However, there is some authority
for the proposition that failure to comply with the applicable filing
provisions of the Inventory Mortgage Act and Accounts Receivable
Law will bring the transaction within the provisions of the General
Chattel Mortgage Act." Thus, under pre-Code law the lender could
be reasonably certain that a single recording pursuant to the General
Chattel Mortgage Act would suffice to cover both the realty and
the personalty of the corporate mortgagor. Enactment of the Code in
Colorado will upset this simplified scheme of perfection and require
Code filing in addition to real estate recording.
With respect to proceeds arising from the sale of extracted
4 Such an amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act was recently advocated by Senator
Gordon Allott in an address before the Association of American Petroleum Landmen
on June 25, 1965.
48 Analogous problems concern security interests in oil and gas leases issued by the
State of Colorado. Section 9-302(3) (b) exempts from the filing provisions of Article
9 security interests in property subject to a statute "[o]f this state which provides for
central filing of security interests in such property .... (Emphasis added.) Al-
though COLO. REv. STAT. § 112-3-10 (1963) provides that the records "kept by
the state board of land commissioners shall be a part of the public records of said
board and shall be open to inspection," this section does not purport to be a record-
ing statute.
49 COLO. REv. STAT. § 21-1-9 (1963). An interesting question is presented as to whether
this statute is intended to relieve the mortgagee from filing as a chattel mortgage with
respect to personalty kept in counties other than the county where the mortgaged real
estate is situated. Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 21-1-4(2) (1963). This uncertainty will
be mooted by enactment of the Code.
50 Exchange Nat'i Bank v. Hough, 258 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1958). The Hough case,
however, also suggests that compliance with the more stringent requirements of the
General Act, such as direct application of the proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness,
would be necessary if the Inventory Mortgage Act and Accounts Receivable Law were
not complied with. Id. at 789-90.
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hydrocarbons, Section 9-306(3) provides in effect that a perfected
security interest in hydrocarbons will be automatically perfected in
the proceeds thereof for ten days after the debtor receives the pro-
ceeds. The security interest will be continuously perfected if the
financing statement on file states that it covers proceeds or if a
financing statement covering proceeds is filed before expiration
of the ten day period. This ten day "grace period" for perfection
has no counterpart under the present Accounts Receivable Law.
Moreover, a security interest in proceeds, whether perfected initially
or during the ten day period, will be continuously perfected against
third parties, including a trustee in bankruptcy or a levying creditor,
as to accounts and cash proceeds identified according to the tracing
rules of Section 9-306(4).
A more subtle problem may be encountered under Code law
concerning express subordination agreements. The Code authorizes
"subordination by agreement by any person entitled to priority."'-
Contractual subordination of competing security interests has been,
and will continue to be, an important tool in oil and gas financing.
As has sometimes been the practice, subordination agreements have
not been placed of record. However, under the Code a serious ques-
tion exists whether a subordination agreement constitutes a 'security
interest" and is subject to the filing rules of Article 9.52 Until this
question is resolved, parties to a subordination asreement would be
well advised to file under the Code if practicable.
IV. EQUIPMENT AND MOTOR VEHICLE:S
"Equipment" is defined in Section 9-109(2) as goods used or
bought for use in business. Rigs, pumps, drilling apparatus and
other machinery used upon the oil and gas leasehold would pre-
sumably fall under this definition.53 Often equipment used in lease-
hold operations is motorized or attached to motor vehicles. For ex-
ample, some types of modern drilling rigs are self-propelled vehiclCs.
The Code,' read in connection with the Colorado Certificate of Title
5' Section 9-316.
52 See Zinman, Under the Spreading U.C.C.-Subordinations and Article 9. 7 B.C. IND. &
COMM. L. REv. 1 (1965). Coogan, Kripke and Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Aloney and Deposits, Negative Pledge
Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARV. L. REv. 229 (1965).
53 "Consumer goods" are defined in § 9-109(1) as goods "used or bought for use pri-
marily for personal, family, or household purposes." Because oil and gas equipment
does not ordinarily constitute consumer goods, there need be no itemization of the
equipment to make the description sufficient in the financing statement, as is other-
wise required by § 9.110.
54 Sections 9-302(3)'(b) and (4).
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Act,"5 provides that Article 9 does not cover the perfection of security
interests in "motor vehicles." Section 9-302(4) states:
The filing provisions of this article do not apply to a security
interest in property subject to a statute ... [o]f this State which
provides for a central filing of security interests in... a motor
vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for which a certificate
of title is required under the statutes of this state, if a notation of
such security interest can be indicated by a public official on a
certificate or duplicate thereof .. . .A security interest in property
covered by a statute described in subsection (3) of this section
can be perfected only by... indication of the security interest on a
certificate of title .... (Emphasis added.)
The Certificate of Title Act fits squarely into this Code scheme
by providing, in section 13-6-19, that chattel mortgage filing "shall
not.., apply to the mortgaging of motor vehicles." Section 13-6-19
requires that an encumbrance upon a motor vehicle, to be valid
against third parties, "shall be filed for public record and the fact
thereof noted on the owner's certificate of title .. " In other words,
where oil and gas equipment includes "motor vehicles," Article 9
filing is inadequate; only certificate of title notation protects the
lien. In all other respect (i.e., rights on default, priorities, etc.),
Article 9 still applies."
Although it seems clear that a self propelled drilling rig would
be a "motor vehicle," questions may arise whether other types of oil
and gas equipment attached to a motor vehicle become part of the
vehicle for filing purposes. The Certificate of Title Act is not help-
ful in its definition of motor vehicle as "all vehicles propelled by
power, other than muscle power .... ."" However, the Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that a purchase money security interest in
tires affixed to a motor vehicle is not subordinate to a prior mortgage
with an after-acquired property clause which encumbers the vehicle.
The court reasoned that the tires were subsequently added to the
vehicle as an accessory, were readily detachable, and thus were not
"merged" into the "motor vehicle.'' s" The same rationale could apply
to oil and gas equipment subsequently attached to a motor vehicle
covered by a prior mortgage. If, however, equipment were attached
to a vehicle prior to execution of a security agreement covering the
equipment, a court might conclude that the equipment had become
part of the "motor vehicle" and subject to the Certificate of Title
55 COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-6-1 to -43 (1963). The statute excludes from the definition
of motor vehicle "industrial machinery not designed primarily for highway trans-
portation." This exclusion is not, however, helpful with respect to equipment
attached to motor vehicles which are subject to the Certificate of Title Act.
56 See Kapral v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 52 Luz. Leg. Reg. 276 (Ct. C. P., Pa., 1962).
5 7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-2(2) (1963).
58 Rabtoay Gen. Tire Co. v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 135 Colo. 110, 120, 309 P.2d 616,
621 (1957).
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Act. If so, a security interest in the equipment could only be perfected
by compliance with the Certificate of Title Act, and Article 9 would
be inapplicable. Where this uncertainty is present the oil and gas
mortgagee should obtain complete protection by filing under the
Code as to all "equipment" and complying with the Certificate of
Title Act as to any equipment which is motorized or attached to
motor vehicles."
V. ACCOUNTS, CONTRACTS RIGHTS AND GENERAL INTANGIBLES
The Code's definitions of accounts, contract rights and general
intangibles bear careful consideration in the oil and gas context.
Section 9-106 states:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper. "Contract right" means any rights to payment under
a contract not yet earned by performance and not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper. "General intangibles" means any per-
sonal property (including things in action) other than goods,
accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents, and instruments.
Section 9-103, dealing with conflict of laws, provides that filing
as to accounts or contract rights is governed by the law of the state
in which the assignor has located the office which keeps the records
concerning such accounts or contract rights."0 On the other hand,
filing as to general intangibles is governed by the law of the state
where the debtor's chief place of business is located."' Because of this
filing distinction, it is vital that the nature of the collateral be ac-
curately analyzed in each financing transaction to assure that an
effectual Code filing in the proper state will be accomplished.
Where a filing is made as to accounts or contract rights, the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the state where the assignor's
records are kept will control. Section 9-103 is, of course, the relevant
conflict of laws rule for all states which have adopted the Code.
However, if the assignor's records are kept in a non-Code state, such
as Delaware, complications will arise. The conflict of laws rule of the
non-Code state may require that the assignee file in the state where
5 9 Another problem arises with respect to oil and gas equipment moved from state to
state. In such cases (assuming that all states involved have adopted the Code), filing
in the first state will be effective in the second state for four months after the equip-
ment is moved to the second state. Section 9-103(3). If filing is accomplished in the
second state within the four month period, perfection of the security interest relates
back to the first filing; if filing in the second state is accomplished after the four
month period, perfection dates from filing in the second state. Where oil and gas
equipment is transported across state lines, the lender should, therefore, file timely
financing statements in the adjoining state, as well as in Colorado.
0 Section 9-103 (1). The Code gives no definition of "records."
61 Section 9-103'(2). The term "debtor," as used in § 9-103(2), means the owner of the
collateral subject to the security interest and should not be confused with the term
'account debtor." See §§ 9-105(a) and (d).
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the oil is produced or where the records of the oil purchaser are kept.
Thus, troublesome multiple filings may be necessary in one or more
states unrelated to the loan transaction.
Another problem may arise where oil and gas in place is com-
mitted to a purchase contract prior to extraction. This will nearly
always be the case where production of natural gas is involved.
In such a case, the lender may never have acquired a security interest
in severed hydrocarbons; instead, the lender's security interest intitally
may have attached to "contract rights" which ripened into "accounts"
upon delivery of the extracted hydrocarbons to the production pur-
chaser at the wellhead. In this respect the contract rights, as independ-
ent collateral, may be subject to the special filing provisions of
Section 9-103, instead of the filing provisions of Sections 9-401 and
9-306, which apply to contracts rights as mere proceeds of the ex-
tracted hydrocarbons. " Thus, if the record keeping office of the
debtor is located outside of Colorado, it is advisable for the lender
to file in both states.
An anomalous situation may also result from the Code dis-
tinction between "contract right" and "general intangible." A
purchase contract, viewed from the seller's standpoint, creates a
right to receive payment for hydrocarbon substances delivered to the
purchaser. This is a "contract right" which matures into an "account"
upon performance by the seller.6" But from the purchaser's stand joint
the contract creates a right to receive goods and is therefore classified
as a "general intangible.''" Where a financing transaction involves
a pipeline or processing company as a debtor this distinction is vital.
It is common practice in such situations to include as part of the
62 If the contract rights or accounts were construed as mere "proceeds" of the hydro-
carbons, the proper place of filing would be with the Colorado Secretary of State,
because the primary collateral is the "goods." Section 9-306(2).
Another problem concerning proceeds, accounts and contract rights may arise
under § 9-306(3), which provides that a security interest in proceeds relates back to
the time of perfection of the security interest in the collateral which gave rise to the
proceeds. This provision was intended, among other things, to alleviate any question
of voidable preference in bankruptcy where the proceeds were obtained within the four
month period but the security interest in the collateral was perfected prior thereto.
Unfortunately, this provision may confuse the priority of competing security interests
in contract rights, accounts and proceeds. Where hydrocarbons in place are covered
by a purchase contract prior to extraction, as in the case of a gas purchase contract,
the collateral may never take the form of "goods" (extracted hydrocarbons). Instead,
the collateral may constitute "contract rights" (before extraction) and "accounts"
(after extraction). If Lender A files as to extracted hydrocarbons, accounts and pro-
ceeds, and Lender B subsequently files as to contract rights, accounts and proceeds,
which party has priority as to proceeds? Lender B may argue that his perfected inter-
est in proceeds relates back to his perfected interest in contract rights under § 9-106,
which indicates that a contract right necessarily exists prior to the account which arises
from performance of the contract. To avoid any such controversy, Lender A should
have filed as to contract rights as well as extracted hydrocarbons, accounts and proceeds.
63 Section 9-106 provides that a "contract right" is limited to rights to "payment."
64 Section 9-106.
VOL. 43
OIL AND GAS FINANCING
mortgaged property all of the debtor's purchase and sales contracts
in addition to the physical assets. If the record keeping office and
chief place of business of the debtor are in different states, care must
be taken to comply with the filing laws of the applicable jurisdictions.
Moreover, the lender's problem is unfortunately accentuated by
the Code's use of the phrase "chief place of business." The great
body of case law dealing with this legal concept has not resolved it
to the satisfaction of the security needs of the lender. Indeed, multiple
filings as to general intangibles may be necessary to cover adequately
all jurisdictions in which the debtor conducts business, at least when
the debtor's business activities are substantial enough to raise a ques-
tion that any one or more of such states may be deemed to be his
"chief place of business.""5
VI. VOIDABLE PREFERENCE
An important question may arise under bankruptcy law as to
whether extracted hydrocarbons applied toward satisfaction of
mortgage indebtedness constitute a transfer to the creditor on ac-
count of an antecedent indebtedness within the "voidable preference"
section of the Bankruptcy Act.' The problem stems from Code
provisions related to perfection of security interests in after-acquired
property. A security interest cannot attach until the debtor has rights
in the collateral, and the Code specifically provides that the debtor
has no rights in oil and gas until they are extracted. 7 Because one
of the requirements for perfection of a security interest is that it
must attach to the collateral, it follows that the lender's security
interest is extracted hydrocarbons can never be perfected under the
Code prior to the moment of extraction. Although a financing state-
ment covering proceeds of production may be filed prior to develop-
ment of the leasehold, the lender nevertheless faces attack by the
trustee in bankruptcy as to the proceeds attributable to each unit of
oil and gas extracted within four months of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. Provided that all other elements of a voidable pre-
ference are present, the trustee in bankruptcy may assert that delayed
perfection rendered the transaction a transfer to secure an antecedent
debt.
Section 9-108 of the Code anticipates this problem and provides
that the lender's "security interest in the after-acquired collateral
65 For a general discussion of problems of terminology involved in choosing where to
file under the Code, see Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial
Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems,
76 HARv. L. REv. 1529, 1539 (1963).
66 Section 60(a) ; 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).
67 Section 9-204(2) (b).
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shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for
an antecedent debt." (Emphasis added.) There can be no mistake
that the Code draftsmen clearly intended to eliminate the voidable
preference threat to after-acquired property by virtue of Section
9-108." However, a serious question is presented whether such a
provision of state law could subordinate federal bankruptcy law."
An answer to the lender's security needs in this context must
be sought not in the ritualistic language of Section 9-108, but rather
from a careful analysis of the nature of a security interest in hydro-
carbons prior to, as well as after, extraction. If an interest in oil and
gas in place is an interest in real estate subject to the real estate
recording laws, it follows that proper recording of the mortgage in
the real estate records would perfect the lender's lien as to oil and
gas in place. If the lender concurrently filed a financing statement
under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons, contract rights, ac-
counts and proceeds, and such recording and filing was completed
over four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act should offer no obstacle to the
lender. Section 60(a) (2) provides the following test as to when a
"transfer" of property of the bankrupt occurs:
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed
to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property
shall be deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so
for perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchaser from the debtor
could create rights in such property superior to the rights of the
transferee.
If real estate recording and Code filing were accomplished over
four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the
lender's interest in the oil and gas in place is invulnerable to attack
by a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Moreover, the lender's security
interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds is also invulnerable
to attack by a lien creditor at any time subsequent to the moment of
extraction of the hydrocarbons. Thus, the lender could assert that
his security interest was continuously perfected from the moment
of recordation of the real estate mortgage, nothwithstanding the
metamorphosis which the collateral underwent upon extraction
6 See Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 194 (1959).
5 The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution poses a formidable obstacle
to the realization of the objectives of § 9-108, which may conflict with § 60(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, § 60.51 A (7.2) (1964). See In re
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 C.C.H. INSTAL. CREDIT GUIDE f 98483 (Ore.
1966) (discussed in Editor's Note; supra).
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according to the traditional law of realty and personalty. A forceful
analogy can be drawn from the cases which hold that substitution
of new security for old security does not ordinarily create a preference
because there is no resultant diminution of the debtor's estate to the
injury of other creditors.70
The difficulty with this analysis is that, although an interest in
unextracted hydrocarbons may be an interest in real estate for
recording purposes, the debtor does not acquire rights in oil and
gas, as personalty, until extraction. Conceptually, at the moment of
extraction there is an instantaneous change in the nature of the
collateral from realty to personalty and a correlative "transfer" to the
creditor. As a practical matter, the oil extracted is much more valuable
than the oil in place. Because a time-gap is created between the loan
and the "transfer," the danger of a voidable preference is substantial.
Moreover, if the lender takes only a naked assignment of proceeds
of production without an accompanying real estate mortgage on the
leasehold itself, the danger of a voidable preference is greatly
increased. In such case the lender cannot refer to an earlier recording
date for purposes of establishing a continuous perfection which
antedates the four month preference period.
The oil and gas lender should also be wary of another pitfall
pertaining to bankruptcy proceedings. If the lender records the
mortgage in the real property records and files a Code financing
statement which merely covers proceeds of production rather than
extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, the trustee in bankruptcy may
argue that a gap in perfection of the security interest exists between
the moment of extraction and the birth of proceeds upon sale of the
hydrocarbons. This argument would be particularly persuasive with
respect to oil held in storage tanks on the leasehold before delivery
to the purchaser. The existence of the "gap" period would fortify
the trustee's argument that the "transfer" contemplated by Section
60(a) (2) occurred at the time when the proceeds came into exist-
ence, and that a lien creditor levying during the "gap" period (which
was only scintilla juris) could have obtained priority over the bank.
To avoid this trap, the lender should always file a financing state-
ment which covers extracted hydrocarbons, contract rights, accounts
and proceeds.
The danger of voidable preference is also increased if the lender
70 Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731 (1879); Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 332 (1874);
Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roach, 186 F.2d 827, 831 (1st Cir. 1951) (dictum); 3
COLLIER, id., § 60.20.
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waits to file a Code financing statement covering extracted hydro-
carbons and proceeds until some time after recording the real estate
mortgage but before production is actually obtained. 1 This would
allow the trustee to argue that the lender had not done everything
possible to obtain immediate and continuous perfection and that
such tardiness should make the court favor more the formalistic
preference argument set forth above. With this possibility in mind,
the lender would be well advised to record immediately as to realty
and to file immediately under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons
and proceeds.
Even if the above-described pitfalls are avoided, until the pre-
ference problem is resolved by decisional law the lender must face
the possibility that four months of production attributable to the
interest of the debtor may be lost to the trustee in bankruptcy despite
the lender's full compliance with all applicable recording and filing
provisions. The lender may take some small consolation in the fact
that oil and gas in place at the time of filing of the petition in
bankruptcy will be covered by the perfected lien of the real estate
mortgage, and thus, proceeds of production accruing after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy will not be subject to the grasp of the
trustee under the preference provision?2
VII. THE STATUTORY LIEN
The relationship between statutory liens and Article 9 will also
be of concern to Code lenders dealing with oil and gas. A statutory
lien upon oil and gas in place or fixtures will be governed by the
rules applicable to real estate transactions, but the Code will come
into play when extracted hydrocarbons or other types of personalty
are covered by a statutory lien.
The Colorado statute which grants a lien against oil and gas
properties for labor or materials supplied in the development and
operation of the leasehold 3 creates a number of problems if such
lien is sought to be applied to personalty situated on the leasehold
or to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds. If the statutory lien claim-
71 This situation may arise where a loan is made to finance the development of an un-
proven leasehold. National banking associations, however, are not ordinarily author-
ized to take the unproven leasehold as collateral for such a loan. 55 Stat. 62 (1941),
12 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
72 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 69, § 60.32.
73 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963) provides:
Every person, firm or corporation, whether as contractor, subcontractor,
materialman, or laborer, who perOrms labor upon or furnishes machinery,
material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies for sinking, repairing, altering
or operating any gas well, oil well or other well, or for constructing, repair-
ing or operating any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipeline or water pipeline, pump
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ant files a lien statement within the six month filing period7' and
commences a suit to foreclose the lien within six months after the
date of filing the statement,5 the priority of the statutory lien is
regulated by Section 86-5-3 of the 1963 Colorado Revised Statutes,
which provides:
No chattel mortgage shall be valid as against any person,
firm or corporation entitled to a lien under the provisions of this
article; provided, that no mortgage, lien or other incumbrance
existing and recorded as provided by law at the time of the inception
of the lien herein provided for shall be affected thereby. (Emphasis
added.)
Because the statutory lien may relate back to the first item of
material furnished or labor performed, or the commencement of
work, and because the six month filing period runs from the date
of the last item, it is possible that a lien statement may be filed well
over six months after the inception of the statutory lien. During the
interval period, security interests in the same collateral may be per-
fected under the Code, thereby creating a question as to the priority
to be accorded the conflicting security interests. At first impression,
Section 9-310 appears to resolve the conflict in favor of the lien
claimant. As adopted in a modified form in Colorado, that section
states:
When a person in the ordinary course of business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services does not
take priority over a perfected security interest unless a statute ex-
pressly provides otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
76
or pumping station, transportation or communication line, gasoline plant or
refinery, by virtue of a contract express or implied, with the owner or lessee
of any interest in real estate, or with the trustee, agent or receiver of any
such owner, part owner or lessee, shall have a lien to secure the payment
thereof upon the properties mentioned, belonging to the party or parties
contracting with the lien claimants, and upon the machinery, materials and
supplies so furnished, and upon any well upon and in which such machinery,
materials and supplies shall have been placed and used, and upon all other
wells, buildings and appurtenances, and the interest, leasehold or otherwise,
of such owner, part owner or lessee in the lot or land upon which said im-
provements are located, or to which they may be removed, to the extent of
the right, title and interest of the owner, part owner or lessee, at the time the
work was commenced or machinery, materials and supplies were begun to be
furnished by the lien claimant or by the contractor under the original con-
tract; and such lien shall extend to any subsequently acquired interest of any
such owner, part owner or lessee. (Emphasis added.)
It is also possible for the lien claimant to proceed under the provisions of the
General Mechanics' Lien Law, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 86-3-1 to -24 (1963). However,
the provisions pertaining to the specific statutory lien on wells and equipment allow
for a lengthier filing period (six months) than the provisions of the General Me-
chanics' Lien Law (three months). In either case, it is assumed for purposes of the
discussion to follow that the statutory lien claimant has elected to proceed under COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 86-5-1 to-li (1963).
74 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-4 (1963).
7 5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-5 (1963).
76 COLO. REV. STAT. § 155-9-310 (1963).
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It should be noted that the Colorado version of Section 9-310
differs from the Official Text versionj which grants priority to the
statutory lien unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. Al-
though the presumption of priority has been reversed in the Colorado
version, the lien claimant may argue that section 86-5-3 of the 1963
Colorado Revised Statutes does "expressly provide otherwise" by
subordinating "chattel mortgages" perfected after inception of the
statutory lien.77
One of the requirements of Section 9-310 is that the lien claim-
ant have the goods in his possession. This requirement severely limits
the applicability of Section 9-310 to the statutory lien on oil and gas
properties, as most claimants of this type of lien would not ordinarily
meet the possessory requirement."
On the other hand, the operator of the leasehold probably is in
possession within the meaning of Section 9-310 as to the personalty
located on the leasehold and the oil in the tanks.". Because this pro-
7 For an interpretation that a lien statute referring to the priority of a "mortgage" is
inapplicable to the priority of a Code "security interest" within the meaning of § 9-310,
see Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964). Such a formalistic
view, if adopted in Colorado, would emasculate CoLo. Rv. STAT. § 86-5-3 (1963),
which expressly subordinates a "chattel mortgage" but not a "security interest."
78 Assertion of a non-possessory statutory lien in bankruptcy proceedings against the
debtor may raise a problem which is commonly referred to as the doctrine of "circu-
larity." Section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "statutory liens on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession of such property... shall be postponed
in payment" to expenses of administration and wage claims. 66 Stat. 427 (1952),
11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1966). Although the operator of oil and gas properties may be
in possession within the meaning of § 67(c), laborers or materialmen would not be.
Thus, assertion of a laborer's or materialman's statutory lien in bankruptcy proceedings
against the debtor would bring § 67(c) into play. Because proceeds would not ordi-
narily be in the possession of the operator, laborer or materialman, assertion of a statu-
tory lien as to proceeds [if allowed by COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963)] would
also invoke § 67(c). The following circularity problem might then ensue:
1) The statutory lien would be superior to the mortgage under Colorado law.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-3 (1963).
2) Administrative expenses and wage claims would be superior to the statu-
tory lien under bankruptcy law. 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)
(1966).
3) The mortgage would be superior to administrative expenses and wage
claims under bankruptcy law. 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 69, § 57.07.
Where the statutory lien is superior to the mortgage but inferior to the priority
claims, the courts have resolved the circularity by also subordinating the mortgage to
the priority claims. In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1956) ; In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959).
Under this hierarchy, the order of payment out of the bankrupt debtor's estate becomes:
1) Administrative expenses and wage claims.
2) Statutory lien.
3) Mortgage.
If the priority claims are substantial, the mortgagee's security interest may be
seriously affected by the circularity which will ensue where a relatively small lien
claim is asserted in a bankruptcy proceeding. For a view that § 67(c) is inapplicable
to the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy see California State Dept. of Employ-
ment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 '(9th Cir. 1954) ; New Orleans v. Harrell, 134
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943); In re American Zyloptic CO., Inc., 181 F. SupP. 77
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
Furthermore, the operator would appear to be performing "services" in the ordinary
course of his business. See the Comment to § 9-310.
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vision of the Code respects priority expressly accorded by the statute
creating the lien, the operator may claim a statutory lien (independ-
ent of any contractual operator's lien)"° perfected as of the date of
commencement of operations on the leasehold.81 Therefore, as against
a Code security interest perfected after the commencement of work,
the operator may claim statutory lien priority under section 86-5-3.
Even if the lender perfects a security interest prior to com-
mencement of operations, a possibility exists that the security interest
may be subordinated to the statutory lien if the statutory lien extends
to severed hydrocarbons and proceeds. Because the statutory lien
contains a provision regulating its priority as against a chattel
mortgage, extracted hydrocarbons, as chattels, and the proceeds
thereof arguably are subject to the statutory lien. Although the
statute does not expressly state that extracted hydrocarbons and
proceeds are subject to the lien granted, the statute does mention "the
interest, leasehold or otherwise, of such owner, part owner or lessee"
and further provides that the lien granted "shall extend to any sub-
sequently acquired interest of any such owner, part owner or lessee.'"
In other states, similar statutory liens upon oil and gas properties
have been held not to attach to extracted hydrocarbons or proceeds
where the statutes involved did not expressly so provide." Although
such statutes referred to the leasehold interest, they did not contain
a reference to "any subsequently acquired interest."" Whether, under
the Colorado statute, the concept of "subsequently acquired inter-
est" includes extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds will remain the
subject of speculation until the point is litigated or otherwise resolved
by legislative amendment."
80 The operator will receive the greatest protection, not by relying on his statutory lien,
but by including a lien provision in the operating agreement. Because the contractual
lien covers extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, the operating agreement is subject
to the filing requirements of Article 9. See § 9-102 (1) (a). The operating agreement,
therefore, should conform to the requirements of a Code security agreement and be
filed in the Secretary of State's office as well as in the real property records. In the
alternative, the operator may file a financing statement. If such filing is delayed or
omitted, the operator could presumably still rely on the statutory lien, subject to the
assumption that such lien extends to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds.
81 In Colorado, there is strong authority for relation back to the date of initial leasehold
operations. See Park Lane Properties, Inc. v. Fisher, 89 Colo. 591, 5 P.2d 577 (1939),
where, under the general mechanics' lien statute, commencement of work was deemed
to relate back to the planning stage prior to initial construction of the building.
82 COLO. REv. STAT. § 86-5-1 (1963) (Emphasis added.).
8 Tarheel Drilling & Equip. Co. v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 231 Ark. 510, 330 S.W.2d
717 (1960) ; Stanolind Crude Oil Purchasing Co. v. Busey, 185 Okla. 200, 9 P.2d 876
(1939); Gary v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla. 421, 165 P.2d 344 (1946).
84 The Nebraska statute expressly extends the lien to oil and gas produced from the lease,
and the proceeds thereof. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-803 (3) (Reissue 1960).
85 See generally, Rodden, The Bankruptcy Act and the Independent Producer, 9 RocKY
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 337 (1964).
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Assuming, however, that the statutory lien does apply to ex-
tracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, a troublesome question of
priority is presented. The lender who has properly perfected his
security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds under Sec-
tion 9-306 may find the collateral pumped out from under his
mortgage and into the hands of the statutory lien claimant. This is
because the lender's security interest in extracted hydrocarbons can-
not attach until the moment of extraction," while the statutory lien
can relate back to a point in time prior to extraction. In other words,
Section 9-204(2) (b) makes it impossible for any "mortgage, lien or
other encumbrance" on the extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds to
"exist" before "the inception" of the statutory lien, within the mean-
ing of section 86-5-3. Therefore, if the leasehold operator has pos-
session of extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, he may claim a
statutory lien with priority over a previously perfected Code security
interest. 7 .
A counter-argument, similar to that raised in the voidable pre-
ference context, is applicable where a real estate mortgage en-
cumbers the leasehold prior to commencement of operations. The
argument is that the lender's interest in extracted hydrocarbons relates
back to the recording of the real estate mortgage and establishes a
continuous perfection. Moreover, the lender, by recording and Code
filing has utilized all available means of perfection. Such diligence
is all that section 86-5-3 asks as a condition of priority. Therefore,
the lender's security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds
should not be treated as a "chattel mortgage" interest within the
meaning of the statute, but rather as a real estate mortgage interest.
Whether this argument will be accepted by the courts in light of
Section 9-204(2) (b) can only be open to conjecture."
86 Section 9-204(2) (b).
87 If the operator does not have possession of the runs the same priority problem is pre-
sented. The only difference is that § 9-310 is not involved, and priority turns solely
upon the construction of § 9-204(2) (b) in relation to COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-3
(1963).
88 Extension of the statutory lien to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds presents a
serious problem for the production purchaser in Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 86-5-7
(1963) provides that the transferee of property subject to the statutory lien takes
subject to the lienor's rights, regardless of lack of notice. This result is in direct
opposition to § 9-307 of the Code, which allows production purchasers in the ordinary
course to take free of any "security interest" in the oil and gas. However, § 9-102(2)
provides that Article 9 does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in § 9-310.
Therefore § 9-307 is of no avail to the production purchaser if a non-possessory
statutory lien is involved. But if the operator asserts a contractual lien, it is arguable
that the Code comes back into play to preempt CoLo. REv. STAT. § 86-5-7 (1963) as
"inconsistent." See §§ 9-102(1)(a) and 10-103.
In contrast, the Nebraska operator's lien statute contains provision similar to
§ 9-307 of the Code, which protects buyers in ordinary course from the operator's lien.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-806 (1960); Young, The Nebraska Oil and Gas Lien, 41
NEB. L. REV. 572, 579 (1962).
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VIII. FEDERAL TAX LIENS
The after-acquired nature of extracted hydrocarbons and pro-
ceeds may create problems concerning priority of federal tax liens.
To be considered "choate" as against a federal tax lien, a security
interest must be specific and definite in the following respects:
(1) identity of the lienholder, (2) amount of the lien, and (3)
property subject to the lien."
If a lender files a financing statement which covers extracted
hydrocarbons, accounts and proceeds and a federal tax lien is sub-
sequently filed against the debtor, does the lender have a "choate"
lien upon production which accrues after the filing of the tax lien?
A recent bankruptcy case9" suggests that a perfected Code security
interest in unaccrued accounts is inchoate. In that case, accounts
representing the proceeds of contracts not in existence at the time
of filing of the tax lien were held to be indefinite and the assign-
ment of accounts was therefore subordinated to the tax lien.
However, the bankruptcy case involved accounts arising under
contracts for ship repair services rendered by the debtor. An im-
portant distinction as to the nature of the accounts can be made
with respect to a security interest in extracted hydrocarbons and
proceeds. As to oil and gas in place, a properly recorded mortgage
is choate vis-a-vis a subsequently filed federal tax lien. Where the
lender both records his mortgage as a real estate mortgage and files
under the Code as to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, a force-
ful argument may be made that the lien, once choate, is not rendered
inchoate by transformation of the collateral from realty to per-
sonalty upon extraction.
This argument is fortified by Elliott v. Sioux Oil Co. 1 The
Elliott case involved an assignment of proceeds of oil and gas pro-
duction. The assignment was recorded in the real estate records of
the county prior to the filing of a tax lien against the assignor. It
should be noted that the assignee did not take a formal mortgage of
the leasehold estate. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the assign-
ment was executed as security for a debt and, thus, constituted a
mortgage. Because the subject of the -mortgage" was minerals to
be extracted, the court held that the assignment affected real estate
and was subject to the rules of perfection of liens upon real estate.
Prior recordation of the assignment in the real estate records per-
89 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
90 In re Hudon & Son, Inc., 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9517 (D. Mass. 196-1 ).
91 191 F. Supp. 847 (D. Wyo. 1960).
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fected the lien and eliminated any question as to specificity of pro-
ceeds which accrued after filing of the tax lien.
Although the Elliott case did not involve the Code, the reason-
ing of the court would appear to be equally applicable to Code
security interests in extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds. However,
due to the fugacious nature of hydrocarbons, the lender can never
be certain that his collateral will be realized until the moment of
extraction. This uncertainty, coupled with the Code rules for per-
fection as to extracted minerals, will continue to be a risk to the oil
and gas lender with respect to competing federal tax liens.
IX. FIXTURES
In oil and gas financing security interests in fixtures are par-
ticularly important, because often much of the collateral involved is
attached to the land in some way. Tanks, casing, pipelines, and
residences for field personnel on the leasehold are among the most
recurrent examples. Given this fact, the oil and gas financer, under
the typical production or development loan, will be dealing con-
stantly with Section 9-313 of the Code, which governs priorities
among conflicting security interests in fixtures.
In the oil and gas context, the conflict will typically be between
the bank generally financing development of the leasehold (Bank
"D"), and the bank financing the purchase of equipment likely to
become fixtures (Bank "P"). More specifically, the conflict will be
between Bank D's mortgage on real estate and personalty, which
mortgage contains an after-acquired property clause, and Bank P's
purchase money security interest 2 in the equipment to be affixed to
the leasehold. Bank P will seek to preserve its purchase money
security interest in the equipment to avoid feeding the after-acquired
property clause in Bank D's mortgage. 3
Section 9-313(1) of the Code will probably not be relevant
to ordinary oil and gas financing. That section provides:
The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into
a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass,
metal work and the like and no security interest in them exists
under this Article unless the structure remains personal property
under applicable law.
Apparently, such incorporated materials become part of the
a Section 9-107 provides a definition of this term.
93 For a discussion of this general situation, see Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority,
76 HARv. L. Rav. 1333, 1388-1398 (1963). Two subsidiary points should be men-
tioned. First, if the debtor owns the equipment outright, there will be no conflict and
Bank D's collateral will be increased by the amount of the value of the equipment,
whether it is after-acquired or not. But if the debtor has merely leased the equipment,
Bank D's security interest cannot rise above the debtor's interest as lessee.
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realty subject to real estate recording laws. It is possible to conceive
of items such as well casing in place and buried pipelines as "metal
work.., incorporated into a structure" in a manner similar to "lum-
ber, bricks, tile," etc." However, it is difficult to imagine a situation
in which other types of equipment would be so incorporated into
the leasehold. Equipment such as tanks, pumps, surface pipelines
and related machinery used in oil and gas operations are only
temporarily affixed to the land. Therefore, Section 9-313(1) ap-
pears to be inapplicable to such temporarily affixed equipment.
The other parts of Section 9-313 are, however, very relevant to
oil and gas financing. The section provides a system of priorities
among conflicting security interests in "fixtures," the definition of
"fixtures" being left to state (Colorado) law. Section 9-313(1) also
provides:
This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fix-
tures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
Probably the most important provisions are Section 9-313(2) and
(4), which state in part:
A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons
who have an interest in the real estate except [subsequent transferees
of any interest in the real estate, a creditor subsequently levying on
the realty or a prior mortgage of the realty making subsequent ad-
vances, if the subsequent transfer, levy or advance is made without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.]
Thus, if Bank P's purchase money security interest in the equip-
ment "attaches" before the equipment is affixed to the leasehold,
Bank P has priority to the equipment over Bank D, even if Bank P
never files or records its interest in the chattel or realty records. This
assumes, however, that Bank D executes its mortgage on the debtor's
interest before the "attachment" of the purchase money security
interest of Bank P, and that Bank D does not make "subsequent
advances." If the purchase money interest predates the develop-
ment loan, then Bank P is required under Section 9-313(4) to
94If well casing in place and buried pipelines are "structures" within the meaning of
§ 9-313 (1), the Code rules of priority will not apply unless such items remain "per-
sonal property" under Colorado law. This subsection emphasizes the manner of affixa-
tion of the completed structure as the sole criterion to determine whether the structure
and all of its integral parts constitute realty or personalty. However, "the applicable
law" of Colorado, as discussed in detail in the text immediately following, emphasizes
other criteria to determine the same question.
One of the traditional tests by which to classify property as a fixture of personalty
is whether the property may be removed "without material injury to the freehold."
This concept is completely abandoned by the Code, which requires only that the secured
party who removes the collateral from the real estate reimburse any encumbrancer or
owner of the real estate (other than the debtor) for any physical injury caused by the
removal. See § 9-313(5).
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file in the county where the fixtures are located" with a description
of the relevant land in order to obtain priority over Bank D.
The difficulty with this analysis is that Section 9-313 only
applies to "fixtures" as that term is defined by state law, and in
Colorado there is a serious question (1) what a fixture is and (2)
whether such a category - halfway between personalty and realty -
exists at all as a separate category subject to priorities under the
recording laws.
The general rule which appears to have emerged from the lead-
ing Colorado fixtures cases is that property must be either personalty
or realty; although "fixtures" constitute a recognized category as a
matter of property law, there is no intermediate category of "fix-
tures" insofar as recording priority is concerned. If a chattel mortgage
is executed before physical annexation of the property, the property
remains "personalty" free from any prior or subsequent real estate
mortgage; if execution occurs after annexation, the chattel mortgage
is subordinate to a prior real estate mortgage. 7
Against this background of case law in Colorado it is possible
that "fixtures," as an independent category of collateral under the
recording laws, may not now exist. If Colorado eventually recognizes
"fixtures," apart from realty or personalty, to accommodate state
law to the structure of Section 9-313, then presumably the priorities
of that section will govern conflicting security interests in items such
as well casing, rigs, pipelines and the like. However, in the light
of prior cases, it appears unlikely that the parties will create "fixtures"
by so labeling such property in a security agreement. It is more likely
under the Code, as adopted in Colorado, that oil and gas equipment
will constitute either personalty or realty, depending solely upon
whether the chattel security interest attached before or after affixa-
tion of the equipment to the leasehold.
This uncertainty could create a difficult filing problem for
Bank P. If oil and gas equipment is financed by conditional sale
before its affixation, a Colorado court might well term the equip-
ment "personalty." As personalty, the equipment would no longer
be within the scope of Section 9-313, which deals only with "fixtures."
Rather, the filing rules applicable to "equipment" would apply,
95 Section 9-401 (1) (b). Fixture filings must be cross-indexed from the local personalty
records to the local realty records. Section 9-401 (5).
96 Section 9-402 (1).
97 See Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, 179 Pac. 154 (1919) ; Razatos
v. Daniels & Fisher Stores Co., 110 Colo. 105, 131, P.2d 417 '1942); Stapp v. Car
Ice Corp., 122 Colo. 526, 224 P.2d 935 (1950); STORKE & SEARS, COLORADO SI:-
CUiThy LAW, § 24 (1955) ; Comment, Colorado Fixtures Law, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
458 (1962) ; Coogan, Security Interests In Fixtures under The Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1343-1349 (1962). Clark, supra note 38 at 111-14.
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namely, central filing." If Bank P erroneously files as to "fixtures"
in the county, when in fact the goods constitute "equipment," Bank
D will prevail by virtue of its prior central filing (and the after-
acquired property clause contained in Bank D's security agreement).
The only safe course for the purchase money lender is dual filing,
locally in the county where the property is first affixed, and centrally
with the Secretary of State as to "equipment."" If the debtor uses
property which will be moved from leasehold to leasehold, Bank P,
to be protected as to "fixtures," need only file in the county where
the property is first affixed."
On the other hand, the collateral value of salvaged property is
threatened by the local filing rules of the Code as to fixtures. If the
property initially became a "fixture" prior to removal to another
county and Bank P properly filed in the county where the property
was first affixed, then neither Bank D nor any subsequent lender
can safely assume that the salvaged property is unencumbered until
the records of every Colorado county have been searched. To be
safe, Bank P should have filed centrally as to "equipment," as well as
locally as to "fixtures." Such central filing would have put Bank D
and any subsequent chattel mortgagees on notice of the security
interest without the inconvenience of local record searches. However,
to the extent that Bank P was satisfied that it had a security interest
in "fixtures" and chose to file only locally, Bank D and subsequent
mortgagees are faced with a multi-county record search.
The uncertainty of the law concerning "fixtures" in Colorado
dictates multiple Code filings by the conditional seller of oil and
gas equipment and multiple searches by any subsequent lender
interested in salvaged property as loan collateral. Until Section
9-313 is amended or Colorado law pertaining to "fixtures" is clari-
fied, confusion is apt to reign in this area of oil and gas financing
under the Code.
X. TRANSMITTING UTILITY
Colorado has included a special provision in Article 9 applicable
to pipeline companies as well as to other public utilities. The section
will somewhat lessen the burden of financers of pipeline companies
98Sections 9-312(4), 9-401. If P has a purchase money security interest within the
meaning of § 9-107, then § 9-312(4) allows an extra ten days within which to file
centrally as to "equipment." The ten day period runs from the date that the debtor
receives possession of the collateral.
99Colorado has added § 9-401(5) to the Code. That section requires fixtures to be
cross-indexed from the county personalty records to the county realty records. Such
cross-indexing is inadequate, however, if only personally is involved. In such case,
only central filing with the Secretary of State is adequate.
100 Section 9-401 ( 3 ).
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m Colorado.1 0 1 This new section provides that a lender making loans
to a "transmitting utility" on the security of pipelines and other equip-
ment will be spared the necessity of filing financing statements in
every county through which the pipelines extend - even if the collat-
eral constitutes "fixtures."0 2 Furthermore, no continuation statements
will be necessary on a long-term loan and no description of the real
estate is necessary as to "fixtures."
The definition of "transmitting utility" in Section 9-408 turns
on whether the debtor conducts business "pursuant to the rights or
franchises issued by a state or federal regulatory body." Certificates
of public convenience and necessity are the most obvious examples
of such "rights or franchises," but other types of governmental
regulation may also bring the section into operation. If a carrier
were exempted from state regulation as to isolated and private intra-
state sales of gas, the section would presumably still apply if any
other part of the company's activities were regulated by any other
state or by the Federal Power Commission as to interstate activity."'
In addition, any company which falls within the definition of "public
utility" as defined by Colorado statute'" would also appear to come
within the scope of Section 9-408. Thus, pipeline companies making
only selected sales to private consumers in Colorado may not be able
to avail themselves of the benefits of Section 9-408. The same may
also be true of pipeline companies making surplus sales to munici-
palities for resale to the general public."' 5
To be safe, the lender should first ascertain whether the debtor
has obtained certificates of convenience and necessity from any state
or the Federal Power Commission or whether proceedings exempting
the debtor from regulation have taken place. If a certificate has
101 Section 9-408 provides in part:
Transmitting Utility ... the proper place to file in order to perfect a security
interest in goods of a transmitting utility shall be in the office of the secretary
of state. When the financing statement covers goods of a transmitting utility
which are or are to become fixtures, no description of the real estate con-
cerned is required. The words 'transmitting utility' mean any corporation or
other business entity primarily engaged, pursuant to the rights or franchises
issued by a state or federal regulatory body, in the .. .transmission or dis-
tribution of oil, gas, or petroleum products . . .a security interest in goods
of a transmitting utility perfected as provided above shall continue in effect
in accordance with the terms of the security agreement without the neces-
sity of filing continuation statements.... (Emphasis added.)
102 See §§ 9-401 and 9-402. However, it should be noted that no state adjoining Colorado
has yet adopted a similar provision. Thus, financing an interstate pipeline may require
multiple local filings in adjoining states, even though only one filing is necessary in
Colorado.
103 142 Colo. 361, 351 P.2d 241 (1960). See Public UtIs. Comm'n v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 142 Coio. 36i, 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
104 CoLo REv. STAT. 115-1-3 (1963).
105 See Public UtIs. Comm'n v. Colorado Inter-state Gas Co., 142 Colo. 361, 351 P.2d
241 (1960).
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issued, which will often be the case, then the lending institution may
avail itself of the filing benefits of Section 9-408.
XI. PRODUCTION PAYMENT FINANCING
The code will play a vital part in the financing of production
payments. So long as the leasehold remains undeveloped, the rules
governing priority of security interests in real property are applicable.
It is assumed that in Colorado an unaccrued production payment,
like unaccrued royalty, is an interest in realty subject to the recording
statutes.' However, the hydrocarbons when extracted become per-
sonalty subject to the requirements of Article 9. Therefore, along
with the recording of the real estate mortgage, the lender should also
centrally file a financing statement covering extracted hydrocarbons,
accounts, contract rights and proceeds."'
Although proceeds of production accruing to the production
payment will typically be paid directly to the lender and perfection
may be accomplished by actual possession of proceeds,'01 perfection
of accounts and contract rights may be achieved under the Code only
by filing.!09 Before obtaining possession of the proceeds, the lender
may be viewed as having a security interest only in such accounts and
contract rights. For this reason, filing as to accounts and contract
rights, in addition to extracted hydrocarbons and proceeds, is advis-
able. Such filing will allow the lien to cover the collateral through all
its transmutations with no intervening gaps. As discussed previously,
duplicate filings may be necessary if the debtor's record keeping office
is located in another state."'
The usual pattern in production payment financing is for the
bank to take an assignment of proceeds of production and to execute
transfer and division orders providing for payment of the specified
cash proceeds directly to the bank until the indebtedness is satisfied."'
While there are business reasons for such payment directly to the
bank (such as prepayment of the note and protection in case of
default), the bank's security interest in the proceeds would not be
100 See the textual discussion supra pp. 4-7.
107 The real estate mortgage can double as a Code security agreement and, if all the formal
requirements are met, be filed in lieu of a financing statement. See § 9-402 ( 1).
108 Section 9-305.
109 Section 9-302. Although it is common practice to include a receivership provision in
the production payment mortgage, such provision may not afford protection against
the claims of intervening creditors as to accounts or contract rights unless a filing is
made as to accounts, contract rights and proceeds.
110 Section 9-103(1).
H See Johnson, Legal Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, NINTH ANNUAL INSTIrUTE ON
OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION, p. 158 (1958).
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endangered by allowing the debtor to have dominion over them.
Section 9-205 of the Code specifically rejects and repeals the doctrine
of Benedict v. Ratner"' which endangers such a security interest
under pre-Code law.
Payment of proceeds directly to the lender gives the lender an
important added protection under the Code. Sections 9-306(4) (b)
and (c) provide:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds
has a perfected security interest.., in indentifiable cash proceeds
in the form of money [or checks] which is not commingled with
other money or deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceedings ....
If the lender allows the debtor to take possession of production
payment proceeds or places such proceeds in the debtor's account and
the proceeds become "commingled," the Code will limit the lender
to recovery of an amount not greater than the amount of proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days prior to institution of in-
solvency proceedings against the debtor."' On the other hand, it is
common practice in production payment financing to provide for
assignment of the proceeds to the lender to amortize the indebted-
ness. Thus, the possibility of commingling is eliminated and the
proceeds are indentifiable at all times. To protect its security interest
in proceeds, the lender should keep each production payment loan
account separate from any other accounts arising out of other loan
transactions involving the same debtor.
CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Colorado will
present a number of filing and priority problems for the oil and gas
financer. Problems of transition to Code law will soon face lenders
involved in long-term oil and gas financing transactions entered into
under pre-Code law; Code filing, in addition to Land Office filing,
will be required where personal property security interests in federal
oil and gas leases are involved; the handy "mixed mortgage" record-
ing provision presently applicable to mortgages by corporate debtors
will be repealed, and both recording and Code filing will be re-
quired; Code filing will be necessary as to security interests in
motorized equipment not covered by the Colorado Certificate of
Title Act; filings may have to be made in other states as to accounts
=rnd contract# right-s if schA constitute indeendet cal rather
112 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
113 Section 9-306(4) (d).
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than mere "proceeds" of severed hydrocarbons; and proceeds of
extracted hydrocarbons feeding a production payment or other
mortgage may be claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy as a voidable
preference. In addition, potential priority conflicts remain to be
resolved between the statutory lien on oil and gas properties and
Code security interests; a security interest in extracted hydrocarbons
and proceeds may not be "choate" as against a federal tax lien, due
to the after-acquired nature of such collateral; security interests in
oil and gas equipment will be subject to the uncertainties of Colo-
rado decisional law as to fixtures; questions will arise whether or
not certain debtors are "transmitting utilities" subject to the liberal
filing provisions of Section 9-408; and multi-state filings may be
necessary in production payment financing transactions.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the Code will promote uniformity
concerning the rules for perfection of consensual security interests
in personalty. Although the Code was not drafted with oil and gas
financing foremost in mind, the oil and gas lender may reap the
security benefits intended. A measure of caution, often involving
multiple filings, will reduce risks to a minimum.
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PLANT SHUTDOWNS AND TRANSFERS
INVOLVING Two UNIONS
By EDWIN S. KAHN*
INTRODUCTION
The runaway shop and the plant transfer have engaged the
attention of numerous commentators.' But there has been little or
no consideration of the problem in the context of an economically
motivated plant shutdown and transfer in a two-plant, two-union
situation. It is in this context that the present article is written.
The discussion is timely because of the increasing number and in-
creasing importance of cases involving plant transfers and such re-
lated areas as plant shutdowns2 and contracting-out?
Employees and unions have pursued their claims in a variety of
ways, and these will be discussed under the following headings:
I. FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
II. ARBITRATION
III. THE DuTY TO BARGAIN AND THE NLRB
In order to focus the discussion to follow, the following hypothe-
tical situation is proposed, and will be referred to in the article:
The company operates two plants within one metropolitan area.
Plant A is an older plant and operations there are either unprofitable
or less profitable than the operations of Plant B, 12 miles away.
The company recognized a local of Union X as the bargaining agent
of Plant A about four years ago. A three-year contract expired
three months ago, and a new one-year contract was signed at the
expiration of the prior contract. Local 2 of Union Y was recog-
nized at Plant B two years ago. The company signed a three-year
contract with Local 2. Both plants manufacture the same products,
except that Plant A produces one product, comprising 20 per cent
of its output, which Plant B does not produce. No unique skills
are needed to manufacture that product. Both plants have an equal
number of employees. Both contracts include a broad management
rights clause, a plant-wide seniority system, and comparable wage
scales.
*Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado. Member, Colorado Bar; B.A., cum
laude, University of Colorado, 1958; LL.B., cum laude, Harvard University, 1965.
This article reflects his own views and does not necessarily reflect the views of Holland
& Hart.
I E.g., Daykin, Run-Away Shops: The Problem and the Treatment, 12 LAB. L.J. 1025
(1961); Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 907 (1962);
Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1100 (1964);
Note, Run-Away Shop-An Impediment to Peaceful Union Management Relations,
34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961).
2 E.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
3 E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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One month ago, the Board of Directors decided to close down
Plant A in about six months. The one operation not now performed
by Plant B is to be transferred there. Plant B is also to be expanded
somewhat. The two changes will require the addition of a number
of employees equal to about one-third the number of employees
currently at Plant B. Thus, two-thirds of the employees at Plant A
will lose their jobs unless they have some recourse.
I. FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Individual employees and unions have frequently sought relief
in the federal courts. The jurisdictional basis for such claims is
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 Although
there had been uncertainty whether individual employees could sue
an employer under this section, the Supreme Court held in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n5 that individual employees do have this
remedy.
In the two major cases to date involving the issue of the survival
of seniority rights upon a plant transfer, two courts of appeals have
come to differing conclusions. In Zdanok v. Glidden Co.," the Glid-
den Company had operated a plant at Elmhurst, New York, from
1929 until November 30, 1957. The company had regularly en-
tered into two-year collective agreements with the union. According
to its preamble, the latest contract was entered into by the company
"for and on behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona Avenue
and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York." The agreement
also contained various seniority clauses, including a statement that
any employee with more than five years of continuous service, in the
event of layoff, would be entitled to be re-employed if a suitable
461 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1965):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
5371 U.S. 195 (1962):
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising
from a collective bargaining contract should be excluded from the coverage
of § 301 has thus not survived. The rights of individual employees concern-
ing rates of pay and conditions of employment are a major focus of the
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual
claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, and are
to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many times
precipitate grave questions concerning the interpretation and enforceability
of the collective bargaining contract on which they are based. To exclude
these claims for the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy
of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwilling to
do. 371 U.S. at 200.
6288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted on the limited issue of the participation
of a Judge of the court of claims, 368 U.S. 814, alf'd on that issue, 370 U.S. 530.
petition for rehearing (including a petition for rehearing on a denial of certiorari on
the merits) denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
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opening should occur within three years. In September, 1957, the
company announced that it would terminate the collective bargaining
contract at its expiration on November 30, 1957, and remove its
machinery and equipment to a newly established plant in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania. The jobs of the employees at Elmhurst were then
terminated. The company offered to consider applications for
employment by its Elmhurst employees only if they came to Bethle-
hem and applied on the same basis as new applicants.
After a motion to stay arbitration proceedings had been granted
by a state court,7 the old employees brought a suit for damages,'
claiming that they should have been given new jobs at Bethlehem
with full seniority. On appeal from a decision denying relief, it was
held by the court of appeals, in a split decision, that the plaintiffs
possessed seniority rights which should have been recognized by the
defendant at its new location. The contract clause providing re-
employment rights for a three-year period suggested to the court
that seniority rights were to survive the agreement. Moreover,
Judge Madden of the Court of Claims, whose participation was
affirmed by the Supreme Court,' writing for the majority, said that
the employees had worked on the assumption that they had "ac-
quired" seniority rights and held that the seniority rights could be
considered to have "vested" and could not be unilaterally annulled.
He interpreted the clause specifying the location of the plant as
'nothing more than a reference to the existing situation" and held
that the "reasonable expectations" of the employees must prevail
over the clause." Chief Justice Lumbard's dissent emphasized that
seniority rights arise only by virtue of contract and concluded that
the agreement here did not confer such rights on the employees in
seeking work at the new location." Other employees of Glidden then
consolidated an action previously begun with Zdanok, 2 and that
case once more found its way to the Second Circuit. The court held
that the second action was determined by the first under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel and refused to hear additional evidence which
the company tried to introduce."
7Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172 N.Y.S.2d 678
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
8 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
9 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted on the limited issue of the participation
of a Judge of the court of claims, 368 U.S. 814, a! 'd on that issue, 370 U.S. 530,
petition for rehearing (including a petition for rehearing on a denial of certiorari on
the merits) denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
10 288 F.2d at 103-04.
1 Id. at 105.
12 For an early criticism of the Zdanok decision, see Aaron, Reflections on Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1552-54 (1962).
13 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Caught between the Sixth Circuit's contrary decision in Oddie
v. Ross Gear & Tool Co."4 and the force of the doctrine of res judi-
cata, Judge Friendly, writing for the majority said:
What the Oddie ruling does create, particularly when it is
superimposed on Chief Judge Lumbard's earlier dissent here and the
great amount of critical discussion in the law reviews that our deci-
sion has engendered, is doubt whether, if other similar contracts
should come before us for construction, we ought follow the lead
of our divided decision in this case or of the unanimous contrary
one of the Sixth Circuit in Oddie. This is precisely the situation
in which "the law of the case" is decisive; in Judge Magruder's
words, "mere doubt on our part is not enough to open up the point
for full reconsideration."'
15
However, Chief Judge Lumbard, in a concurring opinion, said:
I should like to point out that, while the law of these specific
cases is settled . . .the prior decision rendered by this court, ...
in fact represents the views of but one Judge Waterman of this
circuit and is entitled to no precedential value so far as this circuit
is concerned. The two judges of this circuit who heard the first
appeal were divided on the appropriate disposition of the case.
As for the merits of these cases, whatever substance there may
have been in the plaintiffs' position on the first appeal, had it been
proper for the district court to consider the additional proof adduced
by the defendant at the second trial it seems to me to be clear beyond
the peradventure of a doubt that the defendant proffered the only
tenable view of the collective bargaining agreement. 16
Thus, if a similar case arose once more in the Second Circuit,
it is highly doubtful that it would be decided the same way as
Zdanok.
In Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co.," the company moved its
entire Detroit division to Tennessee. The recognition clause in the
agreement provided that the company recognize the union as "exclu-
sive representative of its employees in its plant or plants which are
located in that portion of the greater Detroit area which is located
within the city limits of Detroit .... lThe union discussed the trans-
fer with the company, but after getting no satisfaction from it, sev-
eral employees filed a complaint under section 301. The court held:
The collective bargaining agreement provides that the Company
recognize the Union as the exclusive representative ... [as stated
above]. This is plain, unambiguous language. The agreement gave
seniority and recall-to-work rights to employees in the defendant's
plants which were within the city limits of Detroit. It gave no such
rights to employees of a plant in Tennessee. * * * It is true, as
the District Judge pointed out, that the plant in Tennessee has the
same machinery and equipment, the same officers and supervisors,
14 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied; 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
15 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
'ld. at 957.
17 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
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and the same operation, but, as also stated by him, it is a "new
climate," which of course recognizes that it is not in the city limits
of Detroit, but in Tennessee. Whether it would be advisable or
reasonable under the existing circumstances to have the agreement
apply to the plant in Tennessee is not for the court to decide. We
must construe the contract as it is written, rather than make a new
contract for the parties.
18
The court also rejected the "vested" rights theory embraced in
Zdanok. It stated the issue in terms of what rights the union had
under the express provisions of the agreement as to the location of
the plant, rather than whether the relocation cut off any rights it
may have had. It found that no rights upon relocation had been
created by the agreement and, therefore, that none were cut off.
There was some prior bargaining history which indicated that
the union was aware that the company might move, but not that it
might move to Tennessee. In addition, Odie may be distinguished
from the fact situation postulated in the Introduction to this discus-
sion, in that the union responded weakly to the company notice
concerning the move.
However, there are highly signifcant factors in the hypothetical
situation which point to the same result as in Oddie: the limitation
of seniority to the plant; the broad mangement functions clause;
limitation of recognition to the plant; and the absence of an explicit
carry-over of seniority rights beyond the term of the agreement
(there was such a carry-over in Zdanok). However, neither Zdanok
nor Oddie involved an existing two-plant, two-union situation. In
each case, the company shut down an existing plant and established
a new plant at a new location. There is no way of predicting with
certainty whether the Zdanok doctrine of vested seniority rights
would be applied by the Second Circuit to the two-union situation.
Apart from the weakness of Zdanok precedent noted earlier, the
court might hesitate to take this further step because of the difficulty
of the two groups of employees. Just as the courts often leave ques-
tions for Congress, 9 so the courts might be tempted to leave this
decision to the processes of arbitration" or collective bargaining."'
An existing two-plant situation was before the court in Fraser
v. Magic Chef-Food Giant Markets Inc.22 The company's Cleveland
I8 1d. at 148.
19 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 86 Sup. Ct. 272 (1965). For an illuminating
discussion of "The Paradox of Making Law by Refusing to Make Law," see Hart &
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law,
Problem 18, 515-46 (Mimeo. ed. 1958).
20 Arbitrators have no one to whom to pass the buck once they determine the issue is
arbitrable. The arbitration decisions are discussed in Part II, in/ra.
21 The duty to bargain is discussed in Part III, in/ra.
2324 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1963).
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plant manufactured commercial cooking equipment and its St. Louis
plant produced oil and gas-based heaters. The company previously
had closed some of its other plants. It closed the Cleveland plant
about one year after signing a three-year agreement with the union.
The court did not state whether the St. Louis plant was unionized.
Affirming the district court's award of summary judgment for the
company the court held that in the absence of specific language in
the agreement to the contrary, management's right to close a plant
cannot be limited.2
The federal district courts, in situations where the decision to
move has been economically motivated, generally have also followed
Oddie and held that seniority rights do not carry over. In Slenzka
v. Hoover Ball Bearing Co.,24 the recognition clause of the agree-
ment provided that it was binding if any existing operations were
moved within a 60-mile radius. The company closed its old plant
and established a new plant more than 60 miles away. The court
granted the company's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In
one recent case, the court refused to grant summary judgment for
the employer.'5 The union had alleged violation of specific clauses
and implied covenants in the agreement; it had also alleged that the
company's divisional president had promised that the plant would
not be moved during the term of the agreement,"5 a factor which
may make the case distinguishable from Oddie and Fraser.
Although the majority of the cases in federal courts are suits
for money damages, on occasion unions have sought injunctive re-
lief to delay transfers pending arbitration. In Local Div. 1098 v.
Eastern Greyhound Lines, 7 the union was successful in obtaining
a preliminary injunction to halt the transfer of the company's repair
and maintenance facilities until the completion of arbitration pro-
ceedings. The court noted that there would be only a few weeks'
delay in the move as a result of the injunction. In similar cases,
23Id. at 856:
Rights of employees under a collective bargaining agreement presuppose an
employer-employee relationship. A collective bargaining agreement, in ordi-
nary usage and terminology, does not create an employer-employee relation-
ship nor does it guarantee the continuance of one. Employees' rights under
such a contract do not survive discontinuance of business and a termination
of operations. 324 F.2d at 856.
24 215 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
25UAW v. Avis Industrial Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2632, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. { 3l9S (E.D.
Mich. 1964).
2 Cf. Penzien v. Dielectric Prods, Eng'r Co., 3741 Mich. 444, 132 N.W.2d 130, cert.
denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 73 (1965), in which the court held employees not entitled to
severance pay upon a plant closing as a matter of law although the contract provided
in the event of close down, severance pay would be subject to immediate negotiation.
27 225 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1963).
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courts have either flatly refused injunctive relief' or have condi-
tioned the refusal on the posting of a bond by the employer as
security for the employees' recovery should they win the arbitration
proceeding.'
Considering the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the pre-
vailing federal case law is that employees generally have no right
to damages or to carry-over seniority or other rights in plant transfer
situations in the absence of specific language in the contract to the
contrary." Thus, the union or the employees justifiably could con-
clude that in the hypothetical situation postulated earlier, the fed-
eral courts are not a particularly favorable forum. Faced as they
are with the lack of substantive relief in the courts, and the pro-
cedural barrier which may be invoked,31 it is not surprising that
unions and employees often turn first to arbitration in pursuit of
their claims.
II. ARBITRATION
Once the arbitration proceeding is invoked, the threshold ques-
tion is whether the dispute is or is not arbitrable. Arbitrators have
generally held disputes over plant transfers to be arbitrable." One
notable exception is Remington Rand Univac Division.3 Remington
Rand had operated three plants at Ilion, New York, and one plant
in Utica, New York, located about ten miles away. Two different
unions were certified for the two areas and union shop agreements
were in effect. Management decided to close two of the three Ilion
plants and move portions of the operations to Utica. Three months
after the company had announced the move, the union filed a griev-
2American Workers v. Liberty Baking Co., 242 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
2Auto Workers v. Seagrave Division, 56 L.R.R.M. 2874, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 31991
(E.D. Ohio 1964).
30 For a case in which shut-down coincided with the expiration of the contract, see
Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
31 A court may refuse to take jurisdiction on the merits until the union has pursued its
arbitration rights if the contract requires arbitration. Cf. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and Carey v. Westinghouse, 375
U.S. 261 (1964). The rationale for such ruling is akin to the policy underlying
doctrines of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See also DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREAT-
ISE, §§ 20.01-.10 '(1958). For primary jurisdiction, see Sovern, Section 301 and the
Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1963). Such a policy is
in line with the analysis that courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies serve
primarily to review private nongovernmental decisions, rather than to make them in
the first instance, Hart & Sacks, supra note 19, at 6-9.
32 In United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nav. Co., supra note 31, the Supreme Court
issued a direction to the lower federal courts of which most arbitrators are aware:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage. 363 U.S. at 582-83.
3341 Lab. Arb. 321 (1963). Accord, Philco Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 604 (1963).
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ance. One month later, it filed unfair labor practice charges. The
arbitrator held the dispute not arbitrable in these words:
The most careful study of the facts ...reveals that there are
substantive differences between the present case and those to which
the affirmed legal principles apply. First, the Warrior and Gulf
Navigation Co. case . . . constituted no invitation to arbitrators to
favor their authority on capricious grounds. There had to be some
concrete, relevant contract references to justify arbitrability. In the
instant case, the Union has mentioned clauses (recognition, check-
off, general working conditions) but it is not demonstrated to the
arbitrator's satisfaction that the Company action involves directly
the "interpretation and application" of these clauses. In this con-
nection it is very pertinent that the Union has not attacked the
Company's basic right to move certain of its operations to Utica
nor has it cited (nor could it cite) any clause to challenge such
right.
34
Once the threshold of arbitrability has been crossed, the out-
come of the case seems to turn primarily on the geographical limits
of the recognition clause in the agreement. Implicit in rulings based
on this factor is the belief that employee rights with respect to
plant transfers can be negotiated and embodied in the agreement
as are other employee rights. Thus, the majority of the recently arbi-
trated cases have held that employees have no carry-over rights in
plant transfer situation. 5
However, arbitrators have upheld employee work or seniority
rights in a few instances when the contract contained specific lan-
guage barring the transfer of factories," or existing work,37 when
two plants were within the area covered by one bargaining agree-
ment,38 and when the same union represented employees at both
plants and the employer has expressed willingness to have employees
transferred.39 When seniority rights are held to carry over, the usual
remedy is to slot seniority on a case-by-case basis.4
One reason for the prevailing doctrine of no carry-over of
seniority may be the difficulty of reconciling "vested rights" of
34 Id. at 327.
35 Marsh Wall Prods., 45 Lab. Arb. 551 (1965) ; Empire Textile Corp., 44 Lab. Arb.
979 (1965); Crown Cork & Seal, 43 Lab. Arb. 1264 (1964); Paragon Bridge &
Steel Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 361 (1965) ; Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 5 (1964);
Metal Textile Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964); Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 449 (1962); H. H. Robertson Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962); Armco Steel
Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 981 (1961).
36 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. 1364 (1961).
3 7 White Motor Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 517 (1964).
38 Superior Prods. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 517 (1964).
9 Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359 (1964).
4 Compare Sonotone Corp., supra note 39 with Superior Prods., 42 Lab. Arb. 359
(1964). Slotting generally means the integration or dovetailing of two seniority
lists, with the resulting rank of an employee usually dependent on his time with the
company, rather than time at a particular plant.
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the employees of Plant A with the divesting of rights of employees
at Plant B. In other words, slotting seniority or "bumping" em-
ployees formerly at the plant which was shut down (Plant A) gen-
erally violates the spirit and probably the letter of the Plant B con-
tract. The situation probably is even more difficult to resolve when
two different unions are involved.4'
An arbitrator's decision on the merits is generally conclusive.
The decision will bar suits by dissatisfied employees under section
301.42 It will be enforced on a motion for summary judgment,
3
even if the arbitrator's decision is debatable or the underlying con-
tract clause is arguably void or unenforceable."
The arbitrator's focus on the wording of the agreement, as the
essential starting point, seems correct.4'5 The simplest decision on
the merits for an arbitrator would occur if there were a specific
clause governing plant transfers. As can be seen from this review
of the cases, however, such a clause rarely exists. The next step in
the arbitrator's decisional process is generally to look at the breadth
of the recognition clause. A narrow recognition clause limited to
the plant, and often the specific company division involved, usually
limits the applicability of the agreement to the particular plant in-
volved and precludes plant transfer rights.46 This conclusion seems
correct, especially if the contract contains a broad management rights
clause, as postulated earlier.
The primary protection for employees, therefore, would seem
to be in aggressive union bargaining for the inclusion of a work
or plant transfer clause in the contract. In the absence of such a
contractual provision, neither litigation nor arbitration will often
protect employees in plant transfer situations. Nor does the exis-
tence of the duty to bargain generally portend much relief, as will
appear in the next part of this article.
III. THE Dur T'O BARGAIN
Although the NLRB has tended to hold that an employer must
41 Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that an arbitrator appointed to interpret Contract A
has either the jurisdiction to interpret Contract B or the authority to issue an order
so directly affecting Plant B.
0 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1965); Panza v. Arinco Steel Corp.,
208 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa. 1962), affd, 316 F.2d 69 '(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 897 (1963).
43 Amalgamated Meat Cutter v. M. Feder & Co., 234 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
4Selb Mfg. Co. v. IAM, 305 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962).
4 5See generally, Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482
(1959).
46 E.g., United Packers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (1962).
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bargain"7 with the union over the decision to go out of business,'
in the area of transfer of operations it is only required that manage-
ment bargain about the effects of the change but not about the
making of the decision itself. 9
Several courts of appeals have held that an employer is under
no duty to bargain with respect to economically motivated decisions
to shut down," transfer operations,5' or subcontract operations,"2
although the employer has a duty to bargain about the effects of
the decision."
Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that the contracting
out of existing work is a mandatory subject of bargaining," it was
careful to limit the holding to the facts of that case."5 In view of
the Court's limiting language," and the factors it considered im-
portant,5" it is doubtful that the holding will be extended to cover
plant transfers generally.' There is a sharp contrast between the
hypothetical situation postulated earlier and the facts in Fibreboard.
For example, in the postulated situation, there is a change in the
basic operation of the company, only some of the work which has
been performed will continue to be performed, and it will be done
at another plant, capital investment is involved, and it is probable
that the number of employees involved will differ.
As noted earlier,59 it has been clearly established that the em-
ployer has a duty to bargain about the effects of the decision to
shut down." Nevertheless, despite the limited holding of the Su-
preme Court in Fibreboard, the NLRB has since ruled that an em-
4 7 The employer's duty is enunciated in § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)'(5) (1965).
48 Star Baby Co., 140 NLRB 678 (1963), modified to remove the board order on this point
sub nom, NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
has since ruled that an employer may cease business in a one-plant situation for anti-
union as well as economic reasons without a duty to bargain over the decision itself.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 270 (1965).
49 R.C. Can Co., 144 NLRB 210 (1963), enforced on this issue sub nom, NLRB v.
R.C. Can Co., 340 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1965).
50 NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
5 1 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
53 Jay Foods, Inc., v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961).
53 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
54 Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
5Id. at 215.
66 Ibid.
1#7 No change in the basic operations of the company, performance of the work in the
same plant, no new capital investment, and a mere replacement of existing employees
with those of an independent cotractor to do the same work. Id. at 213.
58 For discussion of how far the duty to bargain with respect to the decision to move
should extend, see Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant iReocailn, 77 HAV. L. REV.
1100, 1104-05 (1964).
5 Note 53, supra.
60 Cf. Order of R. R. Tel. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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ployer has a duty to bargain over the decision to transfer or shut
down a plant." That ruling has been reversed,62 however, and the
series of cases which have held that there is no duty to bargain over
the economically motivated decision to shut down or transfer has
been strengthened. 3
The actual result of the duty to bargain about the effects of a
transfer has been that employers have negotiated about severance
pay and related issues, but generally have not negotiated for a carry-
over of seniority rights. Despite the fact that the employer is re-
quired to bargain in good faith on such matters, there is no duty
to reach an agreement. 4 The economic power of the union Linder
such circumstances is relatively meaningless, since the failure of
the parties to agree leaves it with little recourse. The union has
no really effective tactic available.
If six months have passed since the union was notified of the
decision to shut down, it is too late for the union to file an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB.6" Even if a timely charge
were filed and upheld, the net result would be that the employer
would be compelled to bargain in good faith, but not to reach agree-
ment. By this time, the plant would probably be closed, and the eco-
nomic power of the union would be ineffectual.
If, after notice, the union felt that it was not achieving any-
thing at the bargaining table, it could strike.6 But such a move pre-
sumably would only accelerate the close down, and the employer
would be entitled to replace economic strikers for as long as neces-
sary. 7 Thus, the duty to bargain over the effects of the shut-down
61 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 NLRB 545 (1964), modified only on another
issue, 152 NLRB No. 76 (1965).
6NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
63 The court's language on the issue is reminiscent of the failing company exception
to the limitations on mergers:
We conclude that an employer faced with an economic necessity of
either moving or consolidating the operations of a Jailing business has no
duty to bargain with the union respecting its decision to shut down. Id. at
196. (Emphasis added.)
But whether operations at a particular plant are unprofitable or simply less prc fitable
than they would be elsewhere does not seem enough of a difference to justify ho!ding
the employer to a duty to bargain with respect to the decision to shut down in the
latter case though not the former. On the failing company exception in antitrust
law, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962) (dictum).
64 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 403 (1952) (dictum).
5White Consol. Indus., Inc., 154 NLRB No. 127 (1965).
6 The relevance of a no-strike clause in the situation is beyond the scope of this article.
67 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). If the strike were an
unfair labor practice strike, the traditional backpay award would be meaningful. but
reinstatement probably is meaningless unless the employer's failure to bargain in good
faith infected the decision to shut down so that it would be held to have been moti-
vated by antiunion bias, rather than economic considerations. In the latter case, the
NLRB might order reinstatement at the operating plant. Textile Workers V. Darling-
ton Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965).
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offers as little hope for the carry-over of seniority and other rights
as does a section 301 action or arbitration."3
CONCLUSION
In the absence of specific contract language preserving work
and seniority rights, the current status of the law gives the union
and the employees little hope of preserving such rights at other
plants. The only effective way to secure such rights is for the
union to bargain for them when negotiating an agreement prior to
the employer's decision to close down or transfer. An alternative
and probably less effective tactic would be to bargain for broad
recognition and seniority clauses and narrow management rights
clauses. In view of the fact that unions have been fairly aggressive
in bargaining to preserve work and seniority rights in the light of
automation," it is somewhat surprising that they have been less
aggressive in bargaining for such rights in plant transfer situations.
Leaving the parties to settle the issues at the bargaining table is
the general method for the settlement of such issues, and is appro-
priate in this situation.
68 Parts I and II, supra.
6The agreements reached with the West Coast International Longshoremen's Associ-
ation and the New York Newspaper Employees Unions illustrate this fact.
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WHEN IS A LIFE ESTATE NOT A
LIFE ESTATE IN COLORADO?
By THOMPSON G. MARSH*
"We fail to get from the briefs in this case, . . . the assistance
to which we are entitled."' With these disturbing words the Colo-
rado Supreme Court began a strange detour from which it may now
be returning. The route can be traced in seven cases.
There are orthodox landmarks in 1922 and 1926; deviation
beginning in 1942 and continuing into 1960; and at least a halt in
1965.
I. Barnard v. Moore.2
An orthodox case on the main route: "I hereby devise ... to
my wife ... for her sole use and enjoyment during her natural life,
my ranch . . ., and after the death of my wife the life estate hereby
. . .devised to her shall cease, and I hereby devise the remainder
over of said land, in fee simple, to my five sons . . . in fee simple.
. . .In the event my wife shall desire to sell said place during her
lifetime, the proceeds shall be at once freed from her life estate
hereinabove devised, and shall be equally divided between my five
sons and Ida V. Pricket. ' '3 (Emphasis added.)
The widow quit-claimed "all the right, title, interest, claim and
demand which the said party of the first part has in and to the ..
premises" to the five sons and Ida V. Prickett.'
The court said:
A .. . question is whether the widow, by her deed... conveyed the
fee or only her life estate. We think only her life estate. . . . A
power to convey creates, in the donee thereof, no right, title or
interest in the premises to be conveyed .... Her only right, title
or interest, then, was an estate for life; therefore she conveyed
nothing more, unless, elsewhere in the deed, it appears that she
intended to exercise the power.
5
No such intention was found. It is obvious that the result of
the case would have been different if the widow had been held to
have had an estate in fee simple absolute.
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1
McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 380, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
271 Colo. 401, 207 Pac. 332 (1922).
3 Abstract of Record and Assignment of Errors, pp. 8-9, Barnard v. Moore, 71 Colo.
401, 207 Pac. 322 (1922).
4Id. at 14-15.
571 Colo. 401, 404, 207 Pac. 332, 333 (1922).
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II. Blatt v. Blatt.6
Another orthodox case on the main route: "I ... devise and
bequeath to my wife . . .all my property . . . so long as she shall
live, and I hereby authorize my ... wife and my executor ... when-
ever in the judgment of my ... wife and executor, they shall deem
it advisable, to sell said real estate .... . (Emphasis added.)
The widow elected to take against the will and was the only
heir. It was held that she took the entire estate; one-half by elec-
tion and the other half as heir. Collateral relatives of the testator
unsuccessfully tried to establish a remainder by implication. Thus
it is clear that the widow would have taken the entire estate by
election and by inheritance whether the will had given her the fee
simple absolute or only a life estate, but the court said, "It seems
to us altogether clear that this will disposed only of a life estate...
by giving it to the widow.... The fee . . .is not devised . . .to any
person .... "'
III. McLaughlin v. Collins.'
The detour begins: "I hereby ... devise.., all ... of my estate
... to my ... wife . . .to be held and enjoyed by her during her
lifetime, Provided However, that she may sell . . . the real estate
for an adequate consideration, but should she die seized .. .of the
real estate ... then it is my wish that said real estate shall descend
to my son Harry ... during his lifetime, without the power of grant
or sale as to the same ..."10 (Emphasis added.)
The widow did sell the real estate, and the proceeds in the
hands of her executor were unsuccessfully claimed by the heirs of
the testator upon the ground that the widow was given only a life
estate and that the remainder to Harry was of real estate only, not
proceeds.
The court held that the proceeds belonged to the widow, and
said,
As to the real estate it is pointed out that she took only a life
estate with power of sale, but that . . . no authority was given to
dispose of the proceeds. Let us see ....
It thus seems clear that the interpretation contended for by
[the heirs of testator] would defeat the intention of [the testator]
in the following particulars: First. It would give to Dan over $1300
which his father certainly intended he should not have. Second. It
679 Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926).
7Id. at -,- 24'3 Pac. at 1100.
879 Colo. 57, 61, 243 Pac. 1099, 1101 (1926).
9 109 Colo. 377, 125 P.2d 633 (1942).
'ld. at 378-79, 125 P.2d at 634.
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would convert the power of sale expressly granted [the widow]
from something to nothing. Third. It would give Harry money
with all the authority over it implied by possession when his father
only intended he should have real estate without right of alienation.
We must therefore affirm this judgment [sustaining the widow's
right to the proceeds] unless forbidden by some positive statute
or some decision which has become a rule of property, hence stare
decisis. No one contends there is such a statute and we think the
authorities binding upon us are to the contrary."
The opinion might have ended there, and if it had, the court
would still have been on the orthodox route. However, having
referred to "the authorities binding upon us," the court proceeds
to discuss them. They turn out to be, surprisingly enough, two cases
from Maine.2 The language from these two cases fits together very
nicely. In the first case, Gregg v. Bailey, the court says, "If ... [the
intent of the testator] is so expressed that it cannot be effectuated
without violating some 'canon of interpretation so firmly established
as to have become a fixed rule of law . . .' it must fail of execution." 3
The second case, Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, quotes a rule, and
says, "This rule has been so frequently laid down by this court [i.e.,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine] that it.. is now recognized
as a 'fixed canon of interpretation.' "
What is this "canon of interpretation"? "A devise without
words of inheritance but coupled with an unqualified power of
disposal, either express or implied, conveys an absolute estate.'"
A mere reading of the rule would lead one to suspect that it was
not being applied to words which expressly created a life estate,
"to be held and enjoyed by her during her lifetime," such as the
Colorado court was considering, but that the "canon of interpre-
tation" was being applied to language which merely omitted the
words of inheritance, "and his heirs," which are usually employed
when the creation of an estate in fee simple is intended. A reading
of the Maine case shows that this was indeed the fact. The language
was, "I . . . devise to my . . . wife . . . and my . . . daughter . . . all
the . . . property . . . to their free use and benefit forever and free
from the interference and control of anyone; but if at the decease
of my wife . . . and my daughter . . . there is any of my property
that I . . . devise . . . to them left . . . it shall be equally
divided .. .6
11 109 Colo. 377, 380-83, 125 P.2d 633, 635-36 (1942).
12 Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, 124 Me. 187, 126 Ati. 823 (1924) ; Gregg v. Bailey,
120 Me. 263, 113 Atl. 397 (1921).
13 120 Me. 263, 266-67, 113 Atd. 397, 398 (1921).





Of course, this devise was held to be an estate in fee simple.
Only the words of inheritance, "to them and their heirs," were
missing.
Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7, would produce the
same result. The statute provides, "Every estate in lands which
shall be devised to one, although other words heretofore necessary
to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed
a fee simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by
express words, or do not appear to be devised by operation of law."
(Emphasis added.)
If the Colorado court had considered this Colorado statute
which has been unchanged since its adoption in 1867, as "authority
binding upon us," then it might have been impressed by the fact
that in the case before it "a less estate" had been "limited by express
words," the words being, "to be held and enjoyed by her during her
lifetime."
The "binding" quality of the other Maine case, Gregg v.
Bailey, is also obscure. The language was, "to my sister Georgie
... I . . . bequeath four thousand dollars. At her decease same to
go to my sister, Frances . . 7 Held, Georgie took only for her life.
Yet this case is cited by the Colorado court as requiring a decision
that, "to my ... wife to be held and enjoyed by her during her life-
time, Provided However, that ... she may sell ... ," created in the
wife an estate in fee simple.
As a matter of fact the Colorado court was not itself convinced
by these Maine "authorities." After discussing them and concluding
that "the rule would thus convert the bequest into a gift absolute
to Harriet [the wifel," the court in the very next paragraph of its
opinion says, "here Harriet was authorized to and did extinguish
the -remainder." (Emphasis added.) How could there have been
a remainder unless Harriet had had an estate for life?
The court's detour began in an intellectual fog of which it was
aware --"We fail to get from the briefs in this case, ... the
assistance to which we are entitled.''18
IV. Patch v. Patch-Smith.19
A distant view of the main route: "I . . . bequeath to my wife
• ..all of my property .. .and at her death all of the said prop-
erty . . . is to be divided equally between our . . . children. I wish
to make it plain that my wife ... is to have all of my property ...
17 120 Me. 263, 265, 113 At. 397, 398 (1921).
18 McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 380, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
19 113 Colo. 186, 155 P.2d 765 (1945).
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to do with as she pleases, she can sell or trade any part of it but
what is left at her death is to be divided as specified above."" The
land was in Kansas. In a proceeding to construe the will the court
said,
Counsel for plaintiffs in error cite . . our recent opinion in
McLaughlin v. Collins .. . in support of their contention that the
will should be construed so as to give an estate in fee to the
widow....
Counsel for defendant in error . . . raise the . . . point that
... the property involved is real estate... in Kansas.
• . . the law governing the interpretation of the will here in-
volved is the law.. . of Kansas.
... Kansas decisions ... announcing the law both at the time
the will was executed in 1936 and as of the time it was admitted
to probate, would clearly support the construction which would
award a life estate to the widow and the remainder to the two
daughters.21
V. Davey v. Weber.'
The detour continues, and acquires a name. "To my wife . . .
I give . . . the residue of my estate. . . for and during her natural
life, granting unto my . . . wife the privilege of disposing of any
part thereof at any time she may deem it necessary for her welfare
and if at the death of my said wife there shall be any of my estate
remaining it shall go to the following named brothers.....
(Emphasis added.)
In an action to quiet title the court held for the widow's
devisees and against the named remaindermen, and said, "counsel
. . . attempt to distinguish the McLaughlin case [from the case at
bar], but we are not persuaded that there is any difference so far
as the Colorado rule is concerned.
"An unqualified power given a life tenant to dispose of prop-
erty devised by will enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title.
Such is the Colorado rule."2 4 (Emphasis added.)
As if in confirmation, the court quotes the quite different rule
from Methodist Church v. Fairbanks, "A devise without words of
inheritance, but coupled with an unqualified power of disposal,
either express or implied, conveys an absolute estate.' ' The fog
continues. Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7 is not yet
visible.
201d. at 187, 155 P.2d at 765.
211d. at 188-91, 155 P.2d at 766-67.
22 133 Colo. 365, 295 P.2d 688 (1956).
2 1d. at 366, 295 P.2d at 688-89.
24 Id. at 368, 295 P.2d at 689.
25 124 Me. 187, 188, 126 Atd. 823, 824 (1924).
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VI. Zell v. Zell."6
Fog continues to blanket the "Colorado" detour. "I give ...
all the ... residue .. . of my estate ... unto my wife, for and during
her natural life, with the full right and authority to sell . . . any
portion or the whole.., if she in her sole discretion determines that
she is . . . in need thereof .. .and in the event that she shall die
before she has so disposed of this bequest, then I give . . . such
remaining portion to .... . (Emphasis added.)
In a proceeding for construction of the will, the court held that
the wife was vested with an absolute fee simple estate and said:
Since the decision in McLaughlin v. Collins ... Colorado has fol-
lowed what is termed the minority rule in interpreting such testa-
ments of remainders. Our re-affirmance of this rule appears in
Davey v. Weber ... wherein it was stated: "An unqualified power
given a live tenant to dispose of property devised by will enlarges
the life estate to a fee simple. Such is the Colorado rule."28
The court is no longer looking for road signs, and doesn't see
Colorado Revised Statute, section 118-1-7.
VII. First Nat'l Bank v. People.'
The detour is no longer proudly called the "Colorado rule"
but is renamed the "McLaughlin rule." The majority calls a halt.
The dissenter says it is a turning back. The will created a trust and
provided, "My trustees shall pay all of the net income ...to my
wife ...as long as she shall live. . . .In addition .. .my trustees
shall pay to my wife such sums from principal as she may from time
to time request in writing. It is my intention that no limitation be
placed on my wife as to either the amount of or reasons for such
invasion of principal. . . . I hereby grant to my wife alone and in
all events, the power to appoint by her will . . . the entire balance
of principal and undistributed income, if any, . . . free of this trust,
to her estate or to any other persons .... In the event . . . that my
wife shall fail to exercise the power of appointment hereinabout
conferred upon her, then ..... 30 (Emphasis added.)
In a proceeding involving the assessment of the Colorado
inheritance tax, the court held that the wife did not take a fee
simple, but only a life estate, and said,
The commissioner relies upon three decisions of this court, namely,
26 142 Colo. 343, 351 P.2d 272 (1960).
27 Id. at 344, 351 P.2d at 273.
2Id. at 344-45, 351 P.2d at 275, citing Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 368, 295 P.2d
688, 689.
29405 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1965).
30 id. at 731.
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McLaughlin v. Collins, Davey v. Weber, and Zell v. Zell. The rule
announced in these cases may be stated as follows:
An unqualified power given a life tenant to dispose of property
devised by will enlarges the life estate to a fee simple title.
Colorado would seem to stand alone in following the "McLaughlin
Rule." The three Colorado cases supporting it have a number of
similar factual backgrounds, viz:
( 1 ) They all involved a direct devise of real property.
(2) They all involved disputes between a widow and contingent
remaindermen.
(3) They all resulted in giving full effect to the intent of the testa-
tor as gathered from the will as a whole.
(4) They all involved a legal life estate created by express language
of the will.
(5) None of them involved assets specifically made the corpus of
trust.
(6) None of them involved any question arising under the statute
authorizing collection of inheritance and successor taxes.
Under the factual situation disclosed by the record in the instant
case, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the "McLaughlin
rule." It should not be extended to include trust assets of the kind
involved in this case.31
The court does not say how many of the six enumerated "factual
backgrounds" must be present in order to justify the application
of the "McLaughlin rule" (formerly the "Colorado rule").
There are, no doubt, several interesting combinations, for
example, (2) and (6). Taken together they seem to mean that the
widow always wins: against remaindermen she has an estate in fee
simple; against the Inheritance Tax Commissioner she has but a
life estate. If it should happen that the same will should be liti-
gated on both points in separate cases, neither decision would be
res judicata as to the other.
The six "similar factual backgrounds" look like pellets from
a pleader's shotgun, and that is what they are. 2 There is, therefore,
the possibility that they may be stated in a manner that may be
overly-persuasive.
(1) "They all involved a direct devise of real property." True,
and they all involved a direct bequest of personal property. The
will in McLaughli# v. Collins said: "I hereby ... devise ... all...
of my estate . ..both real and personal . . . to my wife . . . to be
held and enjoyed by her during her life time, provided however,
that all personal property... may be ... sold or disposed of as she
may wish....,, (Emphasis added.)
31 Id. at 732-33.
32 Brief for Plaintiffs in Error, p. 20, 405 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1965).
33 109 Colo. 377, 378-79, 125 P.2d 633, 634 (1942).
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The will in Davey v. Weber said, "To my wife, I... bequeath
the residue of my estate, both real and personal ... for and during
her natural life, granting unto my ... wife the privilege of dispos-
ing of any part thereof at any time she may deem it necessary for
her welfare."34 (Emphasis added.)
The will in Zell v. Zell said, "I . . . bequeath all the residue
... of my estate, real, personal, and mixed ... unto my ... wife,
for and during her natural life, with the full right and authority
to sell . . . any portion or the whole of this bequest . . .. " (Empha-
sis added.)
(2) "They all involved disputes between a widow and con-
tingent remaindermen." Not quite true, and certainly misleading.
In McLaughlin v. Collins, the widow had sold the land and the
proceeds in the hands of her executor were claimed by those who
would have been reversioners if she had had only a life estate. How-
ever, the court's first ground for decision was that even though her
estate was a life estate, she was empowered to deal with real estate
and its proceeds as she pleased unless restricted by the phrase "for
an adequate consideration," and the court found no such restriction. 8
(3) "They all resulted in giving full effect to the intent of the
testator as gathered from the will as a whole." This statement is true
only of the first ground of the decision in McLaughlin v. Collins.
As to the second ground, "authorities binding upon us," the court
said, in this part of the opinion, "If we assume that the words, 'dur-
ing her life' and 'for an adequate consideration' evidenced Mc-
Laughlin's intent that . . . any proceeds . . . should go to Harry,
the foregoing rule defeats that intent and confirms Harriet's abso-
lute title to said proceeds."3 (Emphasis added.) The "foregoing
rule" was, "A devise without words of inheritance, but coupled
with an unqualified power of disposal, either express or implied,
conveys an absolute estate." 8
Davey v. Weber does not purport to look for the intention of
the testator, who had said, "to my wife . . . for and during her
natural life," but simply the said case was like that of McLaughlin
v. Collins and applied the "Colorado rule." 9
Zell v. Zell simply says, "The wording... is in fact no differ-
34 133 Colo. 365, 366, 295 P.2d 688, 688-89 (1956).
35 142 Colo. 343, 344, 351 P.2d 272, 273 (1960).
36 109 Colo. 380-81, 125 P.2d 635. ". . Harriet was authorized to and did extinguish
the rem inder." Id. at 384, 125 P.2d at 636.
37 109 Colo. 377, 383, 125 P.2d 633, 636 (1942).
38Ibid.
39 133 Colo. 365, 368, 295 P.2d 688, 688-89 (1956).
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ent from that in McLaughlin," and applies the "Colorado Rule."40
There is no attempt to ascertain the intention of the testator who
has said, "unto my... wife for and during her natural life."
(4) "They all involved a legal life estate created by express
language of the will." True, but this statement seems to fall some-
what short of justifying the court's misapplication of the rule from
Maine. Is it intended to suggest that a legal life estate created by
implication would be more likely held to be a life estate than one
created by express words?
(5) "None of them involved assets specifically made the corpus
of a trust." True. The idea seems to be that a life estate plus a
power to sell can be created only upon payment of a fee -to a
trustee.
(6) "None of them involved any question arising under the
statute authorizing collection of inheritance and successor taxes."
True, and intriguing. The thought seems to be that by devising
to one's wife for life with a power to sell, she may be given a fee
simple absolute, but that it will be taxed only as a life estate. This
really sounds too good to be true.
One is inclined to agree with the dissenter, who failed to find
in these six "similar factual backgrounds" any sufficient reason for
distinguishing McLaughlin v. Collins.
If the court has turned around and does wish to regain the
main road, Colorado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7, which has
never been called to its attention, points in the right direction.
Barnard v. Moore and Blatt v. Blatt lend a feeling of familiarity
to the main road. One might even hope to enjoy seeing the tech-
nique of the next-to-the-last paragraph of McLaughlin v. Collins
used to destroy the "McLaughlin rule."
In that paragraph the court escaped the rule expressed in Blatt
v. Blatt by saying, ". . . a careful examination of the Blatt case will
demonstrate that the holding there was dictum, since in that case
there were neither children nor descendants of children. Mrs. Blatt
would have taken the whole had there been no will."41 Thus by
supplying an alternative ground for decision, the court disparaged
the expressed ground as dictum. How much easier to do the same
thing to the "McLaughlin rule," where the alternative ground is
expressed as a principal reason for the decision, and the "rule" is
employed only, "If we assume. .. "
40 142 Colo. 343, 345, 351 P.2d 272, 273-74 (1960).
41 109 Colo. 377, 384, 125 P.2d 633, 636 (1942).
42 Id. at 383, 125 P.2d at 636.
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If it be suggested that lawyers have come to rely upon the
McLaughlin rule, one wonders just how many lawyers, with Colo-
rado Revised Statutes, section 118-1-7 in mind, and wishing to
create an estate in fee simple absolute, have begun by saying, "to my
wife for and during her natural life."
If it be suggested that security of title requires persistence of
any rule for the sake of certainty, what certainty can there be,
without a return to the main road, after the opinion in First Nat'l
Bank v. People?
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By ALAN D. LEWIS*
I. SCOPE
It is the purpose of this Note to survey the provisions and a few
of the problems which relate to the federal income taxation of estates
and trusts. As such, it will only expose the reader to the general rules
relating to the income taxation of estates and trusts, and will not make
an estate and trust tax expert of him.
The discussion will be accomplished in two sections. The first
section will relate to income taxation at the fiduciary level, encom-
passing the rules and problems involved in the determination of the
income and deductions of estates and trusts, and in particular the
distributions deduction. The second section will discuss some pro-
visions and problems of income taxation at the beneficiary level.
This Note will not be concerned with either the grantor trust
provisions1 or the federal estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. The estate tax provisions comprise an entirely different part
of the Code' and are directed toward a different type of tax.3 How-
ever, the estate tax will be considered in regard to some special pro-
visions that affect both the estate tax and the estate income tax.
11. DEFINITIONS
To comprehend fully the estate and trust income tax provisions
and the discussion thereof, the definitions which the tax laws have
attached to the terms "estate," "trust," "fiduciary," and "beneficiary"
must be understood.
*Arthur Young & Co., Tax Department, Denver, Colorado; member, Colorado Bar;
B.S.B.A. University of Denver, 1963; J.D. University of Denver, 1965.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 671-78. These trusts generally arise when the grantor
has transferred property into a trust and has retained certain reversionary interests,
powers to control beneficial enjoyment of the trust, administrative powers, or rever-
sionary powers. To the extent that the grantor does retain such ownership, he is
personally taxed on the portion of income attributable to that ownership, as though
the trust does not exist. (The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will hereinafter be
referred to as I.R.C.) Unless otherwise indicated, all case authority herein cited has
dealt with either the 1954 Code or the comparable provisions of the revenue laws
prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code.
2 I.R.C. §§ 2001-209.
3 "The estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of property occasioned by death. The
income tax is an annual tax imposed upon the net income received by the taxpayer in
the taxable year." (Emphasis added.) Robert J. Kleberg, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934).
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Estate. The decedent's estate4 is the entity which must account
for the income generated by the decedent's property during the
period of administration, between the decedent's death and the ulti-
mate distribution of the property to the intended transferees.' It is
generally identical with the probate estate of the decedent.
The corpus of the estate, for income tax purposes, does not
necessarily coincide with the decedent's gross estate for federal es-
tate tax purposes, since many of the assets pass outside of adminis-
tration. For example, securities, held in joint tenancy by the dece-
dent and another, in which the decedent paid the full consideration,
would be included in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes.' But on the decedent's death, the securities would be
entirely vested in the survivor and would not be the subject of a
future transfer from the decedent's representative. Therefore, the
securities would not constitute a part of the corpus of the estate for
income tax purposes.
Trust. The Treasury Regulations define a trust in the follow-
ing manner:
In general, the term "trust" as used in the Internal Revenue
Code refers to an arrangement created either by will or by an inter
vivos declaration whereby trustees take title to property for the pur-
pose of protecting or conserving it for the beneficiaries under the
ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate courts. 8
The term is further held to refer only to express trusts; and there-
fore, it does not apply to constructive, resulting, or ex maleficio
trusts.9
4Although the term "estate" generally brings to mind the assets of a decedent, un-
der the Code the term also contemplates other situations. E.g., the term also
applies to assets held by a trustee in bankruptcy. For the fiduciary's requirement
as to bankrupt individuals, see O.D. 174, 1 Cum. BULL. 175 (1919). Also, I.T.
3959, 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 90. For the requirement as to bankrupt partnership
estates, see G.C.M. 24617, 1945 CuM. BULL. 235, modifying G.C.M. 8488, X-1
CuM. BULL. 270 (1931), and recommending that I.T. 1540, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 178
'(1922) be modified. In the case of corporations, I.R.C. § 6012(b) (3) requires
that where the trustee in bankruptcy has possession or title to "all or substan-
tially all the property or business" of the corporation, he must report the cor-
poration's income in the same manner and form as the corporation is required
to make the report. The estate of an infant or incompetent is not a separate entity
from the person for whom the fiduciary is acting, and thus the fiduciary is only
required to file an individual income tax return (form 1040) for the infant or
mental incompetent. Treas. Reg § 1.641(b)-2(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6580,
1961-2 CUM. BULL. 123; Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(b)'(3) (1959).
5 I.R.C. § 641(a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956).
8 I.R.C. § 2040; Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1962).
7United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, motion denied, 306 U.S. 620 (1939) U.S.
620 (1939); Dimock v. Corwin, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. granted, 305
U.S. 593, allirmed, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
8 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960).
' Western Products Co., 28 T.C. 1196 (1957), acq., 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 6.
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A trust will be recognized for tax purposes only when there is
a relationship that is clothed with the characteristics of a trust."0
Thus, even though there is trust form,1 or there are words saying
that a trust is being created, 2 such devices do not control the de-
termination of whether a trust in fact exists.
If a trust, in fact, exists for income tax purposes, it will fall
into one of two categories-a simple trust or a complex trust. This
distinction must be made as different tax consequences may result
depending upon the characterization of the trust.
A trust is classed as a simple trust when (1) the instrument
creating such requires the trustees to distribute currently all of the
trust income to the beneficiaries; 3 (2) nothing more than income
is actually distributed during the taxable year; 4 and (3) the terms
of the trust instrument do not authorize the payment, use, or perma-
nent dedication of the trust funds for charitable purposes. Simple
trust status will be maintained even though the current income is
not actually distributed during the taxable year, provided the trustee
is under a duty to make the distributions." A trust will not lose its
"simple" status merely because it is a sprinkling trust.1 A trust
will lose its "simple" status, however, if in any year it actually dis-
tributes corpus. 8
All other trusts are classified as complex trusts.9 Thus, a com-
plex trust is one that is authorized by its creating instrument either
(1) to accumulate income, or (2) to pay, use, or permanently set
aside funds for charitable purposes.
Fiduciary. The tax laws define the term "fiduciary" as a person
who occupies the position of a trustee, executor or administrator.0
10 Weil v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 681, 180 F. Supp. 407, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
822 (1962).
11 Hubbell v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1945).
12 Boyt v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
13 I.R.C. § 651(a)(1).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-3(a) (1956).
"SI.R.C. § 651(a)(2).
16Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-2(a) (1956).
17Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-2(a) (1956).
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-3(a) (1956). There are provisions, though, that will al-
low a trust to retain a "simple" status even though in a particular year the trust
is required to distribute corpus. It is only in this year of distribution that the
trust takes on a "complex" status, and the trust may return to its "simple" status
after the year in which the distribution is made. In the year of termination, a
trust which formerly was "simple" will always be taxed as a complex trust due to
the distribution of corpus incident to termination.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-i (1956). It is interesting to note that the terms "simple
trust" and "complex trust" are not found anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code.
They are solely the product of the Treasury Regulations.
2
0 I.R.C. § 7701(a) (6) ; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-6 (1960).
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Unless otherwise stated, the same definition attaches to the term
when used in this Note.
Beneficiary. The term "beneficiary" or "cestui que trust," is
defined in the Code, as it is ordinarily defined in the law of trusts.'
The Code expands this definition of "beneficiary" by including there-
in the terms "heir," "legatee," and "devisee." ' The term will be
used in a like manner in this Note in order to facilitate the discus-
sion.
III. TAXATION OF THE FIDUCIARY
The primary problem concerning taxation of the fiduciary's in-
come is the determination of the Internal Revenue Code provisions
applicable to estates and trusts. Most of the provisions are located
in those Code sections applicable to the individual taxpayer.' Many
of these sections incorporate limitations and special rules as to their
applicability to estates and trusts. Other provisions are located in
Subchapter 'J' of the Code. The primary functions of Subchapter
'J' are (1) to limit further the scope of the individual taxpayer pro-
visions applicable to estates and trusts, and (2) to provide special
rules for the taxation of estates and trusts.
The secondary problem is to determine which limitations and
special rules apply equally to both estates and trusts.
Therefore, there are four questions which must be answered
to determine the tax law applicable to an estate or trust:
(1) Is there an applicable individual taxpayer provision?
(2) Does this provision incorporate a limitation or special rule as
to estates and trusts?
(3) Is there a limitation or special rule located in Subchapter 'J'?
(4) If the answer to (2) or (3) is "yes," do the applicable pro-
visions differentiate as to the treatment to be accorded to an
estate as opposed to a trust ?
It is the purpose of this section of the Note to consolidate the
provisions of the Code applicable to estates and trusts, and to deli-
neate instances where the provsions make a distinction between
estates and trusts. The discussion will first consider the status of
an estate or trust as a taxpayer, followed by an analysis of the pro-
visions relating to income, deductions, and credits.
2 1 
MONTGOMERY, WYNN & BLATTMACHR, FEDERAL TAXES-ESTATES TRUSTS AND GIFTS
206 (1951).
22 I.R.C. § 643(c).
23 "Application of Tax. - The taxes imposed by this chapter on individuals shall
apply to the -taxable income of estates or any kind of property held in trust.
I.R.C. § 641(a). Kearney v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
First Trust & Deposit Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1944).
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A. Taxable Status of Estates and Trusts
From the first moment of their existence, both estates' and
trusts? are treated as taxable entities, separate and apart from the
beneficiaries for whose benefit they are being administered. And
both entities continue to exist as separate taxable entities until
termination.2 However, the duration of the administration of an
estate differs from that of a trust, the difference being in the date
of termination. An estate is allowed to continue its existence be-
yond the time limit set by state statutes as long as there are further
administrative duties to be performed by the fiduciary. 7 However,
the period for the administration of an estate cannot be unduly
prolonged; and where continued administration is no longer neces-
sary for the setttlement of the estate, it will be considered to have
terminated.' The termination of a trust, on the other hand, does
not occur until the property therein has been distributed to the in-
tended beneficiaries, according to the terms of the will or trust
instrument.
29
Since estates and trusts are taxable entities, they have the op-
portunity to elect, as do individual taxpayers, the boundaries of their
accounting periods ;0 and the method of accounting to be employed
in the recording of income and expenses." Once these two elections
are made, the fiduciary must accordingly file the tax return of the
estate or trust.
32
24 McCauley v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Ark.), appeal dismissed, 295
F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Jones v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1952).
2 5 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) ; United States v. Norton,
250 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Brigham v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 625 (D.
Mass.), appeal dismissed, 122 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1941).
26 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(b)-3(a), (b) (1956).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956).
2 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1956); McCauley v. United States, 193 F. Supp.
938 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(b) (1956). However, even after the termination point, the
trust may maintain its status for a reasonable period of time in order for the trustee
to complete his administrative duties. A trust may continue its existence for purposes
of distribution to a remainderman after the death of a life tenant. Bryant v. Com-
missioner, 185 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1950).
30The accounting period (or taxable year) of an estate or trust may be selected by
the fiduciary merely by timely filing the entity's first tax return. The election is
binding, however, and once the taxable year has been selected by the filing of the
first return, that return cannot be amended for purposes of changing the taxable
year. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.441-1(b) (3) and (4) (1957).
31 The methods available to the entity include the cash method, accrual method, or a
combination of those two, or any method which clearly reflects income. I.R.C.
§ 446(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1957). In the event that any of the afore-
mentioned methods do not, in the opinion of the Commissioner, clearly reflect
income, or the taxpayer fails to elect a method, the Commissioner will select a
method which he thinks does clearly reflect the income. I.R.C. § 446(b) ; Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(a) (2) (1957) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(b)(1) (1957).
32 I.R.C. § 6012(b) (4) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.641'(b)-2(a) (1956).
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The tax returns are filed in much the same manner as required
for an individual taxpayer."3 However, the requirements for filing
a tax return and for paying the tax liability may differ between
estates, trusts, and individuals. An estate, trust, or individual must
file a return if during the taxable year it had gross income in excess
of $6oo. 34 However, an estate or trust is also required to file if it has
nonresident alien beneficiaries ;31 furthermore, a trust is required to
file a return if it has received any taxable income during the year.3"
The Code requires that the tax liability of a trust or individual tax-
payer be paid at the date when the return is required to be filed. 7
An estate, however, is permitted to pay its income tax liability in
four installments."
B. Income
(1) Kind and Recognition
The income items taxable to an estate or trust are the same as
those taxable to individual taxpayers. 9 In other words, items such
as dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and other sources of income
listed under Section 61, 4' represent amounts of income which are
subject to the estate and trust income tax. The rules that apply to
the treatment and computation of these income items on an indi-
vidual's tax return also apply to the tax returns of estates and trusts."1
Subchapter 'J' has incorporated these provisions by reference,42 and
has added no other provisions which would alter the kind of receipts
that constitute income. Furthermore, the provisions for the individual
- The fiduciary is required to file the return on or before the fifteenth day of the
fourth month following the close of the entity's taxable year. I.R.C. §§ 6012(b) (4),
6072(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6072-1(a) (1959). The government form on which the
tax return is prepared is form 1041, and it must be signed by the fiduciary and
filed at the office of the district director in the revenue district in which the
fiduciary resides or has his principal place of business. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(a) (1)
(1959) ; I.R.C. § 6061; Treas. Reg. § 1.6061-1(a) (1959) ; I.R.C. § 6091(b)(1) ;
Treas. Reg. § 1.6091-2(a)(1) (1959). Along with form 1041, the fiduciary is also
required to file (if not filed previously or if there have been amendments) a copy
of the will or trust instrument if the gross income of the estate or trust exceeds
$5,000. Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-3(a)(2) (1959). The amount of the tax due and
payable on the taxable income of the estate and trust is determined by applying to
the taxable income the same tax rates that are required for use by individuals filing
separate returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-I (1956).
34 1.R.C. §§ 6012(a)'(1), (3), (4).
35 1.R.C. § 6012(a)(5).
36 I.R.C. § 6012(a) (4).
37 I.R.C. § 6151'(a).
38 I.R.C. § 6152'(a) (2). But if there is a failure to pay on an installment date, the
total amount becomes payable on demand. I.R.C. § 6152(d).
39 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-2 (1956).
40 Relating to the definition of gross income.
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-2 (1956).
See authorities cited note 23 supra.
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taxpayers do not contain any rules for special treatment of the in-
come of estates and trusts.4
The income of the estate or trust is recognized by the entity
in the same manner as it is recognized by an individual taxpayer.
That is, recognition of income is dependent upon the accounting
period and the method of accounting that has been employed by
the taxpayer. Thus, if the estate or trust uses the cash method of
accounting, there will be recognition of income only if cash has
actually been collected (or constructively collected) in the account-
ing period." However, if the accrual method of accounting has
been adopted, the income will be reported if it has been earned in
the accounting period, whether or not cash was actually collected.
(2) Income in Respect of Decedents
Generally, income is recognized by an estate or trust only when
it is produced by the property constituting its corpus, after the en-
tity has been established. However, there is an exception to this
principle with respect to estates and beneficiaries of estates. Under
Section 691(a), income accrued to the decedent at the date of his
death and not properly includible in his final personal tax return
is includible in the taxable income of the recipient when that income
is received. Whether or not the item of income is properly includible
in the final tax return of the decedent is dependent upon the
method of accounting which the decedent employed. For example,
if a cash basis taxpayer has accrued interest income on the date of
his death, it is not properly includible in his final personal tax re-
turn since the cash has not yet been collected (or constructively col-
lected) .4' But when the cash is collected (or constructively collected)
by the estate or beneficiary, it is includible in the taxable income of
that recipient. On the other hand, a contrary result might occur if
the decedent had been reporting his income on the accrual method
of accounting, since the accrued interest income might properly be
includible in the decedent's final personal return.47 However, even
under the accrual method, the decedent's final return cannot include
items of income which have accrued only by reason of the taxpayer's
death." These amounts are includible in the recipient's taxable in-
come when received.
43 See I.R.C. §§ 71-79 for those items which are specifically included in gross income.
" Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(i), 1.451-1(a) (1957).
4Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (ii) (1957).
46 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(i), 1.451-1(a) (1957).




It should be noted that the income accrued at the date of the
decedent's death is also includible in his taxable estate, since it is
a right to receive gross income." However, to the extent that estate
tax was paid on this income now taxed as income to the estate, a
a deduction is allowed on the estate's income tax return.'
C. Exclusions, Credits, and Deductions
(1) Exclusions
Generally, estates and trusts are allowed the same exclusions
from gross income as individual taxpayers. However, the nature of
estates and trusts is that of a conduit, and thus part of the income
received by the entity may have been distributed to the beneficiaries.
Consequently, where this distribution has occurred, there may be some
disallowance of the full exclusion. One limitation on exclusions taken
by estates and trusts concerns dividends. There is normally a $100
exclusion of qualifying dividends received by an entity,5 but if a por-
tion of these dividends has been distributed to the beneficiaries, the
fiduciary will not be entitled to the full $100 exclusion. Instead, the
exclusion allowed to the fiduciary is only on the same ratio that
the portion of dividends included in the fiduciary's taxable income
bears to the total dividends received.
(2) Credits
Basically, the same tax credits that may be applied against the
tax liability of an individual taxpayer, may also be applied against
the tax liability of an estate or trust. Obviously, the retirement in-
come credit 3 applicable to individuals does not extend to estates and
trusts. And since neither an estate or trust is required to file a de-
claration of estimated income tax,"4 there would be no credit for es-
timated tax payments. However, there are credits allowed for (1)
partially tax-exempt U.S. bond interest,"5 (2) qualified dividends re-
ceived,"8 (3) foreign taxes paid, 7 (4) interest paid at source on tax-
9 I.R.C. § 2033, relating to property in which the decedent had an interest.
50 I.R.C. § 691(c).
51 I.R.C. § 116.
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(c)-1 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6777, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 14.
It should be noted that the beneficiary is entitled to the full $100 exclusion on the
dividends distributed to him, and is not limited to the balance of the exclusion that
was not available to the fiduciary.
53 I.R.C. § 37.
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015(h)-i (1957).
5i.R.C. § 642(a)(1).
56I.R.C. § 642(a)(3). The dividends-received credit is not applicable to dividends
received after December 31, 1964.
57 1.R.C. § 642(a)(2).
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free covenant bond interest," and (5) qualified investments in certain
depreciable property."' The first four items are only allowed as cre-
dits to the estate or trust to the extent that the income on which they
are based is not allocated to the beneficiaries. And the credit on item
(5) is apportioned between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries on the
basis of income allocable to each,6" even though the credit is based
upon the cost of the property acquired. 1
(3) Deductions in General
Generally, the same deductions which are allowed an individual
taxpayer are also allowed the estate and trust taxpayers by a reference
statute in Subchapter 'J.' This reference statute is the same one that
incorporated the individual taxpayer provisions for income."2 How-
ever, there are several individual taxpayer deductions which do not
apply to estates and trusts. Among these are the standard deduction, 3
deductions for medical expenses," child care expenses, " and em-
ployee's moving expenses. "8 Furthermore, different rules may apply
depending upon whether a particular deduction is to be used by an
estate or a trust. The following discussion will relate most of these
deductions differing from the usual individual taxpayer provisions
and will point out where estates and trusts must be accorded differ-
ent treatment.
(a) Personal exemption. The annual exemption of $600 allowed
individual taxpayers67 is also allowed estates, " but not trusts.
Rather, Section 642(b) makes provision for a personal exemption
deduction of $300 for trusts required to distribute all of their in-
come currently, and $100 for all other trusts. It is important to note
that Section 642(b) does not refer to the trusts as being either
"simple" or "complex." For this reason, a complex trust required
to distribute all of its income currently would qualify for the $300
exemption deduction even though some of the distributions were
5I.R.C. § 32.
59 I.R.C. §§ 38, 46. The property to which this credit applies must be depreciable
property with a useful life of at least 4 years and must be either tangible personal
property or other tangible property. "Other tangible property" does not generally
include a building and its components, but for exceptions to this rule see I.R.C. § 48
and the Treasury Regulations thereunder.
-I.R.C. § 48(f)'(1).
61 I.R.C. §§ 46(a)(I), (c).
62 See authorities cited note 23 supra.
63
I.R.C. § 142(b)(4).
64Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(a)(1) (1957).
6Treas. Reg. § 1.214-1(b) (1956).





made as charitable contributions, or even though corpus was dis-
tributed."
(b) Charitable deduction. The charitable contributions deduction
provided for individual taxpayers in Section 170 is made inapplicable
to estates and trusts, by Section 642(c), which provides for a deduc-
tion in favor of estates and trusts in the year that amounts were paid
to, used, or permanently set aside for charitable organizations as de-
fined in the individual taxpayer provisions. There are four impor-
tant principles relating to this deduction:
(i) Section 642(c) applies only to estates and complex trusts,
and does not extend to simple trusts. A simple trust, by definition,
is one which is not authorized to pay or to permanently set aside
trust funds for charitable purposes." Furthermore, Section 642(c)
states that only estates and complex trusts are able to qualify under
its provisions.
(ii) The funds from which the contribution is made must have
been included in the gross income of the estate or trust. The estate
and trust provisions specify the type of funds that must be used for
the charitable contribution. This specification is contrary to the pro-
visions for the contributions deduction allowed individual taxpayers.
For an estate or trust to take advantage of the deduction, the contri-
butions of the estate or trust must have been made from income
sources included in the gross income of the estate or trust.7' Thus,
contributions made from taxable income received (including income
in respect of a decedent) would qualify for the deduction." On the
other hand, contributions made from funds which are exempt from
income tax would not qualify for the deduction.73 There is an exten-
sion of this rule where the contribution is made from the gain on
the sale of an asset which received long-term capital gain treatment.
If a long-term capital gains deduction of one-half the amount of
such gain was allowed when the gain was reported, the contributions
deduction is limited to the one-half of the gain that was taxed.74
(iii) Estates and trusts are generally not subject to the limita-
tions on the deduction imposed on the individual taxpayer. Section
642(c) provides that if the charitable contribution qualifies for the
deduction, it may be deducted "without limitation" from the gross
69Treas. Reg. § 1.642(b)-i (1956).
70I.R.C. § 651(a)(2).
71Trpas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-2 (1956).
72Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-i(b) (1956).
73Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-2 (1956).
74 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(c)-3 (1956).
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income of the estate or trust. This provision sharply contrasts with
the individual taxpayer provisions which limit the amount of the
deduction to 20% or 30% of the individual's adjusted gross income,
depending upon the type of charity that was the recipient."
(iv) A complex trust may be subject to limitations on the de-
duction. As to charitable deductions, an estate differs from a com-
plex trust in that the latter may be subject to limitations on the
amount of the deduction allowed. There are three types of limita-
tions placed on the charitable contributions deductions of complex
trusts:
First, a trust cannot deduct amounts as charitable contributions
if their source was derived from unrelated business income, even
though these amounts were included in the gross income of the
trust." However, if the contributions made from unrelated business
income were actually paid (as opposed to being set aside) to the
charity, the 20% and 30% limitations imposed on individual tax-
payers will be imposed on the amounts so paid.7"
Second, if the trust enters into any prohibited transaction78
with the funds set aside for charitable purposes, the charitable con-
tributions deduction may be limited to the 20% and 30% limitations
imposed on individuals. However, if there is a disallowance because
the trust entered a prohibited transaction, the trust may nevertheless
receive the unlimited deduction in subsequent years if it can be satis-
factorily shown that the trust will no longer engage in any of the
prohibited transactions. 9
Third, a limitation may be imposed if the trust (1) has set aside
an unreasonable amount of funds for the charity, or (2) has used the
funds set aside for purposes other than charitable, or (3) has jeopar-
dized the interests of the charitable beneficiaries by making impru-
dent investments with the funds set aside."0 If any of these acts
have occurred, the trust will be limited either to the amount actually
75 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1).
761.R.C. § 681(a).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.681(a)-2(a) (1957). Since the concept of adjusted gross income
is inapplicable to trusts, the 20% and 30% limitation is applied to the trust's taxable
income before the charitable contributions deduction.
78 A "prohibited transaction" is one in which the trust uses the amounts set aside
for charitable purposes, for (1) loans without adequate security or interest, or
(2) unreasonable amounts of compensation for personal services, or (3) preferential
services, or (4) unreasonable consideration in the purchase of securities, or (5) a
sale at less than adequate consideration, or (6) any other substantial transaction
which results in its diversion from the purpose for which it was intended. I.R.C.
§ 681(b)(2).




paid to the charity, or to the 20% and 30% limitation applicable
to individuals, whichever results in a lesser amount."
(c) Net operating loss. Estates and trusts are allowed the same
benefits of the net operating loss (NOL) deduction as allowed
individual taxpayers, " with two exceptions. First, the trust must
exclude all amounts, both income and deductions, which are at-
tributable to persons taxed under the provisions of Sections 671-78.8
Second, the estate or trust is not allowed to take into account either
the charitable contributions deduction or the distributions deduction. 4
Closely related to the provisions for the NOL deductions are
those provisions which deal with the disposition of an unused NOL
carryover after the estate or trust has terminated. An individual tax-
payer's NOL carryover is lost as of the date of his death, and cannot
be carried over to his estate.' But a different rule applies if an
estate or trust is terminated; Section 642(h) provides for the dis-
position of a NOL carryover in such situations. That section, and
supplementary provisions, prescribe that the unused carryover be
allowed the beneficiaries directly,' and allocated according to the
share of each 'beneficiary succeeding to the estate or trust property.'
(d) Depreciation and depletion. The depreciation and depletion
allowances for estate and trust property are computed in the same
8
1I.R.C. § 681(c).
8 I.R.C. § 642(d).
8 3 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(d)-1(a) 1956).
8 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(d)-l(b) (1956). It is important to realize that although most
transactions of an estate or trust flow through to the beneficiaries, the NOL deduc-
tion has only an indirect effect on the beneficiaries. Mellott v. United States, 257
F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958), rehearing denied, 358
U.S. 913 (1958); Swoboda v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1957),
affirmed, 258 F.2d 848, (3d Cir. 1958); Kearney v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). This distinction stems from the concept that both estates are trusts
are entities separate from the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries may, however, indirectly
receive the benefit of a NOL carryover deduction in that they may be taxed only
on the distributable net income (discussed, infra, p. 197) of the entity. (The compu-
tation of distributable net income does not require an adjustment for a NOL
deduction included in the entity's taxable income.) Furthermore, in the event of a
NOL carryback by the estate, advice has been given that since the distributable net
income of the estate for prior years has been reduced by the loss carried back, the
amount reported by the beneficiaries in the carryback years may be reduced. Thus,
the beneficiaries may file a claim for refund. Rev. Rul. 61-20, 1961-1 CUM. BULL.
248. (Although the advice was given in regard to estates, it appears that it would
also apply to trusts.) Distributions deduction discussed, infra p. 196.
8Mellott v. United States, 257 F.2d 798 (3rd Cir. 1958). This same rule is also
applicable to capital losses. Rev. Rul. 54-207, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 147.
8Treas. Reg. § 1.642(h)-l(a) (1956). These provisions also apply when, in the
year of termination, %there is either a capital loss or a loss due to an excess of
deductions other than personal exemptions and charitable contributions. I.R.C.
§§ 642(h)(1), (2).
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.6 2(h).4 (1956). As to the meaning of "beneficiaries succeeding
to the property," see Rev. Rul. 60-134, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 259; Treas. Reg. §
1.642(h)-3 (1956). Thus the benefit of a NOL deduction may accrue directly to
the beneficiary only when there is a carryback by the estate or trust, or when there
is a carryover remaining at the time of the termination of the entity.
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manner as those allowed on property of an individual taxpayer.8
However, under the individual taxpayer provisions relating to de-
preciation and depletion, estates and trusts are not entitled to deduct
the entire amount of depreciation and depletion so computed. The
estate or trust may deduct only so much of the depreciation and de-
pletion as is not allowable to the beneficiaries.89
The basic rule is that both estates and trusts must apportion the
amount of the depreciation and depletion deductions between the
fiduciary and the beneficiaries on the basis of the income allocable
to each.' The rule may be different as to trusts, however, where the
trust instrument or local law permits or requires the trustee to main-
tain a depreciation or depletion reserve. The depreciation and de-
pletion deductions would then be allocated to the fiduciary and the
beneficiaries on the basis of the income available only after allocat-
ing the requisite amount to the depreciation or depletion reserve."'
There is yet another difference between estates and trusts as to
depreciation. This difference is presented by Section 179, which
provides for an additional first-year depreciation deduction in the
amount of 20o of the investment in a qualifying asset. That section
has specifically precluded trusts from the enjoyment of this provi-
sion,92 and thus it is available only to estates.
(e) Double deductions. A provision not applicable to individual
taxpayers is found in Section 642 (g), concerning the disallowance
of double deductions. The problem of double deductions occurs
when the estate has incurred expenses such as those stated in Section
2053,9' or losses such as those stated in Section 2054." These items
88Depreciation: I.R.C. § 167; Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 418 (Guidelines).
Depletion: I.R.C. § 611. The Code provides that the amortization deduction for
emergency or grain storage facilities shall be computed in the same manner as the
deduction allowed individual taxpayers. I.R.C. § 642(f). The Regulations further
provide that the deduction shall be allocated in the same manner as deductions for
depreciation and depletion. Treas. Reg. § 1.642(f)-i (1956), as amended, T.D.
6712, 1964-1 (Part 1) CUM. BULL. 114.
8I.R.C. § 6 4 2(e).
90I.R.C. §§ 167(h), 611(b)(3), (4). But if the trust instrument requires a different
allocation, that requirement will be controlling.
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(h)-l(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6712, 1964-1 (Part 1)
CuM. BULL. 109; Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(c)(4) (1960). Note that the provisions
relating to the depreciation reserve are located only in the Regulations, and are not
found in the Code.
92 I.R.C. § 179(d) (4).
93 Relating to expenses, indebtedness and taxes. It should be noted that there has been
a recent amendment to the Treasury Regulations, providing for the estate tax deduc-
tion of a loss incurred on the bona fide sale of estate assets. The amount of the deduc-
tion is the lesser of the difference between the sales price and (1) the fair market
value of the asset on the applicable estate valuation date; or (2) the fair market
value of the asset on the date of sale. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (2) (1958), as
amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 13.
94 Relating to casualty and theft losses.
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are deductible, under Sections 2053 and 2054, in computing the tax-
able estate; they are also deductible, under the authority of the in-
dividual taxpayer provisions, in computing the taxable income of
the estate. In order to prevent this double benefit, Section 64 2(g)
requires the estate to refrain from using these items as deductions
on its income tax return if they have been or will be used in com-
puting the taxable estate. However, the fiduciary may file a waiver
as to the deduction of these expenses or losses for estate tax purposes;
they may then be deducted in computing the estate income tax. Sec-
tion 64 2(g) is applicable only to estates, and has been held not to
extend to trusts, even though the trust property has been included
in the taxable estate."5
(f) Deductions in respect of decedents. Under this provision,"8 the
estate, in computing its taxable income, is allowed a deduction for
the payment of the following expenses which were accrued at the
date of the decedent's death: (1) trade or business expenses; (2)
interest; (3) taxes; (4) expenses for the production, management,
or conservation of income, or the property from which income is
produced; and (5) depletion.
It should be noted that since these expenses were accrued at the
date of death, they may also be deducted under the estate tax pro-
visions in computing the taxable estate."' This deduction can be made
without violating Section 642(g) (discussed above) because that
section applies only to expenses incurred after death, and does not
attempt to deal with the payment of expenses which were accrued
at the date of death."
(4) Distributions Deduction
(a) In general. One of the most important purposes of Subchapter
'J' is to make certain that the estate or trust and the beneficiaries are
taxed on their respective portions of income from the entity, and
that neither one is again taxed on the same amount.' Accordingly,
the estate or trust is allowed a deduction from its income of those
items which are properly includible in the beneficiaries' incomes.
This deduction, known as the "distributions deduction," is a pro-
vision of the Code which applies only to estates and trusts.
The provisions relating to the amount of the distributions de-
95 Commissioner v. Mary E. Burrow Trust, 333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964), acq, 1965
INT REv. BULL. No. 30,at 60. See also, 41 DENVER L.C.J. 328 (1964), for a com-
ment on that case.
96 1.R.C. § 691(b).
97 I.R.C. § 2053(a) (3), relating to claims against the estate.
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956).
" Davidson v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 416, 149 F. Supp. 208 (1957).
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duction vary, depending upon the type of entity under consideration.
Estates and complex trusts are treated in the same manner;" simple
trusts" ' are treated quite differently from the former two entities.
Consequently, following a definition of "distributable net income,"
the rules applicable to each type of entity will be discussed separately.
(b) Distributable Net Income (DNI) - Concept. The Internal
Revenue Code requires that the income generated by the estate or
trust must be subject to an income tax at either the estate-trust level
or at the beneficiary level. Furthermore, the Code requires that the
character of the income (such as dividends) be the same when held
by the beneficiary as it was when held by the fiduciary of the estate
or trust." To fulfill these requirements, the Code has created the
concept of DNI to determine how much income should be taxed
to the beneficiary and the character of this income. The DNI con-
cept gives rise to the estate and trust becoming conduits of income
to the beneficiary, with neither the fiduciary entity nor the bene-
ficiary being taxed on the same item of income.
(c) Distributable Net Income-Defined. DNI is determined by mak-
ing various adjustments, as required by Section 643 (a), to the tax-
able income of the estate or trust. To the amount of the fiduciary's
taxable income, the following amounts which were deducted in ar-
riving at that amount are added back: (1) Distributions to benefici-
aries. (2) Personal exemptions. (3) Long-term capital gain deduc-
tion, to the extent it is not attributable to amounts which were paid,
used, or permanently set aside for charitable purposes. (4) Capital
losses, to the extent that they are not used in determining the amount
of capital gains which were (or were required to be) distributed.
Also added to the fiduciary's taxable income are the following
amounts which were excluded from income: (1) Tax-exempt inter-
est, reduced by allocated expenses which would have been tax de-
ductible had they not applied to tax-exempt income; and by the por-
tion of such interest that has been paid, used, or permanently set
aside for charitable purposes. (2) Foreign trust income, reduced
by the same type of amounts that would reduce the tax-exempt in-
terest (above). Capital gains are included, but they can be offset
by capital losses to the extent of the gains. (3) Dividend exclusion,
to the extent of the fiduciary's portion.
The following items which have been included in the fiduciary's
taxable income are then subtracted, thus yielding the entity's DNI:
100I.R.C. § 661.
101 I.R.C. § 651.
102 1.R.C. §§ 652(b), 662(b).
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(1) Capital gains, to the extent that they are allocated to corpus and
have not been (or required to have been) distributed to a beneficiary;
or have not been paid, used, or permanently set aside for charitable
purposes. 3 (2) Extraordinary, and taxable stock dividends which
have been received by a simple trust, and which in the good faith
determination of the fiduciary have been properly allocated to corpus
and not paid to the beneficiaries.
(d) DNI and simple trusts. As previously defined," 4 a simple trust
is one which is required to distribute all of its income currently. That
is, all of the income received by the trust during the taxable year is
required to be distributed in that year to the beneficiaries. It follows,
then, that the beneficiaries of the trust will be required to include
these current distributions in their personal gross income. 5 To pre-
vent the beneficiaries and the trust being taxed on the same item
of income, the trust is allowed a distributions deduction in the amount
of the required current distribution."8 This deduction is mandatory
whether or not the required distributions were made during the
taxable year. However, the distributions deduction may not exceed
the DNI; therefore, if DNI is a smaller amount than the actual
distributions, DNI will constitute the distributions deduction.'
The statute specifically provides that the amounts of income
required to be distributed currently are only those amounts included
in the taxable gross income of the trust; therefore, items which are
excluded from gross income do not constitute part of the distribu-
tions deduction.1 8 Thus, in the computation of the distributions de-
duction for purposes of a simple trust, tax-exempt income, foreign
trust income, and excluded dividends need not be added to the tax-
able income in computing DNI.
(e) DNI and estates and complex trusts. The distributions deduc-
tion for estates and complex trusts is computed by using a two-tier
system. The first tier is comprised of the same type of distribu-
tions that make up the distributions deduction of a simple trust.
That is, the first tier is comprised of the income which the fiduciary
did, or was required to, distribute currently. Although the fiduciary
is required to make a distribution out of either corpus or income,
103Thus, if the capital gain is either (1) allocated to income, or (2) allocated to
corpus, but distributed to the beneficiaries or paid, used or permanently set aside
for charitable purposes, or (3) used in determining the amount to be distributed,
the gain will not be deducted from taxable income in computing DNI.
104 See discussion p. 185 supra.
1_.R.C. 8 652.
0-I.R.C. § 651.
'0 I.R.C. § 651(b).
18 I.R.C. § 651(b) ;Treas. Reg. § 1.651(b)-1 (1956).
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the first tier distributions deduction is allowed only to the extent that
the distributions were paid out of income.'09
If the amount of distributions in the first tier exceeds DNI, the
DNI amount is used for the distributions deduction."' But if the
first tier has not exhausted the available amount of DNI, then there
must be a computation of second tier distributions. The second tier
consists of other distributions which the fiduciary made or was re-
quired to make during the taxable year."' These distributions may
be those which are made in the discretion of the fiduciary, and may
be made up of either corpus or undistributed accumulated income
from prior years."'
It should be noted that the distributions deduction is applicable
only to those distributions made to beneficiaries other than charitable
beneficiaries."' The reason for this limitation is obvious, as the
Code has already made available a separate deduction for charitable
contributions. If the charitable beneficiary were to be included in
the distributions deduction, there would in effect be a double deduc-
tion of a single distribution.
There is another provision against double deductions, which
concerns income required to be distributed currently but not dis-
tributed until a subsequent year. The rule is that since such income
was used in computing the distributions deduction in the year of re-
quired distribution, it cannot again be used for that purpose in the
year the distribution was actually made."' This rule applies to sim-
ple trusts as well as to complex trusts and estates.
IV. TAXATION OF THE BENEFICIARY
A. Income Reported
The amount and nature of the income of estates and trusts
which must be reported by the beneficiaries individually, depends
upon seven factors: (1) The estate's or trust's taxable year; (2) the
beneficiary's taxable year; (3) the estate's or trust's distributions
deduction; (4) the estate's or trust's DNI; (5) the beneficiary's
share in the estate or trust; (6) the nature of the income to the estate





12 Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(c) (1956).
1131.R.C. § 663(a)(2).
114 1.R.C. § 663(a)(3).
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The beneficiary is required to report as gross income in his in-
dividual return, his proportionate share of the amount of the distri-
butions deduction taken by the estate or trust.115 The distribution re-
cognized by the beneficiary is equal to that taken by the estate or
trust for the taxable year which ends with or within the beneficiary's
taxable year. 6
If the distributions which were (or were required to be) dis-
tributed currently exceed the DNI, the estate or trust may deduct only
the amount of DNI as the distributions deduction. As a result, the
beneficiaries as a whole need not report more than that amount on
their individual returns, and thus each beneficiary will only report as
income his "share" of the DNI."' This "share" is the percentage
computed on the basis of the amounts paid (or required to be paid)
to that beneficiary in relation to the amounts paid (or required to be
paid) to all beneficiaries. Furthermore, as to a complex trust or an
estate, DNI is first reduced by the first tier distributions and there
may be a balance amount of DNI for the second tier distributions.
If there is a balance of DNI and the second tier distributions exceed
this balance, a similar "share" basis is computed among the second
tier beneficiaries on the basis of this balance. 8
The tier system is important because all beneficiaries of the es-
tate or trust probably will not be in the same personal income tax
brackets. As a result, the estate planner may want to place the lower
income tax bracket beneficiaries in line for the first tier distribu-
tions, leaving the higher bracket beneficiaries as second tier dis-
tributees. The obvious effect would be to relieve the higher bracket
beneficiaries from reporting their share of the estate or trust income
in the event there is not enough DNI to absorb a second tier distribu-
tions deduction for the estate or trust.
As mentioned above,"9 the character of the income held by the
beneficiary must be the same as it was when held by the fiduciary.
Therefore, where there are several income beneficiaries of the entity,
there must be an allocation of the various types of income to the
beneficiaries. Generally, the income is to be allocated to each bene-
ficiary on the basis of the ratio that each type of income in the DNI
bears to the total DNI."' However, if the governing instrument
1151.R.C. §§ 652(a), 662(a).
1161.R.C. §§ 652(c), 662(c).
1171.R.C. §§ 652(a). 662(a)(1).
"8 1.R.C. § 662(a)(2).
119 See discussion p. 197 supra.
1201.R.C. § 662(a)(2).
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designates the type of income to go to each beneficiary, this designa-
tion will be controlling. The deductions are generally allocated to
the income items to which they relate, but those deductions which
have no particular income relation may be allocated to any income
item that the fiduciary desires.'21
It is important to note that the beneficiary may have taxable
income from the receipt of property in a distribution of corpus. Gifts
or bequests of specific sums of money or property do not form a part
of the entity's distributions of corpus which constitute taxable income
to the beneficiary.'" However, taxable income from a corpus distri-
bution may arise when an item of corpus is not distributed as a gift
or bequest of a specific sum of money or property, but is rather dis-
tributed to satisfy some other obligation. For example, assume the
following set of facts: The term of H's will provided that W (the
sole beneficiary) receive an annual income of $10,000 from the
estate during its administration. H did not dispose of all his prop-
erty by specific bequest and W was named as residuary legatee. H's
auto comprised part of this residual estate. On July 15, 1965, when
the auto had a fair market value of $3,000, the executor transferred
the title of the auto to W. The DNI for 1965 was $15,000. W
would report as income from the estate for 1965, the following:
$10,000 as a first tier distribution, and $3,000 of the remaining
$5,000 available for second tier distributions-a total of $13,000.
(Of course, the fiduciary would have a distributions deduction of
$13,000.) Thus, proper timing of a corpus distribution is necessary,
when the distribution is for reasons other than satisfying specific
bequests or gifts.
B. Beneficiary of a Complex Trust
While beneficiaries of estates and complex trusts are generally
treated in the same manner, there are two exceptions for complex
trusts. One exception is known as the "separate share" rule, and the
other is known as the "five-year throwback" rule. A brief discussion
of these rules will conclude this note.
(a) Separate share rule."' The separate share rule provides that
separate shares be used in computing the portion of the distributable
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.652(b)-3 (1956). However, there must be an appropriate amount
of these deductions allocated to tax-exempt income.
12 I.R.C. §663(a)(1).These bequests, in order to be exempt, must be paid either all
at once or in not more than three installments. Furthermore, a gift or bequest which
can only be paid from the income of the entity, is not considered to be a specific
gift or bequest.
1
3 I.R.C. § 663(c).
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net income taxable to each beneficiary. Under this provision each
beneficiary of the trust is treated as though he has his own trust
separate from the other beneficiaries for the purpose of determining
the DNI allocable to the respective beneficiaries. The main purpose
of this provision is to relieve a beneficiary from tax liability
on a corpus distribution where the income of the trust is being ac-
cumulated for the benefit of another beneficiary. Accordingly, simple
trusts were excluded from this provision since, by definition, simple
trusts do not accumulate income. There is speculation that this pro-
vision was not extended to estates since a more complex problem
would be involved in determining the separate shares in an estate,
and Congress did not want to leave the definition of such to the
discretion of the Commissioner."
(b) Five-year throwback rule."2 5 The five-year throwback rule con-
cerns complex trusts that in one taxable year make a distribution
of accumulated income to the beneficiaries. The rule essentially pro-
vides that when such distribution is in excess of the DNI for the
year in which the distribution took place, the excess is to be reported
by the beneficiaries in computing their personal taxable income.
The amount to be reported by each beneficiary is his portion, be-
ginning with the first preceding year, of the trust's "undistributed
net income" for that year." The computation is made, in turn,
for each preceding year until either the accumulations distribution
has been exhausted or the excess has been carried back five years,
whichever event comes first.'27 The purpose of these complicated
provisions is to prevent the trust beneficiaries from shifting the
burden of the income tax from themselves to the trust, when the
latter is in a lower income tax bracket than are the beneficiaries.
Simple trusts are not included in this provision since by the
definition of a simple trust, it is required to distribute all of its income
currently, and therefore is not authorized to accumulate. It is not
clear why estates were excluded from this provision, and it is only
speculation that Congress felt that the problem of shifting income
by accumulations was not as prevalent in estates as it was in complex
trusts. Thus, an estate may accumulate its income through the
1
24 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 36.52 (Zimet revision 1957).
125 I.R.C. § 666.
126 "Undistributed net income" is computed by taking the trust's DNI and subtracting
therefrom (1) the first tier required distributions; (2) the second tier other distri-
butionws; and (3) the federal income tax paid on the trust which is allocable to the
undistributed portion of the DNI for the year. I.R.C. § 665(a) and thc Treasury
Regulations thereunder. I.R.C. § 665(d).
127 For exceptions to the five-year throwback rule, the reader is referred to I.R.C. §§
665 (b), (c), and the Treasury Regulations thereunder.
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years, paying a lesser tax on the income than would the beneficiaries.
In the termination year the estate could then distribute all of these
accumulations plus the current year's income, and the beneficiaries
would not be taxed on any income in excess of the current year's
income.
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -THE PASSPORT ACT OF 1926 IM-
POSING AREA RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL IS NOT AN IMPROPER
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, NOR DOES IT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF TRAVEL. Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct.
1271 (1965).
Louis Zemel's application for passport validation for travel
to Cuba was refused by the Department of State. In an action
against the Secretary of State and Attorney General for an injunction
and a declaratory judgment that section 215 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952' and section 211(a) of the Passport Act
of 19262 are unconstitutional and that the Secretary's regulations
restricting travel to Cuba are invalid, a three-judge District Court
for the District of Connecticut upheld the Secretary's determination?
On appeal from a summary judgment for the defendants, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren for the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of
State had statutory authority under the Passport Act of 1926 to
impose area restrictions on travel; that the statue did not involve
an improper delegation of legislative power; and that the exercise
of the authority did not violate appellant's constitutional right of
travel.
The concept of freedom of travel was embodied in the Magna
Carta.' Although the Constitution makes no mention of this free-
dom, the values envisaged in the concept became part of the Ameri-
can tradition at the time of independence. Article IV of the Articles
' Section 215 provides:
a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any
national emergency proclaimed by the President, . . . and the President
shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions
and prohibitions . . .be imposed upon the departure of persons from and
their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation there-
of, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be
unlawful....
b) After such proclamation . . . has been made and published and
while such proclamation is in force, it shall, . . . be unlawful for any
citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart
from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport. 66 Stat.
190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
2 ,T]he Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, . . . under such rules as
the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States,
and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports." 44 Stat. 887
(1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1964).
3 Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1964).
4 [I]t shall be lawful in future for anyone ... to leave the Kingdom and return...
except for a short period in timc of war . .. Chapter 42 of the Magna Carta of
1215, as quoted from Jaffe, The Right to Travel, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17, 19
(1956).
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of Confederation guaranteed the freedom of travel between the
states.' This right of travel within the United States was later
upheld by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions.'
Originally, the passport concept involved governmental permis-
sion to enter or leave a port or harbor, and was gradually extended
to include generally permission of egress and of passage.' In inter-
national law, passports came to be recognized as letters of protection
or safe conduct issued by the host country.' In the United States,
the passport operated simply as a document of identity. It was not
a prerequisite to entry, to departure, or to remaining in the country.!
While possession of a passport facilitated travel abroad, it was not
a necessity, and a traveler could well get along without one. This,
as will be shown, was the case, with war-time exceptions, until
1941.10
In 1856 Congress enacted a statute granting the Secretary of
State power to issue passports "under such rules as the President
shall designate and prescribe."" That act, as amended,12 remains
effective today as the basic authority establishing the discretionary
power of the President to promulgate rules and regulations govern-
ing passport issuance"3 and is the statutory authorization focused
on by the court in the principal case. Congress, in 1918, passed a
statute which prohibited departure from or entry into the United
States without a valid passport during wartime or upon a presi-
dential finding of necessity by proclamation.14 During World War I
the statute became operative through a proclamation by President
5 Article IV provided that, "[T]he people of each state shall have free ingress and
regress to and from any other state .. "
6Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900) ; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
7 
HUNT, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT 3 '(1898).
8 Ibid.
0 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL
19; 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (1942) ; see also Urtetiqui
v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835). In Urtefiqui the Supreme Court, in
discussing the nature of an American passport, declared:
There is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issu-
ing of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or
declaring their legal effect . . . It is a document, which, from its nature
and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request,
that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and it is to be considered
rather in the character of a political document, by which the bearer is
recognized, in foreign countries, as an American citizen; and which, by
usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact. 34 U.S.
at 699.
10Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252.
11 Act of Aug. 8, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52.
1 2 
REV. STAT. § 4075 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 211 (1964).
13 Note 2 supra.
14 Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559.
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Wilson 5 and was rendered inoperative when the war was officially
declared at an end. 8 During World War II, the 1918 Act was re-
enacted to become operative in time of war or proclamation of
national emergency. 7 A presidential proclamation made this re-
enactment operative. 8 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 repealed the revived 1918 statute, but retained similar pro-
visions requiring passports for foreign travel "when the United
States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency
proclaimed by the President . '. ."" The national emergency pro-
claimed by President Truman during the Korean conflict' made
the statute operative and it remains in effect today, requiring a
passport for travel abroad.
A common assumption during the early history of passports
was that the Secretary of State had absolute discretion with regard
to the issuance of passports and that his decision was not subject
to judicial review." In the 1950's, however, a series of cases chal-
lenging the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952' were decided
by the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia establishing the requirements that individuals applying
for passports must be afforded both procedural' and substantive'
due process. In these decisions the right to travel was described
variously as an attribute of "personal liberty''' and as a "natural
right."2 Regardless of how described, the right to travel was con-
15 Proclamation No. 1473, 40 Stat. 1829-31 (1918).
18 Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
17 Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252.
18 Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821 (1941).
19 Note 2 supra.
20 Proclamation No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489'(1953).
21 See e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (Miss Elg, born in the United States
of Swedish parents, had her passport revoked by the State Department on the ground
that she was not an American citizen. Although the Court declared her a citizen, they
refused to compel the Secretary of State to issue the passport); Miller v. Sinjen,
289 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1923). In Miller the court said:
[Al finding that Plaintiff had ceased to be a citizen of the United
States was not necessary to the action of the State Department in denying
him a passport, for the reason that the granting of a passport by the United
States is, and always has been a discretionary matter. . . . 289 Fed. at 394.
See also 61 YALE L. J. 171 (1951), for a discussion of other denials by the Secre-
tary in the exercise of his unrestrained discretion.
22Note 1 supra.
23 Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed,
225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
24 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955) which held that arbitrary
action by Secretary of State in denying a passport does not satisfy the requirements
of due process of law.
2 Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 7(D.D.C. 1952).
2 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955), wherein the court stated:
"The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit,




sidered a liberty within the purview of the fifth amendment 7 and as
such was to be afforded the protections of substantive and procedural
due process; that is, not only did the method of restraint on travel
have to be fair and appropriate, but the content of executive criteria
for travel control could not be unreasonable, and the question of
reasonableness had to be considered in light of the high character
of the liberty sought to be restrained.
Prior to the principal case, the freedom to travel abroad had
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in two important
decisions, Kent v. Dulles28 and Aptheker v. Secretary of State."
Though Kent was concerned with the authority delegated to the
Secretary of State, the Court identified the right stating that it is a
part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment, and there-
fore it may not be infringed without due process of law." Kent
involved the denial of passports under authority of section 51.135,31
augmented by section 51.142,32 of the passport regulations, whereby
either an admission of present membership or refusal to take an
oath with respect to past or present membership in the Communist
Party resulted in automatic denial of a passport. Kent, having
refused to take the oath, brought an action to declare the regulations
unauthorized and invalid as infringing his first amendment free-
doms of speech and association and as depriving him of his liberty
without due process of law. Rather than decide these constitutional
issues, the Court preferred to construe the statutes involved nar-
rowly,33 holding that neither the Passport Act of July 1926"4 nor
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195215 "delegate to the
Secretary the kind of authority"3 he had exercised. The Court in
Kent concerned itself only with interpreting the express powers
granted by Congress to the Secretary of State and did not consider
the extent of Congress' constitutional powers to restrict travel.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State37 the Court was directly con-
fronted with the constitutional limits of travel restrictions occasioned
2 See Fahy, The Right to Travel, 6 NATURAL L.F. 109 (1961).
-357 U.S. 116 (1958).
29378 U.S. 500 (1964).
30 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
3122 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952).
32 17 Fed. Reg. 8014 (1952).
3Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958); accord, Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144
(1958).
34 Note 2 supra.
35 Note 1 supra.
3
6 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958).
37 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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by the requirements of national security. 8 Petitioners Aptheker and
Flynn, admittedly active members of the Communist Party, were
notified that their passports were being revoked under authority of
section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 making
it illegal for all members of registered communist organizations
to use or attempt to use passports."9 In a declaratory judgment
blocking the Secretary of State's action of revocation, Justice Gold-
berg, citing first amendment precedents,"0 declared section 6 uncon-
stitutional because it "too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the
right to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the
fifth amendment."' 1 The significance of Aptheker lies in its seeming
application of first amendment rules' to a case involving the right
to travel, a right that arises inferentially out of the "liberty" guar-
anteed in the fifth amendment 3 and not out of the first amendment."
This decision has been interpreted to imply that, even though the
right to travel is protected by the fifth amendment, it is such an
important right that statutes restricting it should be scrutinized
under first amendment tests.' A more conservative reading of
Aptheker would emphasize the relation between travel and the first
amendment, thereby avoiding the pronouncement of a new consti-
tutional doctrine. This construction can be postulated on the major-
ity's observation that "freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty
closely related to rights of free speech and association," ' and the
38 Id. at 505.
39 64 Stat. 993 (1951), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1951).
40 378 U.S. at 508.
4 1 Id. at 505.
42 See Justice Clark's dissent noting the differences in testing a statute for vagueness
between cases arising under the first amendment and cases arising under the fifth
amendment. Id. at 521.
43 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ; CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 188-98 (1956): In Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955), Judge Fahy of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia speaks of the right to travel as a "natural right" guaranteed by the
fifth amendment.
44 Contra, Judge Wyzanski, Chief Judge of the District Court of Massachusetts, has
written that the freedom of expression and communication involved in travel are
facets of freedom of speech. Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, Atlantic Monthly, 66,
68 (Oct. 1952). "The right to travel could be treated as a facet of free expression
and communication under the First Amendment .. " 57 MICH L. REV. 119, 120-21
(1958). American Civil Liberties Union views the freedom of travel as an integral
element of the first amendment. Hearings on S. 2770, 3998, 4110, 25.4137 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1958).
"The Committee . . . believes that this freedom of travel is a right closely related
to first amendment freedoms and that it accordingly should be denied only when
its free exercise would dangerously impinge upon national interests of the most
pressing urgency." 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF TE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEr YORK,
FREDOM TO TRAVEL 35.
4Comment, 78 HAsv. L. REV. 195, 196-98 (1964).
46 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
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fact that section 6, by making membership in a "communist organi-
zation" grounds for passport denial, directly infringed the first
amendment freedom of association." Regardless which reading is
given the decision, Aptheker clearly indicated that, even if a federal
statute giving the Secretary of State the power to deny passports is
precise, it must be drawn narrowly so as not unduly to infringe the
citizen's right to travel.
Both Kent and Aptheker concerned restrictions placed on indi-
viduals or groups because of their political beliefs or associations.
In Zemel v. Rusk," however, the entire citizenry is restricted in the
exercise of their right to travel. The ban on travel to Cuba does not
depend on individual beliefs or associations; rather, it depends on
foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." On this basis,
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a six-man Court majority, factu-
ally distinguished the principal case from Kent and Aptheker and
upheld the Secretary of State's right to impose area restrictions on
travel .'
The first issue resolved by the Court in Zemel was whether the
Secretary of State was statutorily authorized by Congress to refuse
to validate the passports of United States' citizens for travel to
Cuba. 1 Chief Justice Warren noted that the Secretary, acting under
the authority granted by Congress in the Passport Act of 1926,52
had restricted travel to Ethiopia, Spain and China in the 1930's, and
later to many communist countries" and by not acting, Congress
implicitly approved such administrative practices. 4
The Court rejected appellant's assertion that he was being
denied rights guaranteed by the first amendment by reasoning that
47 1d. at 518.
4885 Sup. Ct. 1271 (1965).
49d. at 1279.
50 Area restrictions on travel arising out of a State Department requirement of passport
validation for travel to "Albania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea and
Viet-Nam under Communist control" (33 Dep't State Bull. 77 n. 3 (1955))
were judicially challenged in a trilogy of cases dealing with individuals wishing to
travel to Communist China. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia upheld the right to impose area restriction in three separate cases
involving a scholar, a newspaperman, and a congressman. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in all three cases. Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 837 (1960); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959) ; Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
51 Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1274 (1965).
5244 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1965).
53 Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1276-79 (1965).
HThe Court did not decide whether section 210 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (Note 1 supra) and the still outstanding presidential proclamation of
national emergency pursuant thereto (Note 20 supra) would alone be sufficient to
make travel in violation of the area restriction unlawful. Ibid.
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the diminishing of a citizen's opportunity to gather information,
though to be considered in determining whether appellant was
denied due process of law, is simply not a first amendment right.5
In the words of the Chief Justice: "The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.""0
Instead, the right to travel allegedly denied appellant was treated
as a "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment and "the fact that
a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not
mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited."5 Determin-
ing that the requirements of due process are a function "of the
extent of the necessity for the restriction,"" the Court answered the
fifth amendment issue by deciding that the interest of the govern-
ment in precluding the involvement of "the nation in dangerous
international incidents" '59 that "might" be caused by American citi-
zens traveling to Cuba outweighed the interests of passport appli-
cants in freedom of travel. Added to the government's side of the
scale was the fact that the Executive has the right to take all steps
necessary, except an act of war, to protect the rights of American
citizens in foreign countries."
Finally, the Court decided that the Passport Act of 1926 does
contain "sufficiently definite standards" for the formulation of
travel restrictions when it is considered that "Congress in giving the
Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs must of necessity
paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic
areas."
61
The Court placed critical reliance on factually distinguishing
Zemel from Kent and Aptheker, but the distinctions may be super-
ficial. It is true that a more or less general ban on travel to a
particular country has an impact different from that of denying
particular individuals the right to travel anywhere outside the
country. Thus the justification for, and the consequences of, the
power to restrict passport use through area restrictions presents a
different question from the passport denial problems in Kent and
Aptheker. However, the right of free movement is the constitutional
value being regulated; the only difference is the manner and degree
of the restriction.
55 Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1281 '(1965).
56 Ibid.
57 85 Sup. Ct. at 1279.
58 Ibid.
59 85 Sup. Ct. at 1280.
60REv. STAT. § 2001 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
6185 Sup. Ct. at 1281.
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The passport regulations invalidated in Kent and Aptheker
were alleged to be necessary to forestall the adverse effects on foreign
countries of travel by political dissenters. This extranational context
would seem analogous to that of the principal case. Moreover, it
is difficult to rationalize why the presidential authority over matters
of foreign affairs should be limited by the rights of the political
dissenter to hold nonconforming opinions and not limited by the
right to develop those opinions.
Kent and Aptheker hold that travel cannot be restricted for
mere belief or association; yet the authority upheld in Zemel -to
impose area bans with exceptions - permits this very thing in those
areas of the world where the Secretary deems travel by American
citizens inimical to government interests. The Secretary can, by
changing the number of nations to which travel is precluded and by
changing the excepted class of persons for whom travel to such
nations is permitted, approach the absolute discretionary control
over travel that the Court held violative of the Constitution in Kent.
It has been argued that intelligent electoral judgment on foreign
affairs is a function of the availability of informed viewpoints from
sources independent of the federal government,"2 i.e., knowledge is
an element of a voter's judgment; he should be free to learn first-
hand. Authorization of area restrictions with exceptions permits
the Executive to grant passports to those favorable to Administration
policy and to deny passports to critics, thereby undermining the demo-
cratic process which the guarantees of free inquiry were intended
to preserve.63 Such curtailment of free investigation necessarily
results in a substantial diminution of the opportunity to arrive at an
intelligent judgment and would seem to infringe on the appellant's
first amendment rights contrary to the pronouncements of the Court
in the principal case.
Zemel was primarily concerned with the power of the President
to restrict travel as a necessary part of his constitutional duty to
control foreign relations - but more was involved because a basic
liberty of a citizen was being curtailed. Where the exercise of the
6
2See CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 195-96
(1956):
Each inroad upon the freedom of travel weakens the base upon which
free society necessarily depends. Unless the citizenry has at least access to
the available fund of information with which to test for itself the sound-
ness of governmental decisions, the structure of a free society is impaired.
The right to know and the right to travel represent freedoms long taken
for granted by Ameicans. 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 37.




President's foreign relations power touches personal liberties, it is
subject to the due process clause of the fifth amendment." In Kent,
the Supreme Court said due process requires that any new regulation
of the right to travel should come from Congress. "5 Zemel involved
no regulation pursuant to new Congressional legislation; the statute
relied on in Zemel is the same as that narrowly construed by the
Court in Kent."
The finding in the principal case of Congressional authoriza-
tions of area restrictions does an injustice to the Kent approach to
statutory construction. There the Supreme Court strictly construed
the Passport Act of 192667 and found no established prior adminis-
trative practice of denying passports on the basis of individual
beliefs sufficiently substantial to warrant the conclusion of implied
legislative approval." There seem to be even fewer instances of
administratively-imposed area restrictions prior to 1926; they appear
explicitly for the first time in a 1938 Presidential authorization to
the State Department." It is difficult to attribute to Congress a
silent acceptance of a policy that was not applied on any widespread
scale before 1952.0 It is particularly difficult in view of the fact
that following the Court's decision in Kent, President Eisenhower
asked Congress for authority to impose area restrictions" and Con-
gress has thus far failed to grant such authority."
Even if legislative intent can validly be imputed by Congres-
sional failure to act in the face of administrative interpretation, the
fact that the Court recognized the constitutional rights involved
should necessitate that the challenged authorization be pursuant to
express Congressional legislation as recognized by Justice Black in
6United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Shachtman v.
Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
65 The Supreme Court found that if the right of travel is "to be regulated, it must be
pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958).
6644 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1926).




69 Exec. Order No. 7856 3 Fed. Reg. 687 (1938).
70 See 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL; Pollitt and Rauh,
Restrictions on the Right to Travel, 13 W. Rs. L. REV. 1128 (1962).
71 (T~he Secretary should have clear statutory authority to prevent Ameri-
cans from using passports for travel to areas where there is no means of
protecting them, or where their presence would conflict with our foreign
policy objcctives or be inimical to the security of the United States. 104
CoG. REC. 13046 (1958).
7 A search of U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS has revealed
no such Congressional grant of authority.
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his dissent in Zemel." A number of studies have been made of the
statutes, regulations and procedures involved in the processing of
passports,74 and most of these have recommended that, at the very
least, the discretionary authority given the Secretary in issuing pass-
ports should be specifically defined.75
In theory, area prohibitions on travel apply equally to all
American citizens, and no constitutional problems based upon the
reasonableness of classification, or discrimination against classes,
groups, or individuals are raised under the fifth amendment, pro-
vided the action is not so arbitrary as to be wholly capricious. How-
ever, in most cases where the Department of State has invoked area
restrictions, they have also made numerous exceptions for persons
whose travel is found to be in the national interest.7" Unanswered
in Zemel is whether such exceptions themselves should be held
discriminatory and area control held invalid in those situations.
What remains of the constitutionally protected freedom of
the United States citizens to travel abroad after Zemel? It is gen-
erally conceded that reasonable limitations can be imposed on
constitutionally protected rights, but there is considerable difficulty
in defining the boundaries of appropriate restrictions. It appears
clear that the Executive does not have inherent power to regulate
the right to travel abroad. Congress does have the power to regulate
the right to travel.78 In Aptheker 9 the Supreme Court stated that the
73 Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1282 (1965). Generally, when the President
needs additional powers to carry out legitimate policies of the government, the
customary approach is through special purpose legislation. CORWIN, THE PRESI-
DENT: OFFICE AND POWER, 191-92 (4th ed. 1957).
74 See e.g., CHAFFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 162-213
(1956); 1957 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
SECURITY; 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT PRO-
CEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM
TO TRAVEL.
75 "Congress should enact legislation defining the standards and criteria of the passport
security program." 1957 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON GOVERN-
MENT SECURITY at 475. "[Tjhe Committee has concluded, on balance, that the
authority to prohibit travel by all United States citizens in areas designated by the
Secretary of State is a necessary instrument to advance the national interest, and it
recommends legislation to clear up any doubt as to the possession by the Secretary of
State of such authority .. " 1958 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 55.
76 A companion press release to the Department of State's area prohibition on passport
validation for travel to Cuba provided for exceptions to "persons whose travel may
be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or
businessmen with previously established business interests." Zemel v. Rusk, 85 Sup.
Ct. 1271, 1274 (1965).
77 If such power exists in the Executive, it would arise out of the power to conduct
foreign affairs. Chicago and Co. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
78 The Supreme Court has found that if the right to travel is "to be regulated, it must
be pursuant to the law-making functions of the congress." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958).
79 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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proposition that Congress has power to safeguard the national
security "is obvious and unarguable."8 Zemel indicates that the
same is true of the related power of Congress to conduct foreign
affairs and that Congress, within that framework may delegate to
the Executive the power to regulate the right to travel.
Regulation of the right to travel must, however, be constitu-
tional. Furthermore, "if that power is delegated, the standards must
be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests."'" The problem
becomes one of balancing interests and is closely related to the
similarly difficult question of determining what restraints may be
imposed on freedom of speech, a parallelism which has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.82 The question of whether or not a given
regulation of the right to travel is constitutional is to be answered
by balancing the freedom to travel against the utility of the means
employed to achieve the intended purpose.3 In Kent"4 the restric-
tions on the individual's right to travel were not justified by their
alleged purpose. In Aptheker,85 the statute itself authorized a sweep-
ing restriction of travel which the Court said was not justified by
the limited evil being pursued. In Zemel, the utility of area restric-
tion on passport issuance in the administration of foreign policy
was found by the Court to outweigh the freedom to travel. The
present situation in Cuba, and possibly politically embarrassing
events which could transpire if American citizens were to travel
there, justified, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, the restriction on
the freedom to travel.
The resultant Court approach to restrictions on the right to
travel abroad seems to be to allow the Executive discretion under
present statutes by continually refusing to declare the wide statu-
tory grant of authority to it unconstitutional, while keeping in
mind that particular exercises of the discretion might be termed
arbitrary and therefore invalid as determined by subsequent judicial
proceedings.
Ronald C. Butz
8o Id. at 509.
81 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
82 Id. at 509.
83 The test as applied by the Court to the challenged statute in Aptheker is a deriva-
tion of that used in Shelton v.Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960):
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose. 364 U.S. at 488.
84 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
85 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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AUTOMOBILES - SERVICE OF PROCESS - COLORADO NON-
RESIDENT MOTORIST ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Clemens v. District
Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
In Clemens v. District Court,1 the Colorado Nonresident Motor-
ist Act' was declared unconstitutional as violative of the due pro-
cess clauses contained in the state and federal constitutions!
Defendant Clemens was involved in an automobile accident
in Denver while a resident of Colorado. At the time of the acci-
dent he was operating an automobile loaned to him by the owner,
defendant Bowers, a resident of South Dakota. The defendants
were served with process pursuant to the provisions of the Colo-
rado Nonresident Motorist Act,' the substituted service being issued
from the Secretary of State's office to to Clemens' "last known ad-
dress," a hotel in Tucumcari, New Mexico, and Bowers' address
in Aberdeen, South Dakota. At the time of issuance of the substi-
tuted service Clemens had changed his residence to Utah and never
received a copy of the substituted service; Bowers, however, re-
ceived the copy mailed to her.
1390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964). The petitioners in this action will be referred to through-
out as defendants, their position in trial court.
2 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-8-1 to -6 (1963).
3 The court did not specifically cite either the CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 25 or the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the defendants argued that
Colorado and Federal due process were violated by the Colorado Nonresident Motorist
Act, it must be assumed that the court was in agreement. The COLO. CONST., art. II,
§ 25 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law... ."
4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963) provides:
Service of process.- When any civil action which pertains to an accident
is commenced in any court of record in this state, the court shall, upon veri-
fied motion giving the last known address of the defendant and setting forth
the circumstances by which the plaintiff is entitled to serve the secretary of
state in accordance with the provisions of this article and upon finding that
such service is proper, enter an order ex parte setting forth the last known
address of the defendant and authorizing service to be made on the secre-
tary of state. Service shall be made by delivering two copies of the process,
complaint, motion and order of court to the secretary of state, his deputy
or assistant, together with a fee of five dollars, which shall be taxed as
part of the cost of the proceedings. Notice of such service and a copy of
each instrument so served shall forthwith be sent by the secretary of state
by certified or registered mail, addressed to the defendant at his address
given in the order of court, with return receipt requested. Promptly after
such mailing the secretary of state shall file with the clerk of the court a
certificate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete thirty days after
service of process on the secretary of state as provided in this section.
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Within the thirty days allowed before service became final
Bowers and Clemens, whom Bowers had apparently notified, ap-
peared and moved that service be quashed.' Upon the denial of
their motion the defendants instituted an original action before
the supreme court to obtain a rule to show cause why the service
should not be quashed.'
It was the contention of Bowers that that provision of the
Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act which defined the owner of
an automobile as a driver' exceeded the limitations of due process
in its attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over one who had
"not had sufficient affiliation or 'minimal contact' with that state
which are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.''8
Clemens contended that the attempt by the act to provide sub-
stituted service on residents of Colorado absent from the state for
ninety days" was in violation of his constitutional rights. Although
recognizing that amenability to suit during sojourns without the
state is an incident of residence or domicile within the state, Clemens
argued that residence at the time of the accident could not be
deemed conclusive of residence at the time of substituted service.
The statute construed in this manner would conflict with the
5 Since no provision for a motion to quash service of process exists in the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure it must be assumed that the motion by the defendants was
a 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person or for the insuffi-
ciency of service of process or both.
6 COLO. R. Civ. P. 106, which abolished the various forms of writs, provides in sub-
section (a) (4) for a rule to show cause. COLO. R. Civ. P. 116(a) provides for
original jurisdiction by the supreme court and authorizes relief in the nature of
prohibition. It would appear, since the defendants entitled their petition to the
supreme court as "Complaint for order to show cause or relief in the nature of prohi-
bition," that the defendants were unsure of which rule was applicable.
7 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-1 (1963) provides:
Definition of terms. - (1) When used in sections 13-8-1 through 13-8-6,
the following terms shall have the following meanings: (2) A "driver" is
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle.
It would appear that the obvious intention of the legislature was to include owners
of vehicles who were not driving at the time of an accident within the scope of the
act. See note 17 infra for further discussion of this point.
8 Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 4, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-2 (1963) provides:
Appointment of agent by resident. - If a resident who is the driver of
a motor vehicle involved in an accident thereafter remains away from this
state for a period of ninety days, said driver shall be deemed to have
appointed the secretary of state to be his true and lawful attorney upon
whom may be served process in any civil action against him pertaining to
such accident, and any such process served as provided in section 13-8-4
shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on such resident
driver personally within this state.
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principle that a state's authority to subject an absent resident to
suit ends when that resident makes his domicile or residence in
another state."0 Furthermore, the defendant argued, it would be
possible under the statute to invoke the substituted service mecha-
nism even when the defendant could be found and personally served
within the state." For these reasons the defendant asked the court
to hold the statute unconstitutional as "arbitrary, unnecessary and
inappropriate to the object of subjecting to suit residents of Colo-
rado absent from the state for ninety days or more.""
Both defendants further urged that Section 13-8-4"s prescribing
the method of effecting substituted service was unconstitutional
as applied to them. Since the statute did not require that the re-
quested return receipt be filed before deeming the substituted serv-
ice complete, the defendant's believed it possible for service to
be affected regardless of whether notice had been mailed to
the defendant's last known address and regardless of whether the
defendant had received notice of the suit."4 Thus, it was contended,
the statute failed to contain provisions making it reasonably prob-
able that the defendant would receive actual notice of the suit,
and under the principle established in Wuchter v. Pizzuti"5 the
statute was in conflict with the requirements of due process.
Justice Hall, in writing the court's opinion, accepted petitioner
Bowers' contention that she had not sufficient "minimal contact"
with Colorado to warrant subjecting her to the court's jurisdiction.
Regarding that portion of the act which defined "driver" as the
' 0 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Although the court did not discuss the
situation suggested, i.e., that the absent defendant had sought to establish residence
or domicile in another state, it would appear that the corollary drawn by the defendant
is valid. The question would always turn, of course, upon the incidents which estab-
lish residence or domicile.
"1 Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 7, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964). The
defendants relied upon the cases of Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 75 Pac.
614 (1904) and Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890). The
Supreme Court stated the corollary when it allowed substituted service upon a show-
ing of diligence by plaintiff in his search for a resident defendant. Jacobs v. Roberts,
223 U.S. 261 (1912).
12 Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 9, Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
13 COLO. REv, STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963), supra note 4.
14 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 12 at p. 9.
15276 U.S. 13, 24 (1927); The Supreme Court noted the general trend of authority
toward sustaining the validity of substituted service of process ". . . if the statutory
provisions in themselves indicate that there is reasonable probability that if the
statutes are complied with, the defendant will receive actual notice .. "
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owner or operator of the motor vehicle16 as a complete fiction,"
Justice Hall launched into a consideration of the history of extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff,18 he noted, which had
limited jurisdiction to persons and property within the forum, was
no longer followed. Instead, when a state has a legitimate interest,
a nonresident can be subject to suit if he has had "certain minimal
1
6 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-1(2), (1963), supra note 7.
17 The obvious intent of the legislature in section 13-8-1 was to include within the scope
of the statute nonresident owners of vehicles who had consented to their use by others
in Colorado. The history of the Colorado Nonresident Motorist Act supports such
a conclusion. The original legislation establishing the act was adopted in 1937, Colo.
Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25, and was patterned after the Massachusetts Act
interpreted in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
The Colorado Supreme Court first interpreted the 1937 act in Carlson v. District
Court, 116 Colo. 330, 140 P.2d 525 (1947). The court therein construed the statute
strictly, as being in derogation of the common law and refused to allow substituted
service on a resident who, subsequent to an accident, has established his residence
in another state. In 1953 the act was challanged by Federal District Court, Larsen
v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239 (D. Colo. 1953), and Judge Knous, relying upon the
Carlson decision, strictly construed the statute as being applicable solely to those
engaged in the actual operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. Two
decisions in 1954 turned upon the Carlson decision: Warwick v. District Court, 129
Colo. 300, 269 P.2d 704 (1954), and Clark v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329, 275 P.2d
952 (1954), held the act inapplicable to an operator resident at the time of an
accident but who later became nonresident before substituted service was attempted.
The decisions in these cases helped prompt legislative amendments. In 1953
the scope of the act was enlarged to include accidents occurring from the operation
of motor vehicles anywhere within the state. Colo. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 44, p. 143.
Operation of a motor vehicle within the scope of employment by agents, servants,
and other employees was deemed by the legislature in 1957 as subjecting the owner
to substituted service, Colo. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 83, p. 143. And, finally, the act
was amended to its pre-Clemens form in 1961, Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 75, pp.
244-46.
Each time the statute was amended its scope was enlarged, and it is inconceiv-
able that the legislature should narrow the scope of the 1957 amendment by excluding
from coverage an absent owner whose agent, servant, or employee was allowed to
operate an automobile and to inflict injuries thereby. If such reasoning is applicable
to the absence of an intent to exclude the nonresident principal, master, or employer
from the scope of the statute, it should not be difficult to define an intent to include
nonresident owners who had consented to the operation of an automobile within
Colorado by someone other than an agent, servant, or employee.
The mere fact that an owner had no contacts with Colorado did not prevent
the supreme court from upholding substituted service in Morrison v. District Court,
143 Colo. 514, 355 P.2d 660 (1960). There the court deemed the family relation-
ship between a father and son sufficient to subject the father to substituted service
of process.
Furthermore, if the method adopted by the legislature to enhance the scope of
the statute was based upon a fiction it nevertheless attempted to remedy the unfortu-
nate situation whereby an innocent resident of Colorado could be denied satisfaction
from certain classes of nonresident tortfeasors. Indeed, the orthodoxy professed by
the court with respect to section 13-8-1 would have been more haecceitas had it also
rejected the basic fiction that a nonresident who operates a motor vehicle in Colorado
consents to constitute the secretary of state as his agent for service of process.
18 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Therein the court stated what came to be known as the physical
power doctrine.
... every state has the power to determine for itself the civil status and
capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may
contract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be
executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in
which their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced; and
also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated
within such territory both personal and real may be acquired, enjoyed, and
transferred. [But] no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory. 95 U.S. at 722.
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contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
(Citations omitted.)' Nevertheless, the limitations on the terri-
torial power of a state to subject a nonresident to its jurisdiction
had not been extinguished. Indeed, "However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called
upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that
State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."
(Citations omitted.) 0
Since the court had already determined as a matter of fact
that defendant Bowers had no contacts with Colorado," the only
conclusion of law which could follow was that the Act was un-
constitutional: "Provisions of Chapter 75 providing for substituted
service on owners with no contacts are lacking in due process, un-
constitutional and void."22
The court ignored Clemens' argument concerning the invali-
dity of section 13-8-2,' which purported to subject residents ab-
sent for ninety days from the state to substituted service of process.
It is at least unfortunate that the court failed to consider the
method adopted by the legislature to obviate the deficiences in the
1937 Act 24 which had left residents removed from the state beyond
the scope of the statute.'5
'9 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945 ).
20 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1957).
21 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 84 (Colo. 1964). The court there stated:
In the case before us, Barbara Bowers has never been a resident of Colo-
rado; she owns a motor vehicle; she did not drive the vehicle; Clemens
drove the same for his own purposes, not as agent for Barbara or for her
benefit or in her behalf. She was not in the vehicle at the time of the acci-
dent and for all that appears in the record was not even in Colorado.
And at page 85,
The language in Chapter 75 providing for substituted service of proc-
ess is broad enough to warrant resort to such service on a nonresident owner
of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in Colorado where the owner has
never been in Colorado and when the owner has no contacts or ties, minimal
or otherwise, with Colorado - the status of Barbara Bowers, defendant in
the trial court.
It is interesting to note in defendant Clemens' affidavit, which accompanied the
petition to the supreme court, the statement, "'I was alone in the vehicle at the
time of the accident as Barbara Ann Bowers had returned to South Dakota several
days before the accident happened." It would appear that the factual conclusion
reached by the court that Barbara Bowers had had no contact with Colorado was at
last in part erroneous. Whether the contact with Colorado which was present would
constitute sufficient "minimal contact" to warrant subjecting defendant Bowers to
the court's jurisdiction is a question to which the could should have addressed itself.
For further discussion of this point see pages 230 infra.
22 390 P.2d at 86.
23 COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-8-2 (1963), supra note 8.
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25.
25Clark v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329, 275 P.2d 952 (1954) ; Warwick v. District Court,




Nevertheless, the court did not address itself to Clemens' argu-
ment before it proceeded with a discussion of the procedures pre-
scribed by section 13-8-4"8 for effecting substituted service of pro-
cess.
Justice Hall began by announcing the well established principle
that the due process associated with substituted service of process
contemplates notice of impending proceedings.2 7 No serious chal-
lenge of the constitutionality of subjecting a non-resident motorist to
the jurisdiction of the state's courts could be maintained. 8 But the
methods prescribed for effecting that jurisdiction through substi-
tuted service of process must, "in order to be valid, contain a pro-
vision making it reasonably probable that notice of the service
will be communicated to the nonresident defendant who is sued."'
Placing particular reliance on the fact that the statute held
constitutional in Hess v. Pawloski0 provided for notice sent by
registered mail and the filing of the return receipt with the com-
plaint, the court considered the degree of probability under the Colo-
rado statute of notice reaching the defendant. In lVuchter"
the United States Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional a
statute which made no provision for notifying a defendant subse-
quent to service on the secretary of state. So also, the Maryland
26 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963), supra note 4.
27 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 86 (Colo. 1964).
2 Id. at 87. The court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Hess v. Pawlosk,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
2 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 86 (Colo. 1964), citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti,
276 U.S. 13, 48 (1927).
30274 U.S. 352 (1927). The Massachusetts statute involved in this case provided in
pertinent part:
Service of such process shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
with a fee of two dollars in the hands of the registrar, or in his office, and
such service shall be sufficient service upon the said non-resident; provided,
that notice of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by
registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return
receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to
the writ and entered with declaration. MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 90, ch. 431,
§ 2 (1923).
31 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1927). The New Jersey statute provided:
From and after the passage of this act any chaffeur, operator or owner
of any motor vehicle, not licensed under the laws of the State of New Jersey,
providing for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, who shall
accept the privilege extended to nonresident chauffeurs, operators and owners
by law of driving such a motor vehicle or of having the same driven or
operated in the State of New Jersey, without a New Jersey registration or
license, shall, by such acceptance and the operation of such automobile
within the State of New Jersey, make and constitute the Secretary of State
of the State of New Jersey, his, her or their agent for the acceptance of
process in any civil suit or proceeding by any resident of the State of New
jersey against such chauffeur, operator or the owner of such motor vehicle,
arising out of or by reason of any accident or collision occurring within the
State in which a motor vehicle operated by such chauffeur, or operator, or




Supreme Court had rejected a statute as providing insufficient prob-
ability of notice reaching the defendant where the statute deemed
as conclusive of the defendant's "last known address" the address
given by him at the time of the accident. 2 Additionally, the Colo-
rado court construed the language of two earlier decisions, one by
the Supreme Court 3 and one by a state court,34 as requiring a method
of substituted service which would be as effectual in imparting no-
tice as would be personal service.
Thus, the court, not unmindful that many courts had held
statutes similar to Colorado's constitutional, believed its only course
for decision was to find the methods prescribed for substituted
service invalid. Deeming the fact that Clemens had not received
notice of the impending suit as conclusive of merely fifty percent
probability that notice would actually be imparted to a prospective
defendant, the court concluded: "Procedures only fifty percent effec-
tive cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring notice to the
defendant or to constitute due process."35
From the foregoing restatement of the court's opinion it is ap-
parent that the court accepted two of the three arguments advanced
by the defendants: that is, in its first holding, the court deemed as
unconstitutional the legislative attempt to subject a nonresident
owner of an automobile driven by a permittee to substituted service
of process; in its second holding, the court considered the act con-
stitutionally deficient because it failed to provide reasonable prob-
ability of notice reaching the nonresident defendant." The court's
3 2 Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 At. 547 (1930). The Maryland statute provided:
Notice of such service and a copy of the process shall forthwith be sent
by registered mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant at his
address as specified in such process; and such address shall be conclusively
presumed to be correct if it be an address given by the defendant in any
proceeding before any court magistrate or justice of the peace, or any police
officer or deputy or any other person, at or subsequent to the collision or
accident aforesaid, or if it be the latest address appearing upon the records
of the Commission of Motor Vehicles . . . or other officer charged with the
administration of the motor vehicle laws of the State in which any motor
vehicle is registered in the name of such defendant. . . . MD. ACTS ch. 254,
(1929), cited in Grote v. Rogers, supra at 548.
33 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), cited in Clemens v. District Court, 390
P.2d 83, 89 (Colo. 1964) ; Justice Holmes stated therein:
To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to
reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial
justice is to be done. 243 U.S. at 92.
34 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944), cited in Clemens v. District
Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964). The court therein placed particular emphasis
upon the impartation of notice.
3s Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 90 (Colo. 1964).
36 This discussion assumes that the due process requirements would be the same regard-
less of whether the defendant is a nonresident or a resident absent from the state
for ninety days or more.
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holding on these two issues made it unnecessary to consider Clemens'
argument that section 13-8-2 of the Colorado Revised Statutes sub-
jecting residents absent from Colorado for ninety days or more to
substituted service of process was unconstitutional.
I. SERVICE ON NONRESIDENT OWNERS NOT PRESENT OR
OPERATING AUTOMOBILE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
The statement by the court in its first holding of the law gov-
erning the degree of contact which is requisite when subjecting non-
residents to in personam jurisdiction is incapable of refutation. The
court's conclusion of fact as well as its application of law to that
conclusion of fact, however, seems poorly founded.
The major objection implicit in the court's first holding lies
in its statement of the question presented for determination; i.e.,
defendant Bowers' contention that she has not had sufficient con-
act with Colorado to subject her to substituted service of process. The
court stated that the question to be resolved was whether provisions
for substituted service of process on owners of automobiles who have
no contacts with Colorado are violative of due process.37 Another
writer,38 suggesting that the court begged the question, stated that
the question before the court was "whether the defendant Bowers
had sufficient contacts with the state so as to make substituted serv-
ice of process on her permissible within the limits of due process.""
An analysis of the cases cited by the court clearly illustrates
that the "minimal contacts" discussed therein involved a thorough
consideration of the factual situation which gave rise to the state's
seeking to subject the objecting parties to in personam jurisdiction.
Many writers have already discussed these cases fully,4' and this
writer could add little to that discussion. Nevertheless, the court's
37 Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 85 (Colo. 1964). See textual discussion
pp. 217-18 supra and citations therein.
38 Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 309, 313 (1965).
39 Ibid.
40 See textual discussion supra pp. 217-18.
41 Briggs, Jurisdiction by Statute, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1963); Campbell, Jurisdiction
Over Nonresident Individuals and Foreign Corporations: the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause, 36 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead -Long
Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 285 (1958) ; Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CH.
L. REV. 569 (1958); Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as
Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249 (1959) ; Wilson, In Personam
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV.
363 (1957); Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV.
909 (1960); Note, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1963) ; Note, 37 IND. L.J. 333 (1962) ;
Note, 44 IOWA L. REV. 361 (1959); Comment, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 86 (1964);
Comment, 38 WASH. L. REV. 560 (1963).
VOL. 43
RECENT DECISIONS
reliance upon Hanson v. Denckla"2 to delimit the scope of the
"minimal contact" required does need further analysis.
Hanson involved a rather complex factual situation, but the
primary question before the Court was whether a Florida judgment
affecting the status of a Delaware trust company which had been
served with process by publication should be given full faith and
credit in Delaware. After carefully examining the transactions re-
lating to the trust held by the Delaware trust company, the Court
found as a matter of fact that "The defendant trust company has
no office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None of the
trust assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the
record discloses no solicitation of business in that state either in
person or by mail."'3 Nowhere in the Clemens opinion, however,
can a factual discussion be found which would support the conclu-
sion that the defendant had had no contact with Colorado. In fact,
the affidavit submitted by Clemens in the District Court would in-
dicate that not only had Bowers been in Colorado but also that the
automobile was loaned in Colorado."
Perhaps the reason for the absence of a factual discussion of
defendant Bowers' contact with Colorado was the court's unstated
but implicit understanding of the principle in Colorado that negli-
gence of a permittee will not be imputed to an owner of an auto-
mobile, at least when there is no indication of negligence on the
part of the owner either through physical presence in the auto-
mobile or in the irresponsible loaning of the automobile to the
permittee.45 But the question of liability was not before the court;
the issue to be resolved was Bowers' amenability to service of
process." Chief Judge Arraj, in a well considered Colorado Federal
District Court opinion, 7 discussed the ever expanding concepts of
in personam jurisdiction:
One of the most elementary of legal principles is that a basis
of jurisdiction must exist before a court has competence to act. Two
4
2Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43Id. at 251. It should be noted that the court's factual finding is preceeded by the
quotation from Hanson found in and relied upon by the Colorado court in Clemens.
Additionally the citations relied upon by the Supreme Court as supporting its finding
of fact are the very same the Colorado court regarded as being limited by Hanson;
i.e., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; and Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
"See discussion supra note 20.
45 Graham v. Shilling, 133 Colo. 5, 9, 291 P.2d 396 (1955).
It is a general rule that negligence in the use of an automobile by one
other than the owner cannot be imputed to the owner merely because of his
ownership, an automobile not being in itself a dangerous instrumentality.
48 Clifford, supra note 38, at 315.
47 Elliott v. Cabeen, 224 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1963).
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tests are applied in determining whether a basis exists. The first is
the inquiry whether legislative jurisdiction exists- does the state
have power to declare that its courts have jurisdiction over a par-
ticular subject matter? The second is whether judicial jurisdiction
exists, a determination made on the basis of a twofold test: (1)
assuming that legislative jurisdiction exists, has the state exercised
it by providing the courts with a method for acquiring jurisdiction?
(2) If a method has been so provided, are there sufficient juris-
dictional facts to satisfy the requirements of the method provided ?"
The discussion of Bowers' position in the first holding is diffi-
cult to fit within the form prescribed by Chief Judge Arraj. It must
be assumed that the court accepted the well-established principle
that legislative jurisdiction over nonresident motorists is within the
power of the state. But the discussion of judicial jurisdiction is
more difficult, since the court in Clemens did not clearly differen-
tiate the distinctions between the exercise of legislative jurisdiction
and the factual basis for subjecting one to that jurisdiction.
Although legislative intent would seem to controvert the idea
that owners not operating an automobile at the time of an accident
were excluded from the operation of the act,4" the court could have
supported its ultimate holding that defendant Bowers was not amen-
able to substituted service of process on this basis. The court, in its
initial interpretation of the original act,"t had said in Carlson v.
District Court,
So far as we are advised and can learn, it is universally held that
statutes, such as section 48(1), [Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92,
§ 4, p. 324], supra, providing for substituted service, are in deroga-
tion of the common law and must be strictly construed and followed
before jurisdiction of the person can attach thereunder .... 11
Later Judge Knous, speaking in federal district court and relying
upon the language in Carlson, held the act inapplicable to persons
not personally operating an automobile at the time of an accident."
On that occasion he stated:
Construing their statutes, courts in other jurisdictions generally
have held that the words 'while operating' and 'operation by' as is
the language of section 48(1), [Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 92, § 4,
p. 324], supra, apply only to nonresident individuals personally
operating a motor vehicle and do not include a non-resident owner
not then present in such state, even though the operation was with
his knowledge and consent.5 3
He noted further:
Decisions in which service on a non-resident owner not person-
48 Id. at 52.
49 See discussion at note 17 supra.
50 Colo. Sess. Laws. 1937, ch. 92, pp. 323-25.
51 Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 342, i80 P.2d 525 (1947).
52 Larsen v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239 (D. Colo. 1953).
53 Id. at 240.
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ally operating the motor vehicle or present therein at the time of
accident has been upheld seem uniformly attributable to express sta-
tutory language so permitting."
Thus, it would have been entirely proper on the basis of exist-
ing precedent for the court to have declared the act inapplicable to
defendant Bowers. Such a declaration would have involved the
recognition that the legislature had not exercised legislative juris-
diction over nonresident owners not physically operating an auto-
mobile at the time of an accident. But the court made no such
declaration. Consequently, it must be assumed that the court accepted
the legislative exercise of jurisdiction over persons in the position
of defendant Bowers.
The acceptance by the court of the exercise of legislative juris-
diction over a nonresident owner whose permittee was involved in
an accident in Colorado required of the court a discussion of the
jurisdictional facts prerequisite to a final determination of the
existence of judicial jurisdiction. Although, as subsequent discussion
will show, it is the position of this writer that the factual conclusion
reached by the court with respect to this final test of judicial juris-
diction could have turned differently, it is unfortunate that the
court accepted the exercise of legislative jurisdiction. Since the
court was determined in limine to conclude that the requisite factual
grounds were not present to support judicial jurisdiction," the court
was adopting a construction of the act which would require a holding
of unconstitutionality. The court, discussing the scope of the statute,
stated:
The language in Chapter 75 providing for substituted service
of process is broad enough to warrant resort to such service on a
nonresident owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in
Colorado where the owner has no contacts or ties, minimal or other-
wise, with Colorado -the status of Barbara Bowers, defendant in
the trial court.
56
In this light the act is clearly unconstitutional. But to adopt a
construction of an act which renders it unconstitutional when, as
here, an alternative approach would have rendered it constitutional,
is to ignore the well recognized principle "that an act should be
upheld as constitutional if possible, and that if one construction
would violate both federal and state Constitutions and another
interpretation would be consonant therewith, the latter should be
adopted . .."" Furthermore, the holding of the act unconstitutional
54 117 F. Supp. at 241.
55 See discussion at note 21 supra.
56 390 P.2d at 85 ; see also the discussion at note 21 supra.
5
7 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 334, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
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on this basis was unnecessary to the ultimate decision by the court
that the notice provisions of the act were deficient.58
Nevertheless, the factual foundation existing in Clemens could
have supported a finding of judicial jurisdiction over defendant
Bowers. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws states
when a state has judicial jurisdiction:
A state has judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has
done or caused to be done, an act which either took place in the
state or resulted in consequences in the state for the purposes of any
cause of action arising out of the act within limitations of reason-
ableness appropriate to the relationship derived from the act. 9
A comment which follows this section discusses its application to
nonresident motorist acts:
In this country, the rule of this Section is most frequently ap-
plied in the case of motor vehicles. Every state provides by statute
for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in certain circumstances over
a non-resident motorist as to actions growing out of an accident
or collision he may have had in the state. Such a statute may be
constitutionally applied if it is in effect when the vehicle is oper-
ated within the State, and if it makes provision for giving the non-
resident motorists reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity
to be heard.
Where a non-resident owner of a motor vehicle does not himself
operate it within the state but causes another to operate it, there is
a question of interpretation of the statute as to whether it is appli-
cable. If the statute is interpreted as subjecting the owner of the
vehicle to the jurisdiction of the court in such a case, the court
acquires jurisdiction over him even though he was not himself at
any time within the state.60
Under this well-recognized rule6I defendant Bowers would be sub-
ject to the substituted service of process provisions of the act.
Apparently the only case to extensively discuss the rationale
of the Restatement rule is Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co.6"
58 See the discussion by Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 U. COLO.
L. REV. 309, 310 (1965), wherein it is observed:
Indeed, unless the court chose to discuss this issue in order to provide
guidelines for future legislation -a meritorious, if unusual, motive for a
court to decide constitutional questions - its decision would seem a clear
departure from the traditional refusal of courts to decide constitutional
questions unless indispensible to decision.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, p. 89 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956).
6O Id. comment f at 94.
61 See generally authorities cited supra note 41 and the Reporters Note, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, at 96-98 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
62 294 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961). This case has been extensively noted. See e.g., Note
7 VILL. L. BEV- 554 (1962); Comment, Motor Vehicle Area Provides Impetus for
Further Expansion of In Personam Jurisdiction, 23 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1963); Com-
ment, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 446 (1962); 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 747 (1962); 37




In Davis, Judge Sobeloff correctly anticipated the method of analysis
suggested by Chief Judge Arraj in Elliot v. Cabbeen.63 Consequently,
the decision specifically held (1) that the North Carolina legis-
lature had exercised legislative jurisdiction over a nonresident owner
of an automobile driven by a sub-permittee at the time of an acci-
dent" and (2) that the requisite jurisdictional facts were present
so that it was constitutional to apply the act to such an owner.
Although the amicus brief in Clemens fully discussed Davis,
no mention of that case appears in the court's opinion. It would
not have been difficult for the court to have distinguished the
North Carolina act from that of Colorado's," but the failure to do
so is not significant since the Clemens decision had already assumed
the exercise of legislative jurisdiction. The failure to discuss Davis
becomes more substantial, however, when it becomes apparent that
once legislative jurisdiction had been deemed exercised, the two
courts had before them the identical question for resolution; namely
whether the jurisdictional facts were present.
Judge Sobeloff in Davis began his consideration of this prob-
lem by discussing the same cases which were cited by the court in
Clemens to support its ruling of unconstitutionality. First, he inter-
preted International Shoe Co. v. Washington"" as establishing the
requirement that the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
A method of analysis was deemed conclusive of this requirement:
Therefore, what is required is an analysis and weighing of the
63224 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1963).
69 The owner in Davis, unlike the owner in Clemens, had never been in the state, and
further, the owner in Davis was deemed subject to substituted service of process
when the act done consisted of furnishing her son an automobile with permission to
loan it to others. The automobile was being driven by a third person at the time of
the accident.
6 The North Carolina Statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1963) provides:
The acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privilege conferred
by the laws now or hereafter in force in this state permitting the operation
of motor vehicles, as evidenced by the operation of a motor vehicle by such
nonresident on the public highways of this state, or at any other place in
this state, other than as so permitted or regulated, shall be deemed equiva-
lent to the appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles, or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney and the
attorney of his executor or administrator, upon whom may be served all
summonses or other lawful process in any action or proceeding against him
or his executor or administrator, growing out of any accident or collision
in which said nonresident may be involved by reason of the operation by
him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or implied, of a
motor vehicle on such public highways of this state, or at any other place in
this state, and said acceptance or operation shall be a signification of his
agreement that any such process against him or his executor or administrator
shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on him personally,
or on his executor or administrator. (Emphasis added.)
6s326 U.S. 310 (1945).
67 294 F.2d at 646.
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interests of a defendant in not being called upon to defend in the
forum, of a plaintiff in being able to acquire jurisdiction over a
defendant in the place where the cause of action arose, and of a state
in being able to open its courts to the particular lawsuit. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, Comment C
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Developments in the Law-State
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 924-925 (1960).68
Balancing the respective interests of the plaintiff and the defendant,
Judge Sobeloff relied upon McGee v. International Life Ins. Co."
as establishing sound precedent for subjecting the nonresident to
suit in the forum where the cause of action arose, where the wit-
nesses reside, and, if possible, in the state whose law is applicable.
In Davis, these conveniences could be provided the plaintiff without
corresponding disadvantages to the defendant."
The strongest argument by the court in Davis, however, was
with respect to the interest of the state in acquiring jurisdiction over
the nonresident owner. Hanson v. Denckla 1 was regarded as merely
requiring "that the forum state have some interest in being able to
open its courts to the action. Unquestionably a state in which an
automobile tort was committed has such an interest." 2 This interest
was described succinctly and in the language of the Restatement:
The state has a strong interest in being able to provide a con-
venient forum where its citizens may be able to seek, from the
owner as well as from the actual operator, compensation for injur-
ies that will often be extremely serious. Jurisdiction over the
driver who inflicted the injury does not exhaust the state's inter-
est; it is not pushing the matter too far to recognize that the state
may also assert the jurisdiction of its courts over the owner who
placed the vehicle in the driver's hands to take it onto the state's
highways. (Citation omitted.)
In Hess v. Pawloski . . .jurisdiction was asserted over a non-
resident motorist who was also the owner of an automobile. We are
asked to go beyond that case and uphold North Carolina's jurisdic-
tion over an automobile owner who had never come into the state.
However, the momentary physical presence of the defendant within
the state should not be controlling. Far more important are the
consequences foreseeable from his authorizing the use of his auto-
mobile there.
73
The language of Judge Sobeloff on this occasion is not unlike
6Id. at 647. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, Comment at
91-93 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Developments in the Law-State-Court Juris-
diction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 924-925 '(1960).
69 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
70 294 F.2d at 647.
71357 U.S. 235 (1957). See textual discussion at pp. 222-23 supra for criticism of
the Clemens application of Hanson.




that used by the Supreme Court on other occasions. In Young v.
Masci,7 decided in 1932, it was said with respect to liability:
A person who sets in motion in one State the means by which
injury is inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process
clause, be made liable for that injury whether the means employed
be a responsible agent or an irresponsible instrument.15
No good reason is suggested why, where there is permission to
take the automobile into a state for use upon its highways, personal
liability should not be imposed upon the owner in case of injury
inflicted there by the driver's negligence, regardless of the fact that
the owner is a citizen and resident of another State. (Citation
omitted.)7
6
Additionally, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,77 the Supreme
Court discussed the entry of judgment against a nonresident cor-
poration not doing business in the state:
Turning to this case we think it apparent that the Due Process
Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a judg-
ment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State. (Citation omitted.) The contract was
delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and
the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they
were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant State in
order to hold it legally accountable. When claims were small or
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost
of bringing an action in a foreign forum - thus in effect making
the company judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses - as here
on the company's defense of suicide - will be found in the insured's
locality. Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it
is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract
but certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due process.
(Citations omitted.) There is no contention that respondent did
74Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). In Young, suit was brought against a resi-
dent of New Jersey who had loaned his car to a third person in New Jersey. The
third person drove the car in New York and was involved in an accident with the
plaintiff. New York had a statute which provided:
Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a public
highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle
or motor cycle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
legally using or operating the same with permission, express or implied, of
said owner. N. Y. Laws 1929, vol. 1, p. 82, cited in Young v. Masci,
supra at 255-56.
The Supreme Court sustained the validity of the statute as applied to Young. The
fact that Young would not have been liable in New Jersey was not deemed to deny
him due process.
751d. at 258.
76 289 U.S. at 260.
77 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare
its defenses and appear.7 8
In both Young and McGee the Supreme Court was discussing
liability and presumably the factual basis upon which liability was
imposed would be more stringently scrutinized than if mere amen-
ability to substituted service of process was being considered. 9 In
Clemens the facts were that defendant Bowers had been in Colo-
rado immediately preceding the accident. She had departed from
the state leaving in the possession of defendant Clemens her auto-
mobile. Evidently Bowers imposed no restrictions on Clemens' use
of the car. Clemens drove the car and through its operation injuries
were inflicted upon others." Is it not possible, then, to conclude
that the factual basis existed for subjecting defendant Bowers to in
personam jurisdiction?
II. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The second holding in Clemens- that, "Procedures only fifty
percent effective cannot be held as reasonably calculated to bring
notice to the defendant or to constitute due process.'81 - is perhaps
the better reasoned portion of the Clemens opinion. Nevertheless,
a discussion of this portion of the opinion is not less difficult than
the discussion of the "minimal contact" portion. Several objec-
tions to the final decision reached by the court are proper.
The first objection is one which is common to most decisions
involving a consideration of nonresident motorist legislation; that
78 Id. at 223-24. The Colorado Supreme Court considered this case as being limited
by Hanson. See textual discussion supra pp. 222-23. But the Court in Hanson
specifically distinguished McGee:
The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done
or transaction consummated in the forum state. In that respect, it differs
from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 and the cases
therein cited. 357 U.S. at 251.
7 See discussion p. 223 supra. In the Brief of Amicus Curiae, Clemens v. District Court,
390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964), Tanksly v. Dodge, 181 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1960), is
relied upon to support the proposition that jurisdictional questions should be con-
sidered independently of the question of liability.
Determination of questions of possible ultimate liability to respond in
damages is not now necessary. The statute here involved does not purport
to deal with the question of ultimate liability. Its purpose is to subject to
the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts nonresidents concerned in the oper-
ation of automobiles within the State within the terms of the statute, so that
its citizens may assent as against such persons their claims in local courts
so that thereby the question of actual liability may be determined ...
Upon consideration of a motion to quash service of summons in such an
instance the question is whether the allegations of the complaint and the
facts of the case as disclosed show that the defendant brought before the
Court is such a defendant as is subjected by the statute to substituted service
of process. If so, questions of actual liability are required to be dctermined
by other and further proceedings. (Emphasis in original.) Tanksly v.
Dodge, supra at 927-28.
80 See note 21 supra.
81 390 P.2d at 90. See also textual discussion at pp. 220-22 supra.
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is, courts tend to rely upon decisions interpreting statutes different
from their own. All fifty states presently have some form of legis-
lation designed to secure jurisdiction over nonresident motorists,8
and in virtually every state the legislation is significantly different
in some detail. These differences in legislation have resulted, as
could be expected, in different constructions by courts even when
essentially identical questions were under consideration. Nowhere
8 Statutes: only the first section is cited unless changed subsequent to latest compilation.
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199 (Supp. 1963).
ALASKA REV. STAT. tit. 9, § 09.05.020 (Supp. 1964).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-502 (1956).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-342.1 (Supp. 1963).
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17450 (1960).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-1 (1963), declared unconstitutional in Clemens
v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83 (Colo. 1964).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52 (Supp. 1964).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3112 (Supp. 1962).
D. C. CODE § 40-423 (1961).
FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (Supp. 1964).
GA. CODE ANN. § 68-801 (1957); § 68-802 (Supp. 1963).
REV. LAWS OF HAWAII § 230-33 (Supp. 1963).
IDAHO CODE § 49-1602 (1957).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 9-301 (1963 Bar Edition).
IND. STATE ANN. § 47-1043 (Supp. 1964).
IOWA CODE § 321.498 (Supp. 1964).
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-401 (Supp. 1961). § 8-402 Sess. Laws of
Kan. ch. 55 (1963).
KY. REV. STAT. § 188.010'(1960).
LA. REV. STAT. § 13-3474 (Supp. 1963).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, § 70 (Supp. 1963).
MD. CODE ANN. art. 6612, § 115 (1957) ; art. 661/2, § 115 (2) (Supp. 1964).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3A (1958).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (1960).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.55 (1960).
MIss. CODE ANN. § 9352-61 (Supp. 1962).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.210 (Supp. 1964).
MONT. REV. CODE § 53-202 '(1961); § 53-204 superseded by Rule 40 (b)
(1964).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14.070 (Supp. 1963).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.070 (Supp. 1963).
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264.1 (1955).
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 39:7-2.1 (1961) ; § 39:7-2.1 (Supp. 1964).
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-3,4 (1960).
NEW YORK MCKINNEY VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 253 (Supp. 1964).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1963).
N. D. CEN. CODE ANN. § 39-01-11 (1960).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.20 (Supp. 1964).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 391 (1962).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 15.190 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 2001 (1960).
R. 1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-7-6 (Supp. 1964).
S. C. CODE § 46-104 (1962).
S. D. CODE § 33.0809 (Supp. 1960).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-224 et seq. (Supp. 1964).
TEX. CIVIL STAT. § 2039a (Vernon's 1964).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12-8 '(1960).
VT. STAT. tit. 12 § 891 (1958).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (1957).
REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 46.64.040 (1962).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5555 (1) (1961).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 345.09 (Supp. 1965).
WYo. STAT ANN. § 1-52 (Supp. 1963).
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is this fact more evident than in two cases cited by the court in
Clemens-Grote v. Rogers" and Kurrilla v. Roth.84
In Grote the Maryland Court of Appeals was asked to invalidate
a statute which conclusively presumed an address which had been
given by a defendant at the time of an accident, or which appeared
of record in the files of the department of vehicle registration in
his state of residence, to be the defendant's address in fact at the
time of substituted service by registered mail.' This conclusive
presumption was one basis for the court's rejection of the statute,
as is apparent from the following excerpt from the Grote opinion:
The direction as to notice in the Maryland act is that it shall be
sent to the defendant at his address as specified in the process. The
address so specified is not required to be the true address of the
defendant at that time, or even his last known address, but it is to be
conclusively regarded as correct for the purposes of the suit if it
is an address which the defendant gave in any proceeding before
any court, magistrate, or justice of the peace, or to any police officer
or deputy or other person at the time of accident or at a subsequent
period, or if it is his latest address appearing on the records of the
commissioner of motor vehicles or other offices charged with the
administration of the motor vehicle laws of the state in which any
such vehicle is registered in the defendant's name. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)M
This portion of the court's opinion immediately precedes that portion
of the opinion which was quoted at length by the court in Clemens.
It continues:
The sources of information to which the plaintiff is thus
referred by the statute may not appraise him of the defendant's
correct address at the time when the notice is to be mailed. In the
period, which may be prolonged, between the accident and the
institution of the suit, a legitimate change of the prospective
defendant's domicile may render his earlier declarations as to his
residence obsolete.
8 7
Thus, it is apparent that the conclusion reached in Grote was
founded upon a statutory defect which did not exist in Clemens.
Furthermore, it may have been that the court in Giote would have
reached a different conclusion had the statute provided that notice
be sent to the defendant's "last known address" as did the Colorado
act.88
8Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 At. 547 (1930).
84 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944).
5MD. AcTs ch. 254 (1929), quoted not 12 supra.
88 Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 at 551 (1930).
87Ibid. Also cited in Clemens v. District Court, 390 P.2d 83, 89 (Colo. 1964).
88 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963) supra note 4.
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It is also apparent from the entire Grote opinion, that the court
considered the actual receipt of notice by the defendant necessary
to comport with the requirements of due process.89 That the Colo-
rado court read the Grote opinion in this manner, also, is supported
by the quote from Kurrilla9 ° immediately following the Grote
citation.9'
In Kurrilla, the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether substituted service of process upon a soldier on active
duty, served by leaving a copy of summons and complaint at the
home of the soldier's mother and stepfather, was within the statu-
tory provisions for such service at a person's "usual place of abode. "92
After construing " 'usual place of abode,' [as] the place where one
is 'actually living' at the time when service is made," 3 the court
deemed the return of service to be false, and ruled that the service
must be set aside."
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Court considered the
due process requirements of notice.
The general rule in regard to the service of process, established
by centuries of precedent, is that process must be served personally,
within the jurisdiction of the court, upon the person to be affected
thereby. Substituted or constructive service, when provided by
statute, is in derogation of the general rule, and so the statutory
directions must be strictly construed and fully carried out to confer
jurisdiction. (Citations omitted.) The construction and appli-
cation of R.S. 2:27-59, N.J.S.A., supra, must comport with the
fundamentals of due process. The design of provisions for such
substituted service is to afford the defendant actual notice of the
action in time to make defense, if he so chooses, and thus to serve
the essential purpose of personal service. The principle of reason-
able notice is of the essence. The object of all process is to impart
to the person affected notice of the proceeding and an opportunity
to defend; and the sufficiency of the statutory substitute for per-
sonal service depends upon whether it is reasonably calculated to
provide the defendant with notice of the action or proceeding and
an opportunity to be heard. (Citations omitted.)
95
a9 See discussion by Clifford supra note 38, at 326-27.
90 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1944).
91 390 P.2d at 90.
2N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:27-59 (1937).
93 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 864 (1944).
94Id. at 865.
5 Id. at 865.
" Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). In Blackmer, the designation by
Congress of consuls to serve subpoenas upon citizens of the United States was found
not to violate due process. In dictum the court states "The efficacy of an attempt
to provide constructive service in this country would rest upon the presumption that
the notice would be given in a manner calculated to reach the witness abroad."
Blackmer v. United States, supra at 439.
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To support its statement of the law relating to notice, the court
relied upon three decisions by the Supreme Court: Blackman v.
United States,9" Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v.
Superior Court,"1 and McDonald v. McBee. Of these decisions, only
McDonald appears relevant to the discussion, and the criterion laid
down by Justice Holmes there has since been superseded by Wuch-
ter.9 The most serious objection to the use of Kurrilla to support
the reasoning in Clemens, however, is that the conclusion reached
therein is inimical to the ultimate holding of unconstitutionality in
Clemens. Although the discussion of the requirement of notice in
Kurrilla was not necessary to support the decision to set aside service
of process - service being valid only at one's actual place of
abode"°° -, nevertheless, the same reasoning applied to the Colo-
rado Act' would have led to a holding of constitutionality. The
New Jersey statute was deemed constitutional and not at variance
97 Washington ex rel Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1933). The court determined that a state statute providing for substituted service
on a corporation which had previously done business in the state and which had
since removed without leaving an agent upon whom service could be served, was
not in violation of due process even though no provision for securing notice to the
corporation was provided in the statute. The Court stated:
The power of the State altogether to exclude the corporation, and the
consequent ability to condition its entrance into the State, distinguishes this
case from those involving substituted service upon individuals . . . whose
entrance into a State may render them amenable to action there, only if the
statute providing for substituted service incorporates reasonable provision
for giving the defendant notice of the initiation of litigation, Hess v. Paw-
laski, 274 U.S. 352. Washington ex rel Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v.
Superior Court, supra at 365-66.
At no point, however, did the Court deem actual notice a prerequisite to valid
substituted service of process.
98 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). Justice Holmes declared invalid a judge-
ment on a personal note where service on the defendant was effected by publica-
tion subsequent to the time when the defendant had removed from Texas and estab-
lished domicile in Missouri.
9 Although some of the language in both Hess and Wuchter could be construed to
support a conclusion that actual notice is required, modern authorities simply do not
support such a conclusion. Reading the cases in context, the most that can be divined
is that a statute ". . . must, in order to be valid, contain a provision making it
reasonably probab!e that notice . . . will be communicated to the nonresident defend-
ant who is sued.'' Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18 (1928).
The generally accepted modern statement of the standard to be applied to notice
is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 75, Comment e, p. 94
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956):
It is not necessary that the defendant should have received actual knowl-
edge of the action in which the judgment was rendered. It is sufficient that
the steps taken to give him notice of the action and an opportunity to be
heard satisfy the requirements of the rule of this Section.
For jurisdictions not following the RESTATEMENT rule see Gibbons, A Survey oj
the Modern Nonresident Motorists Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 257, 267 (1960) and
jox, Non-Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts: Notice Requirements- A Plea
for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151, 178 (1963).
100 See textual discussion, pp. 232-33 supra.
"I CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-8-4 (1963), supra note 4.
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with the requirement of actual notice, because service would be valid
only if served at one's actual place of abode. Similarly, since the
Colorado Act provided for service of process sent by registered
mail to one's "last known address,""1 2 this address, under the Ku'rilla
rationale, would be one's actual address; and notice would be actual
notice.
Disregarding the inapplicability or imprecise application of
the Grote and Kurrilla cases by the court, however, the question of
whether or not the provisions for notice contained in the Colorado
Nonresident Motorist Act meet the requirement of due process
still remains. The Act, in pertinent part, provides:
... the court shall . . . enter an order ex parte setting forth the
last known address of the defendant and authoribing service to be
made on the secretary of state. Service shall be made by delivering
two copies of the process, complaint, motion and order of court
to the secretary of state, his deputy or assistant .... Notice of such
service and a copy of each instrument so served shall forthwith be
sent by the secretary of state by certified or registered mail,
addressed to the defendant at his address given in the order of
court, with return receipt requested. Promptly after such mailing
the secretary of state shall file with the clerk of the court a certifi-
cate showing such mailing. Service shall be complete thirty days
after service of process on the secretary of stale as provided in
this section. (Emphasis supplied.) 103
It is clear from the portion just quoted that the act must be classi-
fied with those from other states which provide that notice be sent
to the defendant's "last known address." It is clear froma the
Clemens opinion that the court did not consider this aspect of the
Colorado Act. The court did consider, however, that the service
provisions did not provide for filing the return receipt, and that
service on the secretary of state was deemed complete regardless of
whether or not the receipt was returned or whether or not notice
had been imparted." 4
Although the court throughout the second portion of the
opinion professed belief in the principle that the notice required
need not be actual,' the conclusion reached was that anything
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 390 P.2d at 90.
Though Chapter 75 requires that the papers be sent by certified or
registered mail, "with return receipt requested," it makes no provision as to
the disposition to be made by the secretary of state of the "return receipt."
The statute provides that the secretary of state shall "promptly" after such
mailing certify as to the fact of mailing. It necessarily follows that if the
secretary of state "promptly" makes his certificate of service, he will have
done so before he could receive any "return receipt" as requested.
105 Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm Jurisdiction," 37 U. CoLo. L. Rrv. 309 (1965).
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short of actual notice would be deficient. " Having reached this
conclusion, it is unfortunate that the court failed to consider the
implications of the last "known address" aspect of the act. As noted
in the discussion of Kurrilla,I°" which is typical of cases construing
"last known address" acts, the orthodox approach would be to
require that the address to which notice was sent to be the actual
address in fact. 8 Applying this rationale it would be possible to
uphold the constitutionality of the act while refusing to allow
service on a particular defendant who did not receive actual notice
of the suit.
While notice of suit actually acquired, but without the terms
of a statute providing for substituted service, cannot give validity
to a statute which is constitutionally deficient,"8 it should be noted
that Clemens had actually obtained notice of the suit and promptly
moved to "quash" service. At least one case,"' involving a statute
not unlike that in Clemens," considered the filing of such a motion
as evidence that service of process had been in fact received. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated therein:
A letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed is presumed to
have reached the addressee, although this presumption is not con-
clusive, but is founded upon the probability that the Postal Depart-
ment will properly discharge its duties. . . . This presumption is
strengthened where the letter was registered, indeed, it is not
contended here that there was no actual delivery. Defendants rest
their case alone upon the fact that this return receipt has not been
filed, a requirement, as we have seen, not written into our statute.
Not only does it contain reasonable provisions for probable com-
munications, but the conduct of the parties indicates communication
106 See textual discussion, pp. 232-33 supra. The court stated at page 90:
We are not unmindful of the fact that courts of last resort of many
states have held that procedures such as those had here and statutes bearing
marked similarity to Chapter 75 are valid and not lacking in due process.
Our reasoning and analysis of the problems presented lead us to contrary
conclusions.
Here, proceeding under the statute, service was had on two defendants;
one received notice, the other did not. Though the effectiveness of pro-
cedures prescribed should not be finally adjudged on results attained in an
isolated case, the result here attained does cast grave doubt on the effective-
ness of the methods provided and pursued.
107 Kurrilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A.2d 862 (1964), and textual discussion
pp. 234-35 supra.
108 Gibbons, A Survey o1 the Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REv.
257, 266-69 (1960).
109 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928).
110 Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S.E. 644 (1939).
111 CODE OF VIRGINIA § 8-67.2 (1957).
... [sluch service shall be sufficient upon the said nonresident, pro-
vided, that notice of such service and a copy of the process or notice are




was actually had. Counsel promptly appeared, and while their
special appearance did not waive the claim that this return receipt
should have been filed, it did indicate reasonable probability that
process had been received, not through random chance, as was true
in Wuchter v. Pizzutti ... but because there had been compliance
with an adequate statute."2
While it is true that Clemens did not receive the registered
letter addressed to him -the court stated, "The record does not
shed any light on what may have become of the letter directed to
Clemens." '13 - the reasoning in the Virginia decision with respect
to the filing of a return receipt appears valid." ' Furthermore, it
would not seem unjust to place upon a prospective defendant the
burden of making his latest address available to one who may have
a valid claim to assert."' Certainly, a liberal construction based
upon the statutory provision for extensions and continuence". could
afford adequate safeguards for one who had, as did Clemens, notice
of the suit.
Earlier some attempt was made to determine legislative intent
with regard to those persons over whom the legislature had sought
to exercise jurisdiction."' The same question now arises with regard
to the changes which the 1961 Act made in the provisions relating
to service of process.118 There would seem to be no doubt that the
intent was to broaden the scope of the act." 9 Nevertheless, investi-
gation by this writer has failed to disclose the purpose behind the
112 Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S.E. 644, 647 (1939).
113 390 P.2d at 90.
14In Speer v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960), the court
stated:
Securing a return receipt and filing it with the court clerk is not a pre-
requisite [to due process) ; it is only one of the possible provisions which
may be adopted. No case making it a prerequisite has been cited or found.
189 F. Supp. 434.
For further discussion see Comment, 42 DEN. L.C.J. 156-60 (1965).
115 See generally, Jox, Non-Resident Motorist Service of Process Acts: Notice Require-
ments - A Plea for Realism, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963).
"1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-8-5 (1963).
117 See discussion note 17 supra.
118 Colo. Sess. Laws 1937, § 3, at 324.
Service of such process shall be made by leaving a copy of the process
...with the secretary of state, or in his office, and such service shall be
sufficient service upon such nonresident defendant ... provided, that notice
of such service and a copy of the process are forthwith sent by registered
mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt
or, in the event the defendant refuses to accept such registered mail, the
registered mail with his refusal thereon and the plaintiff's affidavit of
compliance herewith are filed with the papers in the case on or before the
return day of the process, or within such further time as the court may
allow ....
119 See generally, Clifford, supra note 105 at 323-26.
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changes effected."' It would not seem to be illogical, in view of
the similarity between the Virginia Act 2' and the 1961 Act, to con-
clude that a similar design was desired by the 1961 General Assem-
bly; this design would be particularly true in view of the interpre-
tation placed upon the Virginia Act.
Stephen G. Heady
INSURANCE - OMNIBUS CLAUSE - PERMISSIVE USE IS THE
PROPER TEST OF COVERAGE UNDER PUBLIC AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES AND MINOR DEVIATION RULE APPLIED IN
DETERMINING WHETHER A DEVIATION FROM THE PERMITTED USE
PRECLUDES COVERAGE UNDER THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE.
American Bus Lines, Inc. v. American Surety Co. 238 F. Supp. 589
(D. Colo. 1965).
A State Highway Department employee was directed to take
a truck from Berthoud Pass to Denver for the purpose of having
the truck's radio repaired and then to return to Berthoud Pass. Upon
arriving in Denver, the employee first visited his parent's home and
then reported to the highway shops. The radio work was completed
shortly before noon, but instead of returning to his work station in
Berthoud Pass, he visited a friend's home where he drank a few
bottles of beer.
About four o'clock p.m. he left his friend's home and started
on his return trip to Berthoud Pass. While traveling the very high-
way which would have returned him to his work station, his truck
collided with a bus owned by the American Bus Lines, Inc. The
state employee was killed and the administrator of his estate brought
this action for a declaratory judgment as to the coverage under a
120 It is known that the legislation was proposed by the Colorado Bar Association but
since no legislative history is available in Colorado, it is impossible to go further.
See Menard, Legislation and the Colorado Supreme Court- Techniques of Statutory
Construction, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 425, 433-35 (1954).
121 See textual discussion, pp. 236-37 supra.
122 390 P.2d at 91.
' Schultz v. Krosch, 204 Minn. 585, 284 N.W. 782 (1939): In defining the purpose
of the "omnibus clause," the court held, "the effect of the omnibus clause was to
extend the insurance coverage to any person while using the automobile with the
consent of the named insured." See generally 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
P .CTIcE, §§ 4366-4368 (1962); 12 COUCH, INSURANCE, §§ 45: 463-45-468 (2d
ed. 1964); Austin, Permissive Use Under The Omnibus Clause of The Automobile
Liability Policy, 29 INS. COUNSEL J. 49 (1962); Dimond, The New Standard Auto-
mobile Policy, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 67 (1956) ; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 604 (1949).
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liability policy containing an omnibus clause' issued by the defendant
to the State.
The Colorado Federal District Court, Doyle, J., held that the
proper test of liability coverage for an employee is "permissive use"
rather than "scope of employment" and that the employee's use of
the highway department vehicle, at the time of the accident, was with
the state's permission and hence he was covered by the policy.'
The defendant argued that "scope of employment"3 should be
the proper test of liability coverage rather than "permissive use"4
because the statute5 authorizing the purchase of the insurance al-
lowed the state purchasing agent to obtain insurance for the purpose
of insuring officers, employees, and agents against liability "for in-
juries or damages resulting from their negligence or other tortious
conduct during the course of their service of employment."
The court listed the following reasons for rejecting this con-
tention: (1) the statute is an authorization statute and was not
designed to limit the scope of coverage; (2) the defense of ultra vires
belongs to the State of Colorado and not to the defendant insurance
company; (3) the insurance company is estopped from denying
coverage because the contract was presumably written by it with
full knowledge of the law, a consensual act on its part; and (4)
the Colorado Safety Responsibility Act 6 requires that a permission
clause be included in all liability policies.
Although the first three reasons offered by the court are not
2 American Bus Lines, Inc. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 238 F. Supp. 589
(D. Colo. 1965).
3 Gray v. Sawatzki, 291 Mich, 491, 289 N.W. 227 (1939): In this master and servant
case, the court held that when the employee is outside the scope of employment, he
is outside the employer's consent.
4Messer v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 19, 241 S.W.2d 856 (1951):
The court in this case employed the "permissive use" test and held that coverage
would be allowed where the use of the vehicle, at the time of the accident, was with
the permission of the named insured.
5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 72-16-2 (1963) provides:
The head of a department of the State of Colorado, with the approval of
the governor, or in the case of the county or city and county, the chief
executive officer or county commissioner, and subject to appropriations
being available therefor, is hereby authorized to procure insurance, through
the state purchasing agent as provided in chapter 3, article 4, C.R.S. 1963,
for the purpose of insuring its officers, employees, and agents against any
liability, other than a liability which may be insured against under the pro-
visions of "The workmen's compensation act of Colorado," for injuries
or damages resulting from their negligence or other tortious conduct during
the course of their service or employment. Counties or cities and counties
are hereby authorized to insure their officers, employees, and agents against
similar liabilities.
6 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-7-22 (c) (1963) provides:
Said policy shall insure the person named therein and any other person
using or responsible for the use of said motor vehicle or motor vehicles with
the express or implied permission of said insured.
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without support,' the most persuasive is the fourth. It is generally
recognized that the purpose of such a statute is to guard against the
defense that the insured was not operating the vehicle personally or
through an agent, although it was being operated by another with
his express or implied consent.8 Such statutes have received liberal
constructions.'
In the present case the employee was given initial permission
to use the insured state vehicle. To obtain coverage under the "om-
nibus clause," the deceased employee's administrator had to show
that the employee's use of the vehicle, at the time of the accident,
was with the permission of the State of Colorado. The defendant
insurance company contended that this requirement could not be
satisfied because the employee had placed himself outside of the
1scope of permission" - the permission granted to the employee
did not include the right to make personal trips nor the right to use
intoxicants and, furthermore, the State Highway Department Regu-
lations prohibited the use of state vehicles for pleasure and the use
of intoxicants while driving a state vehicle.
In resolving the question presented by this case - whether a
deviation in time, purpose, or geographical limits from the permitted
use precludes coverage under the "omnibus clause" - the courts
have adopted three different rules."0 Some courts have used the
"Liberal Rule"" which holds that once permission is given, it will
extend to any and all uses of the car, regardless of how grossly
7See statute cited note 5 supra as supporting the court's first reason. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-2-5 (1963) provides support for the court's second reason:
'(1) (a) No act of a corporation ...shall be invalid by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act . . ., but
such lack of capacity or power may be asserted: ... (d) In a proceeding by
the attorney general as provided in this code, to dissolve the corporation, or
in a proceeding by the attorney general to enjoin the corporation from the
transaction of unauthorized business.
Davis v. National Cas. Co., 115 Minn. 125, 131 N.W. 1013 (1911) and Knott v.
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 161 Mo. App. 579, 144 S.W. 178 (1912) provide sup-
port for the court's third reason.
8 Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Halifax Fire Ins. Co., 281 N.Y.S. 193, 245 App. Div. 279,
affd, 272 N.Y. 457, 3 N.E.2d 867 (1936) ; Sears v. Maryland Cas. Co., 220 N.C. 9,
16 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
9 Chatfield v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Indi-
ana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 230 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1956).
10 Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356, 357 (1939): In dis-
cussing the three rules, the court stated:
There are three lines of authorities on this question under the usual omnibus
clause, (1) those holding any deviation, no matter how slight, will defeat
liability; (2) those holding that once permission is given, it will extend to
any and all uses of the car; and (3) those holding that slight deviation does
not violate the omnibus clause.
"Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Collins, 96 F.2d 83 (Sth Cir. 1938) ; Karton v. New
Amsterdam Gas. Co., 280 Ill. App. 201 (1935); Thomas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 121
So. 2d 593 (La. App. 1960); Foley v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co., 193 Tenn. 206,
245 S.W.2d 202 (1951); Maurer v. Fesing, 233 Wis. 565, 290 N.W. 191 (1940).
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the terms of the original permission may have been violated. Others
have adhered to the "Conversion Rule," sometimes called the "Strict
Rule,"'" which holds the use to be nonpermissive where it exceeds
the "scope of permission" given to such an extent as would render
a bailee liable in an action for conversion. A third group has adopted
the "Minor Deviation Rule.""3 Under this rule, if the use is not a
gross violation of the permitted use, even though it may have
amounted to a deviation, the permitee is still afforded coverage.
In the present case, the employee's personal trips constituted
deviations in time, purpose, and geographical limits from the permit-
ted use. Since it is the use at the time of the accident that governs
coverage under the "omnibus clause,"' 4 the deviations in purpose
and geographical limits are insignificant because the employee was
returning to his work station on a direct route at the time of the
accident.
The court held that the employee's use of intoxicants did not
void permission nor the coverage because such a use would not
place an employee outside the "scope of employment,"'" a fortiori,
it would not place him beyond permission. There is also some direct
authority that drinking on the job in violation of an employer's
rule does not terminate permission.'
The last deviation to be considered, the time deviation, presented
the most difficult problem in this case. At the time of the accident
there was approximately a four hour time deviation. The court,
while not expressly adopting any of the three rules previously men-
tioned, held that this deviation did not operate to remove the em-
ployee from the "scope of permission."
Before determining what rule the court, by implication, adopted
in the present case, attention should be directed to the fact that
12Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Rivet, 89 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Hodges v. Ocean Acc.
& Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28 (1941); Hinchey v. National Sur.
Co., 99 N.H. 373, 111 A.2d 827 (1955); Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Lahman, 169 Okla. 380, 36 P.2d 274 (1934); Foote v. Grant, 56 Wash. 2d 630,
354 P.2d 893 (1960).
13 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Williams, 184 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1950); Dickinson v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 At. 866 (1924); Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn.
437, 232 N.W. 790 '(1930) ; Costanzo v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 30 N.J. 262, 152 A.2d 589 (1959); Matits v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 59 N.J. Super. 373, 157 A.2d 853 (1960) ; Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh,
184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356 (1939).
14 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marshbank, 226 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1955); Johnson v. Ameri-
can Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 Atl. 496 (1932) ; Johnston v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 200 N.C. 763, 158 S.E. 473 (1931); Messer v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 193 Tenn. 19, 241 S.W.2d 856 (1951); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Peach,
193 Va. 260, 68 S.E.2d 520 (1952).
15 Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 391 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1964).
16New York Cas. Co. v. Lewellen, 184 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1950); cf. Zurich Gen.
Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 449 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1931).
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these attempts at classification are of necessity inexact and can be
used only as a guide to the question involved." The three rules
frequently overlap and it cannot always be determined into which
category the decisions of a given jurisdiction fall.'8
It seems dear that the "Liberal Rule" was not adopted by the
court in this case. Although under that rule the result would have
been the same, no mention of the rule was made by the court and
considerable attention was devoted to the character of the use of
the vehicle after the court took notice of the fact that initial per-
mission had been given.
Under a stringent application of the "Conversion Rule," it
seems that the court could have denied the plaintiff recovery.' The
decision in favor of coverage and the noticeable omission of any
discussion of the rule leaves the impression that it was not adopted
by the court.
The last rule to be considered, the "Minor Deviation Rule,"
appears to be the rule that the court adopted. While the court did
not mention the "Liberal" or the "Conversion" rule, it did discuss
the "Minor Deviation Rule" in somewhat favorable terms and the
result in this case is in accord with that rule - there was a deviation
from the permitted use; the deviation was found to be insignificant;
and the permittee was held to be within the "scope of permission."
17 Gulla v. Reynolds, 82 Ohio App. 243, 81 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1948): "The judicial
struggling to formulate a rule may be accounted for by reason of this being a factual
question and the cases show an infinite variety of circumstances.-
18 See Harper v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 111 N.W.2d 480
(1961).
19 See Bekaert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1956): Ten
and one-half hour time deviation barred recovery. Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales
Corp., 11 Cal. 2d 64, 77 P.2d 1059 (1938): Permitee granted permission to use car
for two hours; accident occurred twenty-three hours later. The court held that the
use was nonpermissive. Di Rebaylio v. Herndon, 6 Cal. App. 2d 567, 44 P.2d 581
(1935): Time deviation of approximately twenty-four hours held to preclude cover-
age. Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d 28 (1941):
Employee permitted to drive to and from work but instructed not to drive at night
or on Sundays. The accident occurred one Sunday afternoon. It was held not covered.
Ranthum v. Ferguson, 202 Minn. 209, 277 N.W. 547 (1938): The court denied
recovery because of a purpose and two and one-half hour time deviation. Speidel v.
Kellum, 340 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1960); Detour of two and one-half miles was
a material deviation and resulted in denial of coverage. Sauriolle v. O'Gorman,
86 N.H. 39, 163 At. 717 (1932): Master held not liable when servant deviated
one-half mile for his own purpose. Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 P.2d 55
(1932): Employee given permission to use car for one-half hour to do some shopping.
Four hours after receiving possession of car, while driving her mother from a park
to her home, the employee was involved in an accident. The court held that she was
not covered under the "omnibus clause." Collins v. New York Cas. Co., 140 W. Va.
1, 82 S.E.2d 288 (1954): In adopting the "minor deviation rule," the court held
that the permittee's use was nonpermissive when he was responsible for a purpose
deviation and a four and one-half hour time deviation. Boehringer v. Continental
C-9s. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 201, 96 N.W.2d 353 (1959): Employee was given permission
to drive truck on route between employer's plant and a paper mill approximately
six-hundred feet away. He used truck to go home to pick up his lunch and on the
way back, when he was eight or nine blocks from the company, he had an accident.
The court held his use of the truck was nonpermissive.
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The court's decision, in adopting the "Minor Deviation Rule,"
is sound; although this rule is criticized for being subject to un-
certainty, it avoids the harsh results of the "Conversion Rule" and
the abuses of the "Liberal Rule," and it is more in accord with the
intentions of the parties. The propriety of the court's decision in
holding the deviation in the present case to be minor is supported
by the authorities.? Most of the cases holding a time deviation to
be nonpermissive involve much longer periods of time, or else they
have the support of additional deviations in purpose and geograph-
ical limits."
The significance of this case lies in the fact that it is a case
of first impression in Colorado on the question of deviation from
permissive use; that is, deviation in time, purpose, or geographical
limits as distinguished from the question involved where the permittee
delegates the use of the vehicle to a third person.' Whether the
Colorado state courts will follow this case remains to be seen. For
the present, however, the "Minor Deviation Rule" appears to be
in effect in the Colorado Federal District Court, and that court has
definitely adopted the "permissive use" test rather than the "scope
of employment" test to determine coverage under public automobile
liability insurance policies.
Lester D. Bailey
PROBATE - JURISDICTION - DISINTERMENT - THE Dis-
TRICT COURT HAS STATEWIDE JURISDICTION IN PROBATE MATTERS
TO ALLOW DISINTERMENT IN A PROPER CASE. Beere v. Miller, 403
P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
A husband and wife were killed in an automobile accident. The
wife's will, containing a clause leaving Texas property held in joint
tenancy with her husband to her husband, if he survived her, was
filed for probate. The sons and only heirs of the husband filed a
petition in the probate court for an order to exhume the body of
their stepmother along with an affidavit from a pathologist indi-
cating that an autopsy could determine how long each survived
after the accident. The trial court dismissed the petition. The sons
sought relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the district court
to exercise its proper jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
finding that the sons were proper parties, had standing in the
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ewing v. Colorado Farm Mut. Cas. Co., 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956).
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estate, and had an interest in the distribution of the property in the
estate, held that the district court had state-wide jurisdiction to issue
the order for disinterment and ordered that mandamus issue.1
Prior to the adoption of the new judicial amendment of 1965,2
county courts had original jurisdiction in all matters of probate3 and
this jurisdiction was construed to be limited." The judicial amend-
ment of 1965, article VI, section 9 provides: "The district courts
shall be trial courts of record with general jurisdiction and shall
have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, and criminal cases
Subsequent to similar changes in their judicial structures, some
states have held that in exercising probate jurisdiction, a court of
general jurisdiction does not have general powers, but only those
powers formerly exercised by county courts sitting in probate.' Be-
cause probate jurisdiction of county courts in Colorado was construed
to be limited,' the effect of the fusion of probate jurisdiction with
the district court's general jurisdiction seemed unclear. Beere v.
Miller, however, specifically resolved any doubts concerning the
probate jurisdiction of the district courts when it said, "[Ilt is to be
noted that the petition . . . was filed subsequent to the effective
date of . . . Article VI, section 9. The matter being then before
the district court, that court has state-wide jurisdiction to issue
orders of the kind sought here."' Therefore, although the Beere
case could have interpreted the constitutional amendment as having
no effect upon the limited nature of probate jurisdiction, the court
instead held that the general jurisdiction of the district court extends
to matters of probate under the new amendment.
Although in Beere the court was presented with only a juris-
I Beere v. Miller, 403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
2 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
8 COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23:
County courts shall be courts of record and shall have original jurisdiction
in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, appoint-
ment of guardians, conservators and administrators, and settlement of their
accounts, and such other civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred
by law; provided, such courts shall not have jurisdiction in any case where
the debt, damage, or claim or value of property involved shall exceed two
thousand dollars, except in cases relating to the estates of deceased persons.
4 Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952) ; Wright v. Wright, 11
Colo. App. 470, 53 Pac. 684 (1898); Marshall v. Marshall, 11 Colo. App. 505,
53 Pac. 617 (1898).
SIn re Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 69 Pac. 412 (1902) ; In re Sprigg's Estate, 68
Mont. 92, 216 Pac. 1108 (1923); SIMES, MODEL PROBATE CODE p. 4 2 6 (1946).
6 Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952); Wright v. Wright, 11
Colo. App. 470, 53 Pac. 684 (1898); Marshall v. Marshall, I1 Colo. App. 505,
53 Pac. 617 (1898).
7 403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
8 Id. at 863.
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dictional question, strong dictum would indicate that exhumation
would be proper in such a case. The court stated that,
Without the evidence which they [the sons] seek to present to the
court they may be deprived of their interest in the Texas property
in which they have some claim. The extent of their interest would
depend upon the question of survivorship, and the evidence on
this vital issue is necessary for the court to make proper distribu-
tion under the will.
The only apparent reason for the court to make the above-quoted
statement would have been to express its approval of disinterment.
The court, supplying the rationale for allowing disinterment, be-
lieved that a determination of which spouse survived was a vital
issue and that justice demanded that exhumation be ordered to make
proper distribution for the estate. After supplying the propriety for
issuing the order for disinterment, the court stated that, "[the dis-
trict] court has state-wide jurisdiction to issue orders of the kind
sought here,"" indicating that a district court sitting in probate has
the power to order a body exhumed and an autopsy performed.
There has never been a reported Colorado case in which the
power of a court to exhume a body for evidentiary purposes has
been in issue. However, other jurisdictions have recognized that
after its interment the body is in the custody of the law, and a
disturbance of its resting place and its removal is subject to the
control and direction of a court of equity in any case properly
before it.'2
Although the power of a court to order disinterment and au-
topsy or examination for evidential purposes has been denied in a
few cases,'3 it has been recognized in many more." The power to
9 ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928) ("A
dead human body, once buried is the custody of the law .. ").
'2 Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 Atl. 745 (1928)
'("[Aind removal and disturbance of such body is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court of equity . ) ; Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W. Va. 315, 106 S.E. 705 (1921).
3 Tsaraclis v. Characklis, 176 Md. 28, 3 A.2d 725 (1939) (An orphan's court was held
not to have authority to order a grave opened for inspection to determine whether
charges for burial were excessive. It is to be noted, however, that the basis for the
decision was that the orphan's court was one of specified powers and this power was
not within those specified.) ; Homes v. New York, 180 Misc. 364, 42 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1943) ; Crispo v. St. Mary's Cemetery Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N.Y.S.2d 70
(1940); In re Dinkel & Jewell Co., 198 N.Y.S. 831 (1923); Danahy v. Kellogg,
70 Misc. 25, 126 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (1910) ("This is the first application of this
kind ever made, so far as we are aware. We are of the opinion the application of
the defendant should be denied; but, in denying the motion, we base our decision
squarely upon the absence of any right or authority in the court to grant the inspec-
tion asked.").
14The question of the right to exhume a body for the purpose of discovery is covered
in the annotations at 21 A.L.R.2d 538 (1952).
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order disinterment has been recognized to ascertain the cause of
death, 5 to determine the nature of injuries,"' to determine heirship,"
7
and generally to determine any material facts in litigation." How-
ever, the court will refuse to exercise the power where a proper case
for its exercise is not made out.' A proper case is made out when
there is strong reason to believe that fraud is involved," when every
other method of obtaining the evidence has been exhausted,
2" when
the issue in question can be proven or disproven by an examination
of the body,' when that issue is material and can be proven or re-
futed by no other evidence,23 and when justice demands that the
order should be made. 4 However, there is no universal rule to
determine the propriety of issuing the order; each case depends
upon its own facts and circumstances.' Perhaps Professor Wigmore
most aptly states the propriety of ordering disinterment when he
reasons that,
The exhumation or the autopsy of a corpse, when useful to ascertain
facts in litigation, should of course be performed. Reverence for
the memory of those who have departed does not require us to
abdicate the higher duty of doing justice to the living; and the
order of a court of justice, exercising the power of the state in the
communal interest, are not to be placed on the same level with
15 Radomer Russ-Pol Unterstitzung Verein v. Posner, 176 Md. 332, 4 A.2d 743 (1939);
Painter v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 Ad. 158 (1914); Kusky
v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (1950); Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v.
Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928).
16 Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (1950).
' Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178
Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); In re Percival, 101 S.C. 198, 85 S.E. 247
(1915).
18 State v. Wood, 127 Me. 197, 142 Atl. 728 (1928); Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178 Neb.
109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142
Pac. 472 (1914).
19 Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Kilek, 102 N.J. Eq. 588, 141 At. 745 (1928) (good
cause and urgent necessity for the exhumation of the body and an autopsy did not
exist) ; State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472, 474 (1914)
(Where no strong showing is made that the facts sought would be established by
an examination of such body it will be refused.).
2 0 Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Grangers' Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 57 Miss. 308, 34 Am. Rep. 446 (1879).
21 Ullendorff v. Brown, ibid.; Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, ibid.; Crispo v. St.
Mary's Cemetery Ass'n, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N.Y.S. 70 (1940); State ex rel.
Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472 (1914).
22 Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945); Stastny v. Tachovsky,
178 Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964); Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74
A.2d 546 (1950).
2 Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 57 Miss. 308, 34 Am. Rep. 446 (1879); State
ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 81 Wash. 324, 142 Pac. 472 (1914).
24 Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So. 2d 37 (1945) ; Painter v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 At. 158 (1914); Grangers' Life Ins. Co. v.
Brown, ibid.; Stastny v. Tachovsky, 178 Neb. 109, 132 N.W.2d 317 (1964): Kuskv
v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (15 0; In re D..ke. & Te-.. ..
N.Y.S. 831 (1923) ; State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, ibid.
25Bunol v. Bunol, 12 La. App. 675, 127 So. 70 (1930); Lavigne v. Wilkinson, 80
N.H. 221, 116 Atl. 32 (1921) ; Moore v. Sheafer, 282 Pa. 360, 127 At. 784 (1925).
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the acts of an unlicensed and self-seeking intruder upon hallowed
ground.2
Beere v. Miller27 also contains an interesting procedural issue
which the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McWilliams points out.
To avail themselves of discovery under Rule 34 of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure,28 the petitioners must be parties to the
probate proceeding. 9 Generally one becomes a party to a probate
proceeding by being named in the petition for probate" or by filing
a caveat to the will.31 Of course, one could also become a party
by intervening in the probate proceeding. 2 The contention of the
dissenting opinion is that instead of availing themselves of any of
the above procedures, the petitioners merely alleged in their peti-
tion to exhume that they were interested parties.
The majority opinion did not discuss this procedural point and
held that the petitioners were proper parties to the proceeding. The
majority may have reasoned that a probate proceeding is a proceed-
ing in rem in which any interested party may take part.33 Consider-
ing the fact that a person in interest is defined by statute" as an
"heir, legatee, devisee, spouse, and his personal representative, and
creditor, or any other person having a property right in or claim
against the estate of a decedent ... ," it is obvious that the peti-
tioners met the requirements since they qualify as "any other person
having a property right." The majority noted,
If, therefore, the evidence sought by these petitioners established
that their father survived their stepmother, title to the property
would vest in him as a surviving joint tenant and petitioners would
have an interest in either the entirety of the property or possibly in
6 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2221 at 197 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27403 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1965).
28 Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of rule 30(b), the court
in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and,
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which con-
stitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted under rule 26(b) and which are in his posses-
sion, custody, or control....
2 Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1940)
(Rule 34 authorizing production of documents and things for inspection, is limited
to parties) ; Park Bridge Corp. v. Elias, 3 F.R.D. 93 (D.N.Y. 1943).
30 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-22 (1963); PARKS, COLORADO PROBATE PRACTICE
MANUAL § 4.5 at 75 (1964) ; "It would appear that the petition for probate func-
tions as the complaint, that the caveat is the answer ... "
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-33 (1963) ; PARKS, op. cit. supra note 30, § 4.5 (1964).
32 COLO. R. Civ. P. 24.
33
Hoff v. Ambruster, 125 Colo. 324, 244 P.2d 1069 (1952); ATKINSON, WILLS
§ 95 at 493 (1953) ; 43 MICH. L. REV. 675 (1945).
34 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-1-1 (12) (1963).
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one-half thereof, either by Texas law or under the terms of the
will.35
The majority also may have taken into consideration the fact
that the executor seems to have erred in not serving notice upon the
petitioners as heirs of a devisee which would have made them parties.
The executor was apparently acting under the erroneous assumption
that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 6 was controlling. This
act obviously does not control when there is sufficent evidence to
determine which person survived."
Evidence sufficent to controvert the applicability of the Uni-
form Simultaneous Death Act, thus enabling the district court to
make a proper distribution under the will, would be contingent upon
the exhumation and autopsy of the decedent's remains within a
comparatively short period of time following her death. The urgency
inherent in this situation may well have been an additional factor
in the court's dispensing with strict adherence to the procedural
rules.
In holding that district courts have probate jurisdiction as part
of their general jurisdiction, the Beere decision has reached an
excellent result. Mr. Howard Parks in his Colorado Probate Practice
Manual seems to have predicted this result stating that "there ap-
pears to be no probability that the supreme court will reduce the
district courts to courts of limited jurisdiction when sitting in probate,
as has occurred in some states.'"'" Mrs. Parks also believes that, [Tihe
revised judiciary structure of the state will eliminate many of the
problems which existed heretofore because the county courts were
courts of limited jurisdiction."3 This contention seems to be up-
held by the situation presented in the Beere case. A county court
with limited jurisdiction could not exhume a body located in an-
other county while a district court, having state-wide jurisdiction, is
able to order exhumation incident to a probate proceeding. Thus, a
district court sitting in probate could receive evidence needed for
a proper distribution of the estate.
It would seem that the Beere case could be cited with confidence
as an example of approval by the Supreme Court of Colorado of
disinterment for evidentiary purposes when a proper case is before
it. As has been pointed out, other jurisdictions have recognized the
power of a court to order disinterment for evidentiary purposes and
35403 P.2d 862, 863 (Colo. 1965).
36 COLO. R V. STAT. §§ 153-18-1 to -8.
37 Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).




now it seems that there is also a Colorado case which could be used
as precedent for the exercise of such a power.
Although the majority of the court did not discuss the procedural
point highlighted in the dissenting opinion, it would seem, at least
by implication, that liberal procedures in probate courts could be
followed. The majority apparently believed that any interested per-
son could become a party to a probate proceeding by alleging an in-
terest in the estate and showing that his interest may be adversely
affected. It should be noted that the petitioners in the Beere case
did not become parties to the probate proceeding by being named
in the petition for probate, nor by filing a caveat, nor by intervening
in the proceeding, but rather by merely alleging their interest in the
petition to exhume. This result follows the principle that probate
procedures are established for the purpose of providing an orderly
manner in which to conduct the administration of estates and should




Judicial Control of Administrative Action
By Louis L. JAFFE
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The Ombudsman, Citizen's Defender
EDITED BY DONALD C. ROWAT
London: George Allen & Univin, Ltd., 1965. Pp. 348. $8.25
Can the judiciary be counted on to be the official ombudsman of
the citizen? Will the judiciary be the citizen's defender? Neither
of these questions are answered by the authors of the reviewed
books; but both books are illustrative of actual and prospective con-
trol over administrative action.
To say Professor Jaffe's book is the most comprehensive and
analytical approach to the problem of judicial control of administra-
tive action is an understatement. It is the book on the subject.
A series of law review articles, published in the Harvard, Buf-
falo, Michigan and Pennsylvania Law Reviews, heralded the advent
of the work of judicial control of administrative actions. This re-
viewer expected that these articles would be warmed over, expanded
and published as a new statement on the subject -but, such was
not the case. Indeed, in addition to these articles, there are new
chapters entitled "Constitutional Competence of Court and Agency,"
"Judicial Stays Pending Administrative Action," "Temporary Ju-
dicial Stays of Administrative Action" and "Exclusive Jurisdiction
and Remand." In addition, the chapter entitled "The System of
Judicial Remedies" has been completely revised and expanded.
Perhaps the first two chapters of this work, "Introduction: the
Administrative Process" and "Delegation Legislative Power," are the
most important. Therein, the foundation for understanding adminis-
trative actions as well as the judicial checks on those actions are de-
lineated.
The first chapter is a revision of an article which appeared in
the Harvard Law Review.' This chapter describes the role of the ad-
ministrative process in view of what is currently transpiring in the
I Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process.' A Re-evaluation, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1105 (1954).
BOOK REVIEW
world of the administrative agency. Included is a historical develop-
ment of the administrative process and some observations on the
current controversy involving that process. Concluding this chapter,
Jaffe states what most interested parties would perhaps like to know
most, ... are these agencies as we know them 'expert'?"2 This ques-
tion of expertise is the one that most often is asked when the liti-
gating parties go before an administrative tribunal.
In the second chapter, which is also a revision of previous arti-
cles on the delegation of legislative power, the author ponders the
question of whether or not a book whose central theme is the rela-
tionship between court and agency should have a chapter on delega-
tion of powers. His answer is simple:
It is the central theme of this book that agencies and courts are in
a partnership of lawmaking and law applying. The legislative dele-
gation of power is the matrix, the charter as it were of this activity.
If that is so it would seem appropriate to probe the character of the
delegation device.
3
And probe he does. Neatly dissected and lain bare for all to see is
the general theory of delegation as well as the development of the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Succinctly he points out that
while the delegation of power is the dynamo, the power supply to
the administrative agency, the judiciary is the accepted constitutional
circuit-breaker of that power. The constitutional system of checks
and balances is thereby preserved. Furthermore, in spite of criticism
for forcing the legislature to do its job well, the judiciary must con-
tinue to set standards in order that the dynamo of administrative
process does not go unchecked.
What has long been thought to be a problem in the area of ad-
ministrative decisions, the force of res judicata upon the agencies
and the courts, is skirted by the book. In chapters 14 and 15, how-
ever, the consideration of judicial review of questions of law and
questions of fact carries the clear import of such a discussion. Al-
though the words res judicata are not used, the reader cannot escape
the conclusion upon finishing the book that the subject has been
covered.
While ingesting the Jaffe book the reviewer questioned whether
a better way to control administrative action could be provided. If
the control of administrative action is left in the hands of the judici-
ary, the ultimate user of the administrative process is still at the
mercy of a super authority. Since the system of checks and balances
works, if at all, only for those who are checking or balancing, who
2 JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 25 (1965).
3 Id. at vii.
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checks for the ultimate user of the administrative process, the com-
mon man? In many countries it is the obudsman; and it is through
the obudsman that a better method of administrative control may
exist.
Who is the ombudsman? What are his duties? How did the
ombudsman's office come into being? What are his powers? To
whom is he responsible? Ronald C. Rowat's book, The Ombudsman:
Citizen's Defender, answers these questions and asks a few more.
In twenty-nine articles by writers from thirteen different countries
bits and pieces of information explain existent systems employing
the office of ombudsman.
One might say that the ombudsman is the manager of a country's
complaint department. He is an appointed official whose duty it is
to investigate complaints of a private citizen with respect to any
legislative, and presumably administrative, abuse. His powers are
such that he may subpoena witnesses, compel testimony, review
facts, form opinions based on these facts, and publish findings of
fact and opinion. He cannot, however, change a decision nor may
he punish, except by way of publishing his opinion, any person.
The function of the ombudsman is to make the government
aware that abuses have arisen which ought to be corrected. The ad-
ministrative agency which has felt the sting of the ombudsman's
published opinion often sees the wisdom of the opinion and changes
its ways accordingly. The administrative agency, though not bound
by the decisions of the ombudsman, having seen the reasonableness
of the decision, often adopts an action which is more beneficial and
more predictable to the common man.
Though not a part of the law of any nation until first suggested
by the Swedish Constitution of 1809, the office of ombudsman had
as its counterpart the Swedish Supreme Procurator (H6gste Ombuds-
man).' This office created by King Charles XII through his Order
of Chancery in 1713, had as it most important function the twofold
task of supervising the enforcement and compliance by the citizenry
with laws and regulations and the ensurance that all public officials
discharged their duties in a proper manner.
Since that early beginning the office of ombudsman has been
introduced in many nations around the world. In the United States,
California, Connecticut, Illinois and New York (even New York
City has endeavered to establish the office of ombudsman) have
begun the initial establishment of a state ombudsman.
Chapter 3, "Proposed Schemes," insists that it be read. Within
4 ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN, CITIZEN'S DEFENDER 17 (1965).
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this chapter, Representative Henry S. Reuss (D., Wis.) and his
legislative assistant, Everard Munsey, set out their proposed scheme
for an ombudsman in the United States. With some preliminary
discussion of the unsuccessful Philippine Presidential Complaints
and Action Committee, which was abolished because "it was alleged
that its methods of investigation encroached upon the civil liberties
of the citizen,' ' Mr. Reuss proposes that an Administrative Counsel
be established in order that the legislator might help his constituents
while still performing his legislative duties. In the House of Repre-
sentatives the ombudsman sitting on the Administrative Counsel
would perform functions similar to those of his foreign colleagues.
The major criticism of Mr. Reuss' plan is that the ombudsman
would still be a person in the employ of Congress. Thus, in the case
of an uncooperative ombudsman, appropriations could result in his
being put on a starvation diet.
In conclusion, the question is apparently judicial review or om-
budsman checking. Judicial supervision of administrative process
does work; but, only in an agonizingly slow manner. The ombuds-
man is more approachable, and provides less expensive, more direct
and quicker review. Thus, would it not be possible to augment the
judiciary with an independent ombudsman whose very presence
might force the administrative agencies into more predictable actions
- actions reflective of a true measure of justice?
Alphonse Michael Squillante*
5 Id. at 159.
*Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, University of Denver College of Law.
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